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ABSTRACT

This study’s purpose is to investigate the expansion of social control efforts in
American elementary and secondary school settings, particularly the use of zerotolerance policies. These policies entail automatic punishments, such as suspensions,
expulsions, and referrals to the juvenile and criminal justice systems for a host of schoolbased infractions. The widespread implementation of zero-tolerance policies and the
application of harsh, exclusionary sanctions have intensified over the past decade.
Numerous studies have documented this rise; however, there has been little effort to
explore the explanation of the expansion of school-based social controls.
A potential explanation is found in the application of political economic theories
in relation to the increased use and evolving nature of social control in the neoliberal era
of capitalism. As such, the current study employs a new theoretical approach, which
utilizes neoliberal theory combined with theoretical components from existing
metanarratives in the literature. By using this new approach in regard to school-based
social control, the connection between the expansion of social control of the working
class and marginal populations in the criminal justice process, and the retraction of the
social safety nets that characterized neoliberal capitalism is extended to the explanation
of trends in the social control of school-based infractions.
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This investigation incorporates a qualitative, empirical exploration of how these
school criminalization efforts have been implemented and legitimized by the state,
specifically through the authority of the courts. By engaging in textual analysis, the
jurisprudential intent that informs both the relevant state appellate and Supreme Court
decisions was subjected to legal exegeses to determine how and if the judicial system
legitimizes the practice of zero tolerance in schools, which are consistent with neoliberal
ideals. In addition, a quantitative component, to this overall study, examined nationally
representative School Survey on Crime and Safety (SSOCS) data across three academic
years to determine if school security measures and disciplinary actions were increasingly
applied to marginal populations in elementary and secondary schools over time.
Results from the qualitative inquiry revealed that in the overwhelming majority of
court cases evaluated, the courts decided in a fashion that reinforces zero-tolerance
policies as legitimate neoliberal social controls in schools. Several theoretically relevant
themes emerged from the jurisprudential intent, which are transferable for further theory
development and future research. Quantitative findings reveal that, over time, the total
disciplinary actions and removals from school without continued educational services are
disproportionately applied to schools with the highest percentages of minority students
and students who reside in high-crime areas compared to schools with the lowest
percentages of minority students and students who reside in high-crime areas.
Conversely, the results also reveal that the average use of school security measures (e.g.,
metal detectors, access controls, security guards, etc.) are more likely to be used in
schools with the lowest percentages of minority students than schools with the highest
percentages of minorities over time.

vii

These results are discussed in detail, and recommendations for changes in school
policies and practices are offered, while being mindful of evidence-based best practices
that may serve as viable alternatives to the zero-tolerance policies currently being used.
Avenues for future research and theory development are also outlined.
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CHAPTER ONE:
INTRODUCTION

The use of school-based sanctions has increased dramatically over the past
decade. While studies have documented this increase, there has been little effort to
explore the explanation of the expansion of school-based social control. A potential
explanation is found in the application of political economic theories concerning the
expansion and nature of social control in the neoliberal era of capitalism. By employing
this argument in relation to school-based social control, the connection between the
expansion of social control of the working class and marginal populations in the criminal
justice process, and the retraction of social safety nets that characterized neoliberal
capitalism is extended to the explanation of trends in the social control of school-based
infractions. Thus, the purpose of this study is to examine the expansion of social control
in American school settings in relation to the use of infractions, such as suspensions and
expulsions for school age children.
Current trends reveal that suspension and expulsion rates in American elementary
and secondary schools are increasing annually. In 2006, over 3 million students were
suspended and over 100,000 were expelled (National Center for Education Statistics
[NCES], 2009). Recent data collected from the United States Department of Education
(USDOE) found that African-American students comprised 35% of students suspended
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once, 46% of students suspended more than once, and 39% of students expelled from
school (USDOE, 2012). Compared to their White counterparts, African-American
students are over three and a half times more likely to be suspended or expelled,
especially due to enhanced use of zero-tolerance policies (USDOE, 2012).
Zero tolerance is a widely implemented school disciplinary policy in the US that
designates predetermined punishments for school-based infractions, regardless of
circumstance or context (Boccanfuso & Kuhfeld, 2011). These exclusionary punishments
may include automatic suspensions, expulsions with some continued educational
services, expulsions without any continued educational services, mandated referrals to
law enforcement, automatic exclusion from extracurricular or co-curricular activities, and
referrals to and/or placement in alternative educational settings (Giroux, 2003;
Hirschfield, 2008). Under these policies, 56% of students who are expelled are either
Hispanic or African-American (USDOE, 2012). Moreover, Hispanic and AfricanAmerican students make up 70% of students involved in school-related arrests or
referrals to law enforcement (USDOE, 2012).
Additionally, empirical studies have consistently found that zero-tolerance
policies are disproportionately applied to minorities (Lawrence, 2007; Reyes, 2006; Skiba
& Knesting, 2001; Skiba, Michael, Nardo, & Peterson, 2002; Sughrue, 2003) 1. Interviews
conducted by Dunbar and Villaruel (2002) of 36 principals working in urban Michigan
schools suggests that the perception of African American and Latino students puts them
at a disadvantage of receiving harsher disciplinary actions. Although African American
1

Previous research provides a clear implication that, like other forms of social control and criminal justice
(CJ) processes, school suspensions/expulsions exhibit racial and ethnic biases, and this study extends the
scope of research on racial bias. As a result, it is possible that other explanations for this process, which
draw on explanations of the production of racial biases in the CJ system, may be applicable.
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students receive school disciplinary action much more often than their White
counterparts, research has also shown that minority students are expelled typically for
nonviolent infractions, while White students tend to receive punishment primarily for
only serious violations (Fenning & Rose, 2007; Giroux, 2003; Skiba et al, 2002). Some
researchers (Christle, Nelson, & Jolivette, 2004; Skiba et al., 2002) argue that students
from low-income backgrounds are disproportionately targeted for disciplinary action;
however, disproportional school punishment for those of minority status continues to
exist even after controlling for socioeconomic status (Fenning & Rose, 2007; Giroux,
2003; Skiba et al., 2002).
In theory, zero tolerance is expected to deter students from violent, illegal, or
disruptive behavior because the subsequent punishment is harsh and certain, which serves
to incapacitate the students who are perceived to be most dangerous (Chen, 2008; Fries &
DeMitchell, 2007; Hirschfield, 2008; Morrison & Skiba, 2001; Noguera, 2003).
Normally, zero-tolerance policies have been widely accepted for their crime suppression
effect, and much literature has been written to support the connection between zero
tolerance policies and the long-term reduction in crime that has occurred in the US over
the past two decades (Burke & Herbert, 1996; Chen, 2008; Devine, 1996; Ewing, 2000;
Hyman & Snook, 1999; Jones, 1997; Larson & Ovando, 2001). As a result, zerotolerance efforts are often referred to as the “school-to-prison pipeline,” (Fenning &
Rose, 2007, p. 548; Kim, Losen, & Hewitt, 2010; Sullivan, 2010, p. 189) where schools
punish the troubled students who need the most academic, social, economic, and
emotional help rather than apply more restorative sanctions that do not deny them access
to educational services (Fries & DeMitchell, 2007; Giroux, 2003; Noguera, 2003;
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Sughrue, 2003). Violators of zero-tolerance policies are often labeled “trouble makers,”
(Bowditch, 1993; Fenning & Rose, 2007) and contact with the criminal or juvenile justice
system might lead to other stigmatizing labels, which may actually perpetuate future
delinquent involvement (Cocozza et al, 2005; Potter & Kakar, 2003). Furthermore,
referrals to the juvenile justice system have overwhelmed the courts, which already have
overburdened dockets (Hirschfield, 2008; Sullivan, 2010).
While a growing body of literature has attempted to elucidate many of the
negative outcomes associated with zero-tolerance policies and the closely linked schoolto-prison pipeline (Fenning & Rose, 2007; Giroux, 2003; Hanson, 2005; Kim et al., 2010;
Skiba & Knesting, 2001; Stader, 2006), these studies ignore the issues central to the
theoretical examination of the emergence of those policies. One relevant critique is posed
by research (see Hirschfield, 2008) that examines the role economic structures and
assumptions play as they influence social institutions under neoliberal capitalism. A
primary outcome of neoliberal economic policies is the removal of social safety nets, and
the adoption of more conservative and punitive responses to social problems. In the
school setting, the adoption of zero-tolerance policies can be seen as an extension of the
influence of neoliberal capitalism on social institutions. Some researchers argue that the
enforcement of zero tolerance policies across the nation’s educational system is one way
that the state may punish and remove those who are perceived to have no market value
such as those who are identified as flawed consumers, and who are classified as “other”
because of their perceived associations with crime, redundancy, poverty, or expendability
(Giroux, 2003; Hall & Karanxha, 2012).
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In order to better understand the influence structural conditions have on
institutions such as public education, it is necessary to examine the historical context of
such changes in a political economic context. Contemporary, neoliberal restructuring of
capitalism in the US, which began in the 1990s, continues to greatly reduce the welfare
state, privatize state enterprises, and eliminate state regulations on the economy (Kotz,
2003, 2008, 2009; Wacquant, 2009a, 2009b). The consequence is the restriction of forces
of controls that would seek to redistribute resources more equitably in response to
evidence of injustice (Kotz, 2008, 2009; Wacquant, 2009b). Ironically, in order for the
markets to enjoy such freedom from controls, it is also necessary to undermine working
class power to facilitate the expansion of social control over workers and the
economically marginalized (Kotz, 2009; Wacquant, 2009a, 2009b). Thus, neoliberal
capitalism frees the mobility of capital across markets from government regulations,
while also increasing formal social controls on marginal populations to manipulate the
labor market and perpetuate the existing class structure (Wacquant, 2009a, 2009b). The
social controls which are exerted, tend to be punitive and carceral 2 in nature (Wacquant,
2009b). In addition, zero tolerance is expected to be increasingly applied to marginalized
groups, including minorities and those living in concentrated disadvantage (Wacquant,
2009a).
Additionally, the recent neoliberal restructuring of the economy and its intrusion
into other social institutions, such as the educational system (Shapiro, 1984), presents a
legitimation crisis in need of reconciliation. Classical liberalism refers to a market-based
ideology, which justifies a capitalist mode of production by freeing the market from
2

Carceral refers to practices of social control and discipline that transforms public spaces into prison-like
settings characterized by heightened surveillance and security (see Foucault, 1977).
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government regulations and encouraging self-interested individualism among citizens
(Wolfe, 1977). Conversely, democracy promotes the maximization of civic participation
by the populace in an effort to establish a community defined by equality, mutual respect,
and cooperative interaction among citizens toward commonly agreed-upon goals (Wolfe,
1977). The logic behind these dueling ideologies presents a contradiction, whereby
liberalism creates inequality via power imbalances across rigid class lines, while
democracy struggles to respond by promoting social welfare remedies and state
regulations to alleviate social ills (Habermas, 1975; Shapiro, 1984; Wolfe, 1977). When
punitive social control efforts consistent with the neoliberal agenda conflict with the
equitable and democratic roles the educational system traditionally serves by being a
public good, the state must overcome attempts to challenge its credibility and authority in
light of such a legitimation problem. To date, no study has investigated the manner in
which these zero-tolerance policies are legitimized by the state when constitutional
challenges are raised in the courts by those affected.
Concurrent with the neoliberal restructuring efforts of 1990s, serious violent
juvenile offending reached a peak in the US in 1993 at 1.2 million victimizations with at
least one juvenile involved, its highest level since 1973 (Snyder & Sickmund, 1999).
These rates sparked renewed concern over youthful offenders, and many prominent
public figures, including James Alan Fox, John J. DiIulio, and William J. Bratton,
inflamed the rhetoric being publicized by mass media when they exaggerated reports of
youth “wilding” and growing legions of juvenile “superpredators” (Fuentes, 2003;
Welch, 2005, p. 168-169; Welch, 2011, p.216-217). Indeed, wilding became synonymous
with youth violence and fed the media-driven moral panic by drawing on racial and
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ethnic stereotypes already embedded in the prevailing political economy (Welch, 2005).
As a result, minority youth were targeted as threats to society, while racial and economic
inequalities were reinforced via ever-increasing, “get tough” responses to the perceived
panic over youth crime (Welch, 2005, 2011).
Recent instances of deadly school shootings (e.g., Sandy Hook Elementary,
Columbine High School, Chardon High School shootings, and Lake Worth High School)
resulted in efforts to increase security within schools through the widespread adoption of
zero-tolerance policies (Hirschfield, 2008; Stinchcomb, Bazemore, & Riestenberg, 2006;
Sullivan, 2010). Thus, society’s focus on social control efforts shifted from street corners
to school yards (Stinchcomb et al., 2006). In fact, the rigid, punitive response to the
moral panic caused by the school shootings of the 1990s and 2000s has allowed the
juvenile justice system to broaden its reach to include school disciplinary policy
(Boccanfuso & Kuhfeld, 2011; Chen, 2008; Hirschfield, 2008). As a result, students now
face juvenile court proceedings and expulsion for even minor school misconduct instead
of the brief school suspension they would have received years ago (Scott & Steinberg,
2008).
Whereas zero-tolerance policies were first intended to punish possession of
weapons and drugs at school, these policies have undergone net-widening to include
minor offenses such as speech, truancy, excessive tardiness, shoving matches, dress code
violations, profanity, and possession of common health aids (e.g., Advil and cough drops;
Black, 1999; Hirschfield, 2008; Insley, 2001; Morrison & Skiba, 2001; Sughrue, 2003).
Such harsh realities are becoming more and more commonplace in light of the fact that
the actual probability of an American student being murdered in school is lower than that
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of being struck by lightning (Orpinas, Horne, & Staniszewski, 2003; Scott & Steinberg,
2008). Ironically, juvenile offending has been declining ever since 1993 (FBI, 2008), but
school criminalization efforts have continued to escalate (Hirschfield & Celinska, 2011).
While episodic moral panics may provide the impetus for school criminalization via the
expansion of zero-tolerance efforts, there appears to be larger political, organizational,
and structural forces needed in order for these policies to become institutionalized
(Hirschfield & Celinska, 2011).
The Current Study
This study examines the enforcement of zero-tolerance policies in school settings
and seeks to explain the emergence and sustained longevity of such policies. A thorough
examination of the historical and structural conditions necessary for the development of
such punitive policies within the educational system will be conducted. Several metanarratives regarding the theoretical mechanisms influencing school criminalization and
the increased use of zero-tolerance policies will be explored and critiqued for their
necessity and sufficiency in conceptualizing this phenomenon. In addition, the various
explanations offered by the extant literature will be pieced together to offer a more
complete theoretical explanation of the expansion of zero-tolerance policies in the school
setting. Unlike previous investigations, this study will also incorporate an empirical
exploration of how these school criminalization efforts have been implemented and
legitimized by the state, specifically through the authority of the courts.
As part of that effort, attention will also be focused on the court’s responses to
legal challenges to penalties carried out to reinforce zero-tolerance school-based social
control. Attempts by youthful defendants to challenge zero tolerance outcomes on the
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grounds of violations of First, Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights have
largely been dismissed by the courts (Kim et al., 2010; Sullivan, 2010; Yell & Rozalski,
2000). It is hypothesized that the affirmation of zero tolerance policies through court
decisions legitimates the state’s control of marginal populations. Examination of both the
relevant state appellate and Supreme Court decisions surrounding the possible
constitutional rights violations exhibited by zero tolerance policies is warranted to extract
this jurisprudential intent, which permits and regenerates these crime control processes.
Court decisions, like other legal documents, serve as archival data that record mainstream
legal thoughts on several justice-related matters, and as such, they can be interpreted to
reveal societal meaning. A qualitative textual analysis via a case law method approach is
employed to investigate the underlying jurisprudential intent guiding these legal
decisions, which provides legitimacy to the practice of zero tolerance in the education
system and promote disciplinary strategies that will be consistent with neoliberal ideals.
An examination of neoliberal policies’ influence on the national trends regarding
increased mandatory disciplinary actions across elementary and secondary schools is
largely absent from the current research. As a result, studies tend to ignore the historical
association between the impacts of neoliberal policies on social control outcomes, such as
the expansion of zero-tolerance polices and their outcomes. In addition, prior studies
have failed to explore the scope of this extension of this form of social control, and have
tended to employ case study approaches. Few existing quantitative studies are crosssectional in scope (Chen, 2008; Kupchik & Ellis, 2008; Mayer & Leone, 1999). This
study expands prior research by exploring this issue across both time and location.
Relevant data collected nationally from the School Survey on Crime and Safety (SSOCS)
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provides a source for information regarding disciplinary problems and actions across
several years (e.g., 2004, 2006, and 2008) and across locations. SSOCS surveys a
nationally representative sample of public elementary and secondary school principals.
Principals were asked about the amount of crime and violence, disciplinary actions,
prevention programs and policies, and other school characteristics, including some
demographic variables. Quantitative analyses of the available variables regarding the
various forms of disciplinary actions taken, with or without continued educational
services, in response to a variety of school-based infractions, are conducted to identify
trends that may reflect the increased punitiveness in the social control of marginal
populations within the educational system during the recent neoliberal transition.
Finally, a critical evaluation of the qualitative and quantitative findings will
inform implications for policy and practice. Viable alternatives for zero-tolerance policies
will be explored and future directions for research will be explicated.
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CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW

There are several bodies of literature on zero tolerance policies, which need to be
reviewed. First of all, there were numerous historical events that led to the development
of school criminalization. How these developments factored into the widespread
implementation of zero tolerance policies across schools in America will be discussed.
Secondly, the various theoretical rationales that underpin zero tolerance policies will be
explained to elucidate how proponents buttress their support for the application of such
policies. Thirdly, the empirical evidence of the net-widening of zero tolerance policies
and their adverse impact on minority and disabled students will be clarified. Next, the
existing metanarratives 3 that attempt to critically explain the theoretical foundations for
the origins and growing use of zero tolerance policies in school will be reviewed and
appraised. Finally, neoliberal theory and the crisis of liberal democracy will be described
in detail to provide a historical context of how market forces affected the emergence zero
tolerance policies in the educational system.

Factors Affecting the Accelerated Criminalization of Schools
3

Metanarrative refers to a grand narrative or story-like explanation that attempts to provide a
comprehensive account to various historical events, experiences, and social/cultural phenomena by
appealing to some kind of universal knowledge, theoretical basis, or schema (See, Habermas, 1981;
Lyotard, 1979).

11

Several rationales for why harsh, punitive school disciplinary practices have
emerged in recent years are noted in the existing literature on school violence and
discipline. Most of the potential factors affecting the acceleration of the criminalization
of school children have been identified as instilling fear in a reactionary public and the
power brokers of the current political-economic system (Hirschfield, 2008; Hirschfield &
Celinska, 2011; Simon, 2007; Welch, 2005, 2011). Zero-tolerance policies, which
automatically impose severe punishments regardless of the circumstances, are
prominently featured in recent school criminalization efforts (Kim et al., 2010).
Traditionally, criminalization refers to the development and diffusion of criminal law that
“targets a set of activities perceived to be attached to a social group” in need of control
(Jenness, 2004, p.150). Thus, school criminalization includes policies and practices that
sanction student misconduct as crime and casts students as suspects, criminals, or
prisoners in need of control (Hirschfield, 2008; Hirschfield & Celinska, 2011).
The 1960s and 1970s were a period that experienced high tides of youthful
violence in schools (Gottfredson & Gottfredson, 1985; Snyder & Sickmund, 1999; Toby,
1998). This period was also marked by social unrest due to the civil-rights revolution, the
women’s liberation movement, and anti-war protest, which questioned authority, the
status quo, and conformity to outdated social structures and controls. The sentiments that
emerged from these social movements spread into public schools (Toby, 1998). As such,
teachers and school administrators began to express concerns over maintaining control
within the classroom when students misbehaved, especially since U.S. Supreme Court
decisions in the 1960s and 1970s extended greater due process protections to juveniles
(Bowditch, 1993; Goss v. Lopez, 1975; In re Gault, 1967; In re Winship, 1970; Kent v.
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United States, 1966; Toby, 1998). Thus, teachers and administrators perceived that these
social and legal changes weakened their authority to swiftly administer punishments,
which subsequently undermined order within schools (Toby, 1998). Indeed, it has been
hypothesized that school personnel’s fear of loss of control, coupled with public scrutiny
in regards to school safety, has contributed to an influx of classroom conflict between
students and educators (Casella, 2003a; Fenning & Rose, 2007; Noguera, 1995; Vavrus
& Cole, 2002). Throughout the 1970s, the number of media reports regarding school
violence continued to increase to the point that public concern resulted in Congressional
hearings on the matter (Gottfredson & Gottfredson, 1985; Toby, 1998).
Consequently, the Ninety-Third Congress mandated a study on the scope and
severity of school violence be conducted in 1974. This comprehensive national study on
school crime and safety surveyed principals in 4,014 schools in urban, suburban, and
rural areas (Asner & Broschart, 1978). In addition, 31,373 students and 23, 895 teachers
in 642 junior and senior high schools were also surveyed on their exposure to school
crime, especially victimizations (Asner & Broschart, 1978). The final report was
published by the National Institute of Education and the findings were presented to
Congress in 1978 (Asner & Broschart, 1978). Unfortunately, no previous studies existed
by which to compare the findings in order to determine if school violence was increasing
and by how much (Asner & Broschart, 1978; Toby, 1998). Regardless, Asner and
Broschart (1978) concluded with incomplete evidence that classroom disruption was
significantly more serious than 15 years prior but that levels remained steady within the
past five years. While the report vacillated on the reasons for this increase in school crime
and disruption, it was argued that the single most important difference between safe
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schools and violent schools was the presence of a strong, dedicated principal who served
as a role model for both students and teachers, and who instituted a firm, fair, and
consistent system of discipline (Asner & Broschart, 1978).
Increasing reports of misbehaving students were blamed primarily on teachers
abandoning their roles as disciplinarians because they were being intimidated by unruly
youths (Bowditch, 1993; Toby, 1998). Some argued that teachers needed to reassert their
role as agents of control and bolster their authority, because control of the classroom was
deemed a prerequisite for education (Bowditch, 1993; Toby, 1998). Moreover, Jackson
Toby (1998), as a social control theorist, claimed that an element of fear was necessary to
maintain classroom control, because students would be less likely to be disruptive if it
would jeopardize the teacher’s approval of them. It was also perceived by some that
American students simply did not fear their teachers anymore and they no longer
perceived the potential loss of stakes in conformity, which formal education provided
(Toby, 1998). Thus, increased security, surveillance, and formal sanctions for disruptive
and violent behavior in schools were proclaimed as essential to restore a controlled,
disciplined environment so educational processes could be effective, since students
would conform to school norms or face strict consequences for misbehaviors (Bowditch,
1993; Toby, 1998).
Also, from the 1960s to the 1980s, an association between youth culture and
drugs and drug trafficking was framed by the government and media as a major threat to
the safety and educational missions of schools (Simon, 2007). The nationwide crackdown
on drug-related offenses during the 1980s gave rise to the concept of zero tolerance,
which promotes holding people accountable for their behavior via a punitive,
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exclusionary response (Boccanfuso & Kuhfeld, 2011; Fuentes, 2003; Skiba & Knesting,
2001; Stinchcomb et al., 2006). However, the crime-related politics behind the war on
drugs has shifted the crime control efforts of drug policy from the street corners to
schoolyards (Stinchcomb et al., 2006). In addition, criminologists like James Q. Wilson
and John DiIulio predicted a rising tide of violent youth crime to be perpetrated by
growing numbers of “superpredators” (Fuentes, 2003; Welch, 2005, p. 168-169; Welch,
2011, p.216-217). By 1997, at least 79% of schools nationwide adopted zero-tolerance
policies toward alcohol and drugs (Boccanfuso & Kuhfeld, 2011).
The National Center for Education Statistics (2012) reports that 60% of public
high schools utilize random dog sniffs to check for drugs and roughly 29% use some
other form of random sweeps to search for contraband and drugs. A Texas company
called Interquest Detection Canines has supplied over 1,000 schools in 14 states with
drug-sniffing dogs (Beger, 2002). Thus, the potential for profit may motivate the
continued expansion of canine searches in schools (Beger, 2002).
Around 13% of public high schools drug test athletes, while 8% drug test students
who are participating in nonathletic extracurricular activities (Sullivan, 2010). The
Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton (1995) decision upheld the school policy allowing
for all student athletes to subject to mandatory drug testing under the argument that the
testing would not lead to any law enforcement consequences or used for any internal
disciplinary actions. A positive drug test would only result in exclusion from the
extracurricular activity. Such testing has mostly been restricted to participation in
competitive extracurricular activities; however, the district court in one locale has
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actually upheld the random drug testing of student drivers (Joye v. Hunterdon Cent. Reg’l
High Sch. Bd. of Educ., 2003).
Students who are found possessing or using drugs, including alcohol and tobacco,
or drug paraphernalia, while on school property, face not only suspension or expulsion
but also a potential referral to the juvenile and criminal justice systems (Beger, 2002;
Education Law Center, 2012). Therefore, it is possible for students to receive
imprisonment for possession and distribution of drugs in or around schools, especially
given the increased use of juvenile waiver in recent years (Arya, 2011; Beger, 2002;
Sellers & Arrigo, 2009). However, empirical evidence has revealed that zero tolerance
policies were actually encouraging students to “conceal rather than deal with their drug
use” and/or abuse and many of those students who are caught and expelled are not
necessarily the ones who use drugs the most (Hammersley, Marsland, & Reid, 2003, p.
xi; Stinchcomb et al., 2006). In fact, disciplinary action, like in-school suspension has
been associated with later drug use and long-term disaffection and alienation
(Stinchcomb et al., 2006). Alternative evidence-based programs, like Reconnecting
Youth, have been implemented in several states (Boccanfuso & Kuhfeld, 2011) and
experimental evaluations found that students who successfully completed the program
had lower rates of alcohol and drug use than those who did not participate (Eggert,
Thompson, Herting, & Nicholas, 1995; Eggert, Thompson, Herting, Nicholas, & Dickers,
1994). Regardless, concerns over the presence of drugs in schools have emboldened the
use of zero-tolerance policies for drug-related offenses and they remain largely in place
in the majority of elementary and secondary schools (Kim et al., 2010; Simon, 2007).
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Perhaps the most salient issue affecting the implementation of draconian
disciplinary practices in schools would be the recent incidents of schoolyard shootings
and murders in the 1990s and 2000s. The Safe School Initiative identified 37 separate
incidents of targeted violence between 1974 and 2000, which involved 41 perpetrators
across 26 states (Vossekuil, Fein, Reddy, Borum, & Modzeleski, 2002). The primary
weapon used by the attackers in these instances was some type of gun, with over half
using handguns (n=25, 61%) and nearly half using rifles or shotguns (n=20, 49%;
Vossekuil et al., 2002). Possibly the most noteworthy events of this kind were the
Columbine High School shootings (by Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold) in Littleton,
Colorado, the Chardon High School shootings (by Thomas Lane) in Ohio, and the
shootings in Lake Worth High School (by Nathaniel Brazill) in Florida (Greene, 2005;
Hirschfield, 2008; Kim et al., 2010; Sullivan, 2010). The media’s coverage of such
violent incidents has influenced the framing of the issue of school violence as one that is
out-of-control (Hirschfield & Celinska, 2011; Simon, 2007). Thus, the public perception
in society is that schools are no longer safe and fear has created a moral panic, especially
among middle-class families in the suburbs (Hirschfield, 2008; Hirschfield & Celinska,
2011; Schoonover, 2007, Simon, 2007).
Although weapons in schools are relatively rare (Devine, 1996; Stader, 2004), a
culture of fear has persevered, whereby control and surveillance are the paramount
concerns of new “get tough” policies in schools (Giroux, 2003, p.560). As such, the fear
of school-based crime is used as the overarching rationale to tighten controls on the
movements of students in and out of schools, as well as the automatic punitive responses
for policy violations (Barrett, Jennings, & Lynch, 2012; Noguera, 1995; Simon, 2007).
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Thus, the implementation of zero tolerance policies has continued to expand and the
scope of their restrictions has broadened to include infractions other than illicit drugs,
guns, and serious violence (Casella, 2003b; Schoonover, 2007; Stinchcomb et al., 2006).
Theory, Rationales, and Policies Supporting Zero Tolerance in Schools
The main underlying theories guiding the implementation of zero tolerance
policies in schools are deterrence and rational choice theory (Casella, 2003b). Studies
testing deterrence theory often looked either at specific deterrence or general deterrence.
Specific deterrence refers to when an individual is deterred from crime because he or she
received punishment directly (Akers & Sellers, 2009; Kubrin, Stucky, & Krohn, 2009).
Conversely, general deterrence refers to when society overall is deterred from crime
because some offender was punished for his or her crime (Akers & Sellers, 2009; Kubrin
et al., 2009). Thus, either direct (specific) or indirect (general) punishment is what was
traditionally scrutinized by researchers. Both specific and general deterrence can occur
during the administration of a single punishment (Kubrin et al., 2009). For example, a
person who is punished may be specifically deterred from the personal experience, and in
addition, the general public be also be deterred from the indirect knowledge that this
individual was punished.
Certainty and severity of punishment are the factors that are most often examined
to determine the effects of specific and general deterrence (Akers & Sellers, 2009; Kubrin
et al., 2009). Certainty refers to the likelihood of being caught for a crime and
subsequently punished. Severity refers to the magnitude or nature of the punishment,
which may deter crime if it is perceived as slightly more harmful then the harm caused by
the crime (Akers & Sellers, 2009; Kubrin et al., 2009). Celerity refers to the swiftness in
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which the punishment is administered, with swifter punishments thought to have more of
a deterrent effect (Kubrin et al., 2009). However, there is one fundamental aspect that the
past conception of specific and general deterrence has neglected to take into account.
Stafford and Warr (2006) reveal that punishment avoidance can actually affect
and distort one’s perception of the certainty or severity of punishment. In other words, a
person may become more inclined to continue to commit crime in the future if he or she
has never actually been caught or knows others who commit crimes and are never caught.
Thus, punishment avoidance can have both a direct and indirect effect on one’s persistent
criminal behavior (Stafford & Warr, 2006). For example, if a student gets into a violent
altercation with another student, while at school, and he or she is never stopped by school
administrators or teachers, then he or she may perceive the chances of being disciplined
and arrested as slim. Similarly, if a student witnessed someone fighting at school, and this
person is not stopped by school officials, then the certainty of punishment may be
perceived as less likely. Moreover, if such a student were observed but did not receive
automatic punishment, then others may not be deterred. Therefore, punishment avoidance
may encourage an initial criminal act or recidivism according to such logic (Stafford &
Warr, 2006).
Thus, there is a mixture of indirect and direct experiences with punishment and
punishment avoidance. This differential experience can either reinforce crime or deter it
(Stafford & Warr, 2006). Zero tolerance policies in schools seek to maintain control of
students through deterrence by having strict, certain, and automatic punishments that are
not delayed by taking in to account the circumstance of the school-based violation (APA
Zero Tolerance Task Force, 2008; Casella, 2003b; Heitzeg, 2009). In addition, zero
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tolerance policies in schools are intended to overcome the potential phenomenon of
punishment avoidance by eliminating discretion in an attempt to improve consistency,
and thereby, send a clear disciplinary message to other students (APA Zero Tolerance
Task Force, 2008). Zero-tolerance policies seek to deter potential offenders from
committing school-based infractions by adhering closely to the strategy of “punishing
dangerousness,” which is both preventive and preemptive in nature (Chen, 2008;
Robinson, 2001, p. 1432).
This new perspective on deterrence is very compatible with social learning theory,
especially since differential reinforcement plays a role in how one perceives the certainty
and severity of punishment in relation to direct and indirect experiences with punishment
and punishment avoidance (Stafford & Warr, 2006). Besides, social learning theory
argues that behavior can be learned through experience as well as by observational or
vicarious learning (Akers, 1973; Bandura, 1977). An example of experiential learning
would be if a person shoplifts but is never arrested and finds the behavior to be positively
reinforced so he or she decides to continue to shoplift based on this experience. An
example of vicarious learning would be if a person had a friend who smoked marijuana
everyday behind the gym but was never caught, which might result in that person
deciding to smoke also. Of course these scenarios can alter behavior if punishment is
actually experienced or observed (Stafford & Warr, 2006). It is a more diverse way of
thinking about deterrence and why some are deterred, while others are not. Thus, it is
reasonable to conclude that the rationales for zero tolerance efforts in schools are
buttressed by deterrence theory and differential reinforcement in order to dissuade school
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violence and misbehavior by students for fear that they will receive swift, harsh, and
certain consequences (Casella, 2003b; Ewing, 2000; Heitzeg, 2009).
Rational choice theory draws greatly from classical criminological theory and
economic theory, and hypothesizes that perceived certainty and severity of shame,
embarrassment, and legal sanction may deter potential criminals if they engage in a
cost/benefit analysis (Cornish & Clarke, 1986, 2006). The theory examines the benefits
of crime as well as its costs by applying Bentham’s hedonistic calculus to the
mechanisms of deterrence theory (Grasmick & Bursik, 1990). In regard to costs, this
theory conceptualizes self-imposed shame as an internalized punishment and socially
imposed embarrassment as an informal punishment (Grasmick & Bursik, 1990). Shame
refers to a person’s conscience that causes the individual to feel guilt for committing a
crime, while embarrassment refers to a person feeling ashamed of criminal behavior by
letting down those who are closest to him or her (Grasmick & Bursik, 1990). Hence, this
theory assumes that criminals are rational agents who weigh the costs and benefits of
engaging in crime before executing the act (Cornish & Clarke, 1986). Proponents of
deterrence and rational choice theories often affix blame to the individual, while
dismissing any external social forces that may constrain that individuals options (Pratt,
2009).
Rational choice theory reinforces a primary rationale for the adult criminal justice
system, which operates under the premise that adults are rational decision makers who
are capable of making cost benefit analyses that deter them from criminal or antisocial
behavior for fear of criminal sanctions (Levick, 2000). Mandatory expulsion and the
likelihood of a follow-up referral to juvenile court makes zero tolerance policies reflect
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adult sanctions, which begs the question of whether school officials should examine and
provide proof of the youth’s intent or knowledge of his or her actions (Hanson, 2005).
Currently, zero tolerance policies do not give discretion to school authorities in order to
determine the student’s intent (Hanson, 2005).
As a “get tough” strategy for school violence, zero tolerance policies make it
possible for students to face imminent punishment without consideration for possible
developmental immaturity, or related social and emotional deficits, which may impair
their decision making. Empirical evidence specifies that the deficiencies in “psychosocial
maturity” among juveniles are caused by their impulsivity (Grisso et al, 2003; Oberlander
et al, 2001; Scott & Grisso, 2005), reliance on peer acceptance (Feld, 2003; Katner, 2006;
Kupchik, 2006, p. 19; Redding & Frost, 2001; Scott, 2000, p. 304; Scott & Grisso, 2005),
lack of autonomy (Katner, 2006), and poor judgment in relation to future consequences
(Grisso, 2006; Katner, 2006; Oberlander et al, 2001; Redding & Frost, 2001; Scott &
Grisso, 2005, p. 335). In addition, neuroscience research acknowledges that the cognitive
capabilities of juveniles are also hindered because of biological development (Arya,
2011; Deitch et al., 2009; MacArthur Foundation Research, n.d.; Sowell, Thompson,
Tessner, & Toga, 2001). For instance, the adolescent brain is not fully developed since
the prefrontal cortex is still maturing throughout this developmental period (Arya, 2011;
Sowell et al., 2001). Moreover, this underdeveloped region of the adolescent’s brain is in
charge of rational decision-making, long-term planning, impulse control, insight, and
judgment (Arya, 2011; Heide & Solomon, 2006, 2009; Miller & Cohen, 2001; Sowell et
al., 2001). Thus, the adolescent’s brain is typically focused on the immediate present and
not the consequences from the overall situation, which may entail severe collateral
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consequences affecting future employment and educational aspirations (Heitzeg, 2005;
Deitch et al., 2009).
Notwithstanding the findings from social, behavioral, and neuroscience research,
public policy has been fashioned to reflect school disciplinary practices in line with
deterrence and rational choice principles in an effort to make schools safer. In fact, zero
tolerance policies are a part of a larger set of federal school violence prevention
initiatives that were developed in the 1990s, which include the following: (1)
development of violence prevention and conflict resolution programs, (2) attempts at gun
control laws, and (3) the implementation of punitive and judicial forms of discipline
(Casella, 2003b). Zero tolerance policies are derived from the latter two initiatives
(Casella, 2003b).
The initial federal legislation began with the Gun-Free School Zone Act of 1990,
which made it a federal crime to possess a firearm within 1,000 feet of a public,
parochial, or private school. However, this law was found unconstitutional under the
ruling of U.S. v. Lopez (1995). The subsequent Gun-Free school Act (GFSA) of 1994
required all states receiving federal funds to expel any student bringing a gun to school
for a period of no less than a year. An amendment to the Elementary and Secondary
Education Act of 1965 required that federal funding be withheld from any school that did
not conform to the expulsion mandated by the GFSA for students who bring firearms
within 1,000 feet of a school (Casella, 2003b).
In addition to the mandatory expulsion of violators for at least a year, GFSA also
required the school systems to report these individuals to the criminal justice or juvenile
justice system as well as report discipline statistics to the federal government annually
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(Sughrue, 2003). Another provision within the GFSA, which was included in the
modifications made under the No Child Left Behind Act (2001), permits the school
administrators the discretion to reduce disciplinary action for firearm violation on a caseby-case basis (Stader, 2006; Sughrue, 2003). Thus, the school administrators are able to
consider extemporaneous circumstances by which the student in question may receive
modified disciplinary action. However, zero tolerance policies were widely implemented
by the GFSA and amendments to the act in 1995 changed the word “firearms” to
“weapons,” which broadened the category of weapons and items that can be used as
weapons that will result in mandatory expulsion if a student is found possessing one
(Casella, 2003b). Zero tolerance policies aim to prevent violence by punishing youths for
their potential for violence and the dangerousness they exhibit (Casella, 2003b;
Robinson, 2001).
The Safe Schools Act of 1994 (H.R. 2455--103rd Congress) and the Safe and
Drug-Free Schools and Communities Act of 1994 provided funding via grants to
educational agencies and non-profit groups to supply violence education programs, peer
mediation, conflict resolution, and various other violence prevention programs associated
with the first category of federal initiatives, as well as programs to deter use of illegal
drugs and alcohol. Under the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994,
over $30 billion was authorized to fund more police officers, new prison construction,
and community-based crime prevention programs, which were related to school safety
efforts by targeting at risk youth in high-crime and high-poverty areas and promoting
projects that involve community participation and school cooperation (see also Yell &
Rozalski, 2000). Lastly, the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Amendments of
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1997 permitted school administrators to place students in special education in an interim
alternative educational setting (IAES) for 45 days if they brought a weapon to school or
any school function. In addition, the amendments to this act allows a hearing officer to
place a special education student in an IAES for 45 days if the school district can provide
cogent evidence that this student presents a danger to self or others (Yell & Rozalski,
2000).
Under these theoretical rationales and federal legislation, zero tolerance policies
are assumed to accomplish many objectives. First of all, zero tolerance is expected to
make schools safer and more effective in handling disciplinary problems (APA Zero
Tolerance Task Force, 2008; Heitzeg, 2009). This argument comes from the assumption
that school violence is at a crisis level and ever-increasing, which necessitates the need
for stringent, no-nonsense strategies for violence prevention (APA Zero Tolerance Task
Force, 2008; Ashford, 2000; Litke, 1996). Also, it is assumed that zero tolerance
increases the consistency of school discipline and the clarity of the disciplinary message
to students (APA Zero Tolerance Task Force, 2008). Next, it is expected that the removal
of students who violate school rules will foster a school climate that is more conducive to
learning for those students who do not misbehave (APA Zero Tolerance Task Force,
2008; Bowditch, 1993; Ewing, 2000). Finally, it is assumed that the swift and certain
punishments associated with zero tolerance policies will have a deterrent effect on
students, and these policies will improve overall student behavior and discipline (APA
Zero Tolerance Task Force, 2008).
The American Psychological Association Zero Tolerance Task Force (2008)
examined the data from the existing research and literature and found a lack of support
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for the above mentioned assumptions. For instance, the empirical evidence does not
support the argument that school violence is spiraling out-of-control, as incidents of
deadly school violence are a relatively rare occurrence that make up only a small portion
of school disruptions (APA Zero Tolerance Task Force, 2008; De Voe et al., 2004;
NCES, 2009; Orpinas et al., 2003; Scott & Steinberg, 2008). In addition, there is no
evidence that zero tolerance policies have increased the consistency of school discipline,
because suspension and expulsion rates vary widely across schools and schools districts
(APA Zero Tolerance Task Force, 2008; NCES, 2009). In fact, recent research has found
that higher rates of suspension and expulsion are associated with worsening school
environments and poor school wide academic achievement (APA Zero Tolerance Task
Force, 2008; Skiba & Rausch, 2006). Yet, zero tolerance policies continue to flourish
even without evidence that they actually increase school safety and security (APA Zero
Tolerance Task Force, 2008; Skiba & Knesting, 2001).
Furthermore, evidence from adolescent development and neuroscience have
found that if a particular structure in the youth’s brain is still immature, then the functions
that it governs will exhibit immaturity (APA Zero Tolerance Task Force, 2008; Baird &
Fugelsang, 2004; Luna & Sweeney, 2004). In other words, adolescents are more likely to
engage in risker behaviors and reason insufficiently in regards to consequences for their
actions because of their psychosocial immaturity and underdeveloped brain structures
(APA Zero Tolerance Task Force, 2008; Grisso, 2006; Sowell et al., 2001).
Developmental research has also identified certain characteristics of secondary
schools that conflict with the developmental challenges of adolescence, which includes
the need for close peer relationships, autonomy, adult and parental support, identity
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negotiation, and academic self-efficacy (Eccles, 2004). If used improperly, zero tolerance
policies may intensify the challenges of early adolescence and the possible mismatch
between an adolescent’s developmental stage and the punitive structure of secondary
schools (APA Zero Tolerance Task Force, 2008). For example, if the youth’s
misbehavior is a result of developmental or neurological immaturity, and the action does
not pose a threat to school safety, then the harsh punishments prescribed by zero
tolerance may unnecessarily impose detrimentally long-term consequences for poor
judgment that is common in the developmental stage of adolescence (APA Zero
Tolerance Task Force, 2008). Indeed, zero tolerance policies may create, enhance or
perpetuate negative mental health outcomes for students by increasing feelings of
alienation, anxiety, and rejection in students, as well as breaking healthy bonds to adult
figures in school settings (APA Zero Tolerance Task Force, 2008).
Net-widening and the Impact of Zero Tolerance on Minority and Disabled Students
Although the original intent for the GFSA was to require automatic punishments
for seriously dangerous violations involving weapons, zero tolerance policies have
frequently been applied to very minor and non-violent infractions, such as tardiness, the
use of profane language, and disruptive behavior (Heitzeg, 2009). Some of the violations
in which zero tolerance sanctions are being applied to are extreme given the nature of the
infraction (Hall & Karanxha, 2012; Heitzeg, 2009; Schoonover, 2007; Stinchcomb et al.,
2006; Sullivan, 2010). For instance, in 1998, five-year-old Jordan Locke was suspended
for wearing a five-inch plastic axe as a part of his firefighter costume he wore to his
class’s Halloween party (Skiba, 2000). School administrators have in fact “cast a very
wide net,” especially when students have been expelled for possessing nail clippers,
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Advil, and mouthwash (Heiteg, 2009, p. 9; Skiba, 2000). In Texas, students face
suspension and placement in alternative programs if they are found cheating, violating
dress codes, engaging in horseplay, being excessively noisy, and failing to bring
homework to class (Fuentes, 2003).
In some states, an expellable offense can “include willful or continued defiance of
authority or disruptive behavior and habitual profanity” (Morrison & Skiba, 2001, p.
174). Another example is the case of LaVine v. Blaine School District (2001), where the
Ninth Circuit ruled that the school district did not infringe upon a student’s freedom of
speech rights for expelling LaVine when he presented a poem to his teacher, which
contained violent themes (Sughrue, 2003). School officials believed that the nature of the
themes conveyed in the poem posed an imminent threat, and an emergency expulsion of
the student was applied (Sughrue, 2003). In addition, two fifth-graders, in Virginia, who
were accused of slipping soap into a teacher’s drinking water, were charged with felonies
that carried a maximum sentence of 20 years (Giroux, 2003; Heitzeg, 2009). Then there
is the case of the youth who was brought up on a drug charge for giving fellow students
two cough drops (Giroux, 2003; Gorman & Pauken, 2003). Several other cases are
documented in the literature (see Advancement Project, 2005; Heitzeg, 2009, pp. 9-10;
Justice Policy Institute, 2009; Sullivan, 2010, p. 190) and include the following:
•
•

•

A 5-year-old girl handcuffed, arrested, and taken into custody in St.
Petersburg, FL for throwing a temper tantrum and disrupting class.
An 11-year-old girl in Orlando, FL tasered by a police officer, arrested,
and charged with battery on a security resource officer for disrupting a
school event and resisting with violence because she pushed another
student.
A 14-year-old disabled student in Palm Beach, FL referred to the
principal’s office for allegedly stealing $2 from another student. The
principal referred the student to the police, where he was charged with
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•
•

•

•
•
•

•

strong-armed robbery and held in an adult jail for six weeks even though
this was his first arrest.
A 5-year-old boy in Queens, NY arrested, handcuffed, and taken into
custody for having a temper tantrum and disrupting class.
A 12-year-old boy in Ponchatoula, LA, who suffered from hyperactive
disorder, warned other students not to eat all the potatoes, or “I’m going to
get you.” The student was suspended for 2 days and referred to the police
for making “terroristic threats.” He remained incarcerated for 2 weeks
while awaiting his trial.
A 13-year-old boy in Denton County, TX was assigned to write a “scary”
Halloween story for class; however, when he wrote a story about shooting
up a school, he both received a passing grade by his teacher and was
promptly referred to the principal. The police were called and the student
spent 6 days in jail before the courts dismissed the case, because they
confirmed no crime had been committed.
In West Virginia, a child in the seventh grade gave a zinc cough drop to
another student and was suspended for 3 days because the cough drop had
not been cleared by the administration.
A 6-year-old boy in North Carolina was suspended for a day for violating
the school’s rule regarding “unwarranted and unwelcome touching”
because he kissed his classmate.
In Louisiana, a student in the second grade brought his grandfather’s
watch to class for show-and-tell. When it was discovered that the watch
had a one-inch-long pocketknife attached to it, the youth was suspended
and sent to an alternative school for a month.
An 11-year-old girl in South Carolina brought a knife to school to cut her
chicken, which her mother packed in her lunch box and she was taken
away in a police car.

As one can see, the examples mentioned above reveal the nature of the netwidening trends that school zero tolerance policies are undergoing. These policies are
now punishing minor infractions with force and arrest, while also focusing more on
younger elementary and pre-school students (Heitzeg, 2009). Also, the net-widening
effect reveals enhanced cooperation between schools and the justice system, and how
many of the barriers separating the two in the past have been removed (Hirschfield,
2008).
While such trends are alarming, perhaps the most troubling finding in the extant
research is the overrepresentation of minority students, particularly African American
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males, in the exclusionary practices enforced by zero tolerance policies (APA Zero
Tolerance Task Force, 2008; Casella, 2003b; Fenning & Rose, 2007; Giroux, 2003;
Lawrence, 2007; Reyes, 2006; Skiba et al, 2002; Skiba & Rausch, 2006; Skiba &
Knesting, 2001; Sughrue, 2003). In fact, empirical evidence dating back to 1975
documented that African American males disproportionately receive exclusionary
disciplinary consequences (Children’s Defense Fund, 1975). Recent national data reveals
that African-American students comprised 35% of students suspended once, 46% of
students suspended more than once, and 39% of students expelled from school (USDOE,
2012). Moreover, compared to their White counterparts, African-American students are
over three and a half times more likely to be suspended or expelled, especially due to
enhanced use of zero-tolerance policies (Heitzeg, 2009; USDOE, 2012). Under zero
tolerance policies, 56% of students who are expelled are either Hispanic or AfricanAmerican (USDOE, 2012). Furthermore, Hispanic and African-American students make
up 70% of students who are arrested or referred to law enforcement for school-based
infractions (USDOE, 2012).
Minority students are predominantly from lower socioeconomic status and more
likely to attend inadequately resourced inner-city schools (Christle et al., 2004; Giroux,
2003; Skiba et al., 2002). However, some studies have found that racial disparities, in
regards to disciplinary action, continue to exist after controlling for socioeconomic status
(SES; Fenning & Rose, 2007; Skiba et al., 2002). While the association between low SES
and minority status is well-documented in social science research, suspension and
expulsion as it relates to zero tolerance policies potentially has an additional adverse
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effect on poor minority students compared to others because these kids are typically
unable to afford tutoring and often fall behind their peers (Casella, 2003b).
Skiba and colleagues (2002) found that African American students received more
referrals for subjective and nonviolent offenses, such as insubordination or being too
loud, when compared to their White counterparts (See also APA Zero Tolerance Task
Force, 2008). A Harvard study reported that even though African American students only
comprised 17% of students enrolled in public schools, they represented 33% of out-ofschool suspensions due to zero tolerance (Advancement Project/Civil Rights Project,
2000). More recent findings reveal that while African American students make up 17% of
the school age population, they represent 37% of suspensions and 35% of all expulsions
(Witt, 2007). Usually, when a group of people represents a certain category at a rate of
10% or more than their percent makeup in the general population, they group is being
overrepresented for that category (Reschly, 1997).
Studley’s (2002) study investigated discipline rates among 4 of the largest school
districts in California and found African American students were suspended at the highest
rate out of all ethnic and racial groups. Similarly, Mendez and colleagues (2002)
analyzed discipline data from 1996-1997 for the second largest school district in Florida,
and they found that African American males were suspended at a greater rate than any
other racial or ethnic group for all elementary, middle, and high schools in that district.
Nelson and colleagues’ (2003) review of the literature on administrative referrals for
discipline revealed that African American students were twice as likely to receive
referrals as their White peers.
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Research has also found that students with disabilities, especially those with
emotional or behavioral disorders, are disproportionately suspended or expelled (Leone,
Mayer, Malmgren, & Meisel, 2000; Wagner, Kutash, Duchnowski, Epstein, & Sumi,
2005). Historically, minorities, predominantly African Americans, are disproportionately
placed in special education, and this finding has been documented since the 1960s (Dunn,
1968; Fuentes, 2003; Skiba et al., 2008). Nationally, African American students represent
33% of students who are identified as mentally retarded when they only make up 17% of
the school-age population (Skiba et al., 2008). A meta-analysis between 1975 and 2000
found that African American and Latino students received referrals to special education
more frequently than White students (Hosp & Reschly, 2003).
Research indicates that African American youth do not violate school rules at a
higher rate than other students (Skiba et al., 2002); therefore, racial disparities cannot
adequately be explained by differences in behavior, but instead should be explained by
differences in application by school teachers and administrators (APA Zero Tolerance
Task Force, 2008; Heitzeg, 2009). This differential treatment of minority students may be
a reflection of teachers’ lack of preparation in classroom management, lack of cultural
diversity training, and the perpetuation of racial stereotypes (APA Zero Tolerance Task
Force, 2008; Heitzeg, 2009). Eighty-three percent of teachers in the U.S. are White and
mostly female (Heitzeg, 2009). Qualitative research findings suggest that White teachers
tend to feel more threatened by minority students because they are perceived to be
disruptive (APA Zero Tolerance Task Force, 2008; Bowditch, 1993; Fenning & Rose,
2007; Heitzeg, 2009; Hirschfield, 2008; Hirschfield & Celinska, 2011; Morrison &
Skiba, 2001; Witt, 2007).
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In fact, there is a tendency for teachers and school officials to classify
misbehaving White students as in need of psychological or psychiatric intervention rather
than of harsh punishment as prescribed by zero tolerance policies (Heitzeg, 2009). For
example, psychiatric labels, such as Conduct Disorder (CD), Oppositional Defiant
Disorder (ODD), and Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) make it possible
for school officials and law enforcement to handle disciplinary infractions and drug use
by White students as a mental health problem rather than disruptive or disobedient
behavior (Heitzeg, 2009). In fact, studies have revealed racial disparities in the diagnosis
and treatment of ADHD and other Disruptive Behavior Disorders, which suggest that
teachers are more likely to expect and define these disorders as an issue for White
students (Bussing, Zima, Perwien, Belin, & Widawski, 1998; Heitzeg, 2009; LeFever,
Dawson, & Morrow, 1999; Rowland et al., 2002; Safer & Malever, 2000; Safer & Zito,
1999; Zito, Safer, dosReis, & Riddle, 1998). Moreover, a child’s social class, insurance
coverage, and race are often key factors in who receives treatment for such disorders
(Bussing et al., 1998; Rowland et al., 2002; Safer & Malever, 2000).
Empirical content analyses have found that poor, minority students are
consistently labeled by school officials as “troublemakers” (Fenning & Rose, 2007, p.
544 & 548; Hirschfield, 2008, p. 92; Morrison & Skiba, 2001, p. 178). Casella’s (2003b)
findings also suggest that African American and Latino students are labeled as potentially
dangerous and often in need of removal. Of course the most common nonviolent offenses
in which minority students are disciplined for are classroom defiance, disruptive
behavior, and profanity (Bowditch, 1993; Mendez et al., 2002). One possible explanation
for why teachers label minority students as troublemakers may have to do with a
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perceived loss of control whereby teachers feel that their authority is threatened by
disruptive behavior, regardless of the absence of violence or threat of harm (Fenning &
Rose, 2007). The practice of labeling, as it is associated with the frequently exclusionary
nature of zero tolerance approaches to school-based discipline, may actually amplify
disruption and crime in schools (Cocozza et al, 2005; Potter & Kakar, 2003).
Lemert (1967) argued that social control precedes deviance just as much as the
reverse. Lemert (1967) also stated that when the individual initially commits a deviant
act, a societal reaction ensues, which sanctions this individual for violating accepted
norms. The repetition of deviant or criminal acts by this individual leads to further public
reactions and subsequent labels. By experiencing negative labels the deviant person
becomes entrenched in a criminal persona, and thus, the person accepts his or her fate as
a publicly and self-identified criminal who continues to engage in such a lifestyle
(Lemert, 1967). Thus, as Tannenbaum stated, “The person becomes the thing he is
described as being” (1938, p. 20). Similar to labeling theory, Lemert’s arguments suggest
that societal reaction is required in order for offenders to become both psychologically
and behaviorally rooted in a criminal lifestyle (1976). Zero-tolerance policies, which
mandate automatic disciplinary action and referrals to the criminal or juvenile justice
system, are examples of reactionary responses to disruptive behavior exhibited by
adolescent students who may merely be immature (APA Zero Tolerance Task Force,
2008; Curwin & Mendler, 1997; Grisso, 2006; Sowell et al., 2001). Additionally, the very
conceptualization of school criminalization alludes to labeling theory because in order to
“criminalize” someone, or a group, one must first label them a criminal (Hirschfield &
Celinska, 2011, p. 2).

34

Thus, it is possible for teachers to project criminal futures onto students,
especially African American youth (Hirschfield, 2008). Noguera (2003) found that less
than half of African American students in California believed that their teachers cared for
their future and supported them. Ferguson’s (2000) investigation of how penal practices
are adopted by school officials and the overall school’s disciplinary process revealed
African American students are disproportionally cast into roles as “at-risk of failing,”
“unsalvageable,” and “bound for jail” (p. 9). Indeed, students who are frequently
suspended or expelled from school face an increased risk of juvenile or criminal
incarceration (Skiba et al., 2003). In addition, studies have found a significant
relationship between high rates of minority student suspensions and minority student
dropout rates in urban areas (Bullara, 1993; Felice, 1981; Fuentes, 2003; Gordon, Della
Piana, & Keleher, 2000; Hall & Karanxha, 2012; Sheley, 2000).
When students experience expulsion, it is very difficult to be readmitted to
schools, which also increases the likelihood of dropping out completely (Fenning &
Rose, 2007). Thus, racial disparities in the enforcement of zero tolerance policies, which
are closely associated with subsequent contact with the justice system and high dropout
rates, increase the likelihood that minority students will be funneled into a school-toprison pipeline (Fenning & Rose, 2007; Giroux, 2003; Hanson, 2005; Hirschfield, 2008;
Kim et al., 2010; Skiba & Knesting, 2001; Skiba et al., 2003; Stader, 2006). For example,
roughly 60% of African American male high school dropouts are incarcerated by age 3034 (Pettit & Western, 2004).
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Existing Metanarratives in the Literature
There are several metanarratives, which have been developed in recent years in an
attempt to critically explain the theoretical foundation for the origins and growing use of
zero tolerance policies in schools (see Hirschfield, 2008; Hirschfield & Celinska, 2011).
While these explanations describe conditions that are necessary to the formation and
perpetual implementation of such policies in the American educational system, they are
not adequately sufficient to explain this phenomenon on an individual basis. In other
words, these metanarratives collectively contribute to a better understanding of some of
the root causes behind the emergence of zero tolerance in schools. This subsection will
briefly explain the tenets of these theoretical frameworks and their potential
shortcomings, which will lay the groundwork for a more complete theoretical explanation
of the expansion of zero-tolerance policies in school settings that will be developed in
Chapter 3.
The moral panic narrative has already been mentioned above, and it functions as
one of the major interpretations of school criminalization. School crime and school
violence began to surge in the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s, especially in regards
to school shootings (Boccanfuso & Kuhfeld, 2011; Chen, 2008; DeMitchell & Cobb,
2003). Unlike the rise in school violence in the 1960s and 1970s, these later decades were
met with much more media attention (Hirschfield, 2008; Toby, 1998). Under the moral
panic narrative, fear of school violence, as driven by media framing of the issue, serves to
unify a frightened public, school teachers, school administrators, and public officials in a
stance against a marginalized “folk-devil” (Burns & Crawford, 1999; Cohen, 1972). The
emotionally-charged American public often demands immediate solutions to the crisis
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that spawned the moral panic (Burns & Crawford, 1999; Hirschfield, 2008). As such, the
emotional and political response results in “quick-fix, punitive solutions,” such as zero
tolerance policies and increased security measures that are typically excessive given the
actual threat of future violence (Hirschfield, 2008, p. 85).
Media framing of social issues can often be distorted and exacerbate the public’s
fears (Burns & Crawford, 1999). The media is capable of influencing popular beliefs
through an assortment of accessibility and applicability effects that utilize agenda setting
and priming in order to provide persistent coverage of particular aspects of issues (Kim,
Scheufele, & Shanahan, 2002; Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007). As a result, the media’s
agenda becomes easier to recall for people in order for them draw a connection between
two concepts and accept it as fact (Kim, Scheufele, & Shanahan, 2002; Scheufele &
Tewksbury, 2007).
Accessibility and applicability effects are complimentary because applicable
constructs are much more likely to be acknowledged when made readily accessible to the
public (Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007). Thus, the belief that issue A is connected to issue
B will tend to persevere and mold public perceptions and attitudes provided that the
message is consistently presented or unless some opposing information is made apparent
(Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007). Thus, agenda setting and priming are utilized by the
media to identify what vital issues require an optimal amount of processing time and
attention from audiences, while framing focuses on the manner in which these issues are
presented to the public (Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007).
According to Entman (1993), framing entails selecting certain aspects of a
perceived reality and making them more prominent in a communication text so that a
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particular perspective is promoted over others and people’s attitudes may shift. In other
words, framing permits the media to tailor perception and shape reality through various
methods which include, the amount and placement of coverage, exclusion of factual
material, word choice, the repetition of information, and whether or not a link is
established between familiar symbols and the subject matter so the coverage is more
noticeable and evocative (Bullock, 2007; Bullock & Cubert, 2002; Entman, 1993). The
more frequent a particular frame for an issue is utilized by the media, the more likely it is
to be accepted and rationalized by the public (Carlyle, Slater, & Chakroff, 2008).
Therefore, the successful framing of news can influence the discourse on problems such
as crime (Sasson, 2010).
The moral panic perspective argues that prompt political responses, accompanied
by policy changes, are a product of media driven outrage over a social problem that
mobilizes popular support among the citizenry (Burns & Crawford, 1999; Giroux, 2003;
Hirschfield, 2008). Politicians seize the opportunity to bolster public support by
attempting to swiftly remedy the problematic situation by instituting social controls
targeting the perceived deviant or potentially dangerous offenders (Burns & Crawford,
1999; Giroux, 2003). The reactions of policymakers tend to lead to more sensationalizing
of the social problem by the media. Thus, the media’s message, which persistently
conveys to the public that school violence is an out-of-control social problem, is fueling
the implementation of misguided zero tolerance policies by political powerbrokers (Burns
& Crawford, 1999; Giroux, 2003). A moral panic exists when a large number of nondeviant people believe there is a larger number of people engaging in the stigmatized
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behavior than there actual are and the media’s framing of the issue prolongs this
sentiment (Burns & Crawford, 1999; Giroux, 2003).
However, such reactionary tactics by policymakers seem unnecessary given that
juvenile and school-related violence has been declining ever since 1993 (De Voe et al.,
2004; FBI, 2008). In fact, far more children’s lives are claimed daily by family violence
than by school violence, yet family violence receives less media attention (Burns &
Crawford, 1999; Males, 1998). Family violence and child abuse/neglect may even be
underlying cause for violence in schools (Males, 1998).
Moral panics tend to be sporadic in nature (Cohen, 1972; Hirschfield, 2008) and
driven by alarming media portrayals. However, this type of hysteria does not always
result in policy shifts. If the tightening of disciplinary practices and school security are
characterized by spikes in school crime and violence, then why were zero tolerance
policies not implemented during the school violence panic of the 1970s, which did
receive media coverage (Hirschfield, 2008; Toby, 1998)? Perhaps there is a larger
political agenda at play regarding recent school criminalization efforts. The moral panic
narrative does explain how school criminalization, via the implementation of zero
tolerance policies and enhanced security, is potentially initiated; however, it does not
sufficiently explain how such policies changes become institutionalized and continually
expand when the moral panic recedes (Hirschfield, 2008). It may require powerful
political, organizational, and structural forces, beyond public outrage, for school
criminalization policies and practices to become long-term protocol in the educational
system (Hirschfield, 2008).
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Next, the school accountability metanarrative somewhat explains the longevity of
school disciplinary reforms produced by episodic moral panics, but does so by focusing
on the neoliberal imperative for school accountability rather than politically-motivated
reactions from politicians (Burns & Crawford, 1999; Hirschfield, 2008). This narrative
suggests that market competition, performance monitoring, and accountability for
underperformance and failure are economic principles that have infiltrated the
educational system in an effort to promote more efficiency and improve educational
outcomes for youth (Hirschfield, 2008). The No Child Left Behind Act (2001) directly
ties school funding to scores on annual achievement tests in reading and math (Fuentes,
2003; Heitzeg, 2009).
The accountability perspective argues that teachers and administrators in
“financially strapped schools” are under pressure to raise standardized test scores and
attendance rates to the extent that they are willing to exclude underachieving students in
order to focus on high-achievers (Fuentes, 2003; Heitzeg, 2009; Hirschfield, 2008, p. 85;
NAACP, 2005). Zero tolerance policies serve as the mechanism by which teachers can
weed out low-performing students who, as outliers, might drag down standardized test
scores for struggling schools (Fuentes, 2003; NAACP, 2005). The net-widening of the
possible infractions for which a student may receive suspension and/or expulsion makes
it easier for school officials to remove failing students and conceal educational deficits
caused by a lack of resources and teaching quality (Fuentes, 2003; NAACP, 2005). This
perspective acknowledges the promotion of selective or frequent exclusionary practices
by school officials to focus on the best performing students and dismiss those who
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threaten overall performance on standardized tests so schools may avoid harsh sanctions
(Fuentes, 2003; Hirschfield, 2008; NAACP, 2005).
However, zero tolerance policies actually weaken school authorities’ discretion
and replace it with strict guidelines and security agents (e.g., school resource officers),
which means that some promising students will be sacrificed in the process (Fuentes,
2003). The accountability narrative does not explain this possibility very well, especially
since it is possible for honor roll students to face expulsion for infractions covered under
zero tolerance policies (Hirschfield, 2008). Thus, there are larger social, legal, cultural,
political, and economic contexts that influence how the educational system acts in
response to moral panics and greater demands for accountability (Hirschfield, 2008).
In regard to a portion of the legal context underpinning disciplinary reforms in
schools, the due process narrative offers a rationale for why school officials support zero
tolerance policies, which minimize their discretion in matters of enforcing punishment on
misbehaving students (Hirschfield, 2008). Under this perspective, it is argued that the
ineffectiveness of school discipline and low educational achievement is associated with
the erosion of moral authority in public schools, which creates an “atmosphere of
disorder” (Arum, 2003, p. 3). When schools become unable to enforce moral authority
over the student body, their objective to effectively socialize youth appropriately is
threatened and the teaching environment becomes chaotic as a result (Arum, 2003).
The due process narrative claims that the students’ rights movement of the 1960s
and 1970s, which led to a series of judicial rulings that curtailed arbitrary and capricious
disciplinary practices by school officials and standardized many disciplinary procedures,
actually undermined the traditional moral authority that school administrators
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traditionally exerted (Arum, 2003; Toby, 1998). Arum (2003) and Toby (1998) both
argue that the court decisions also encouraged students to overtly defy their teachers’
authority. As such, school principals became cautious when administering suspension and
expulsion for fear of litigation (Arum, 2003; Hirschfield, 2008). In fact, among the
crucial stakeholder groups supporting zero tolerance policies in schools are the national
school principals associations (Boylan & Weiser, 2002). Furthermore, the due process
narrative elucidates that reasoning behind the increased role that police and the justice
system play in school disciplinary matters, because by expanding law enforcement
entities’ involvement, school administrators are able to reduce their susceptibility to
litigation (Hirschfield, 2008). With both school violence and school funding crises
coinciding at similar periods, the political atmosphere necessary to support zero tolerance
initiatives was reached (Hirschfield, 2008). However, this narrative neglects to
adequately explain why strict zero tolerance codes and an armed police presence are
mostly found in inner-city school systems (Hirschfield, 2008). Disadvantaged, minority
students and their families are less likely to seek legal challenges against school officials
and sustain the cost of drawn out court proceedings without institutional assistance
(Arum, 2003). Therefore, concerns over liability explain only a portion of the rationale
for school criminalization efforts, but do not clarify the reasoning for racial disparity in
the application of harsh zero tolerance policies and practices (Hirschfield, 2008).
A governing through crime metanarrative also exists, and it offers an
understanding of the governance pertaining to the highest levels of policy making in the
American educational system, especially zero tolerance and school criminalization
initiatives (Simon, 2007). School criminalization reflects a political agenda to refocus
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social control measures and enforce harsh punishment for crimes (Simon, 2007). Of
course “the consent and complicity of the governed” are necessary in order for the focus
to be placed on personal responsibility, such that students, teachers, and failing schools
bear the burden for transgressions and attention is diverted away from deep-rooted and
complex social, structural, and cultural problems affecting school violence (Hirschfield,
2008, p. 88; Simon, 2007). Federally mandated legislation, such as zero tolerance
policies, are instrumental in shifting school governance toward a crime control model
(Simon, 2007).
The fear of crime becomes an overarching rationale to bolster support for
increased social controls over students in hopes of creating safer school environments
(Simon, 2007). Much of this fear is associated with “parental insecurity” (Simon, 2007,
p.230). Schools use to be a mechanism used to promote racial segregation and inequality,
but social reforms in the 1960s and 1970s reversed this trend and actively pursued racial
equality and interracial solidarities (Simon, 2007). However, not all Americans saw racial
justice as essential to improving educational experiences (Simon, 2007). Actually, some
parents perceive compulsory education through desegregation was a way in which
parents were forced to surrender control over their children’s safety, while at school,
because now their kids would be required to attend dangerous schools (Simon, 2007).
Just like the accountability narrative acknowledges school criminalization as a tool to
exert political pressure for a school voucher system (Arum, 2003), this narrative similarly
recognizes the role that parents and communities give to the criminalization of schools in
hopes of gaining back control over their children’s safety (Simon, 2007).
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Consequently, the governing through crime narrative claims that in the school
context, disruptive students and failing schools must be recast as criminals, while highperforming students and their parents are recast as victims, and educational policymakers
are elevated to the role of prosecutor and judge (Simon, 2007). Zero tolerance policies
become the means through which schools are expected to document and manage
problems of violence and crime, or otherwise face sanctions (Simon, 2007). Thus, the
criminal element in schools must be isolated and removed in hopes of improving
educational achievement among deserving students (Simon, 2007). As mentioned before,
the No Child Left Behind Act embraces market mechanisms in order to link funding of
public schools with test scores and hold failing schools accountable, which in essence
creates a climate of competition for resources (Simon, 2007). The reform structure of this
legislation is very much in sync with the crime model because those schools with
worsening overall test scores will suffer serious consequences (Simon, 2007). In addition,
the formal barriers between the school system and the juvenile justice system are
eradicated and criminal justice officials receive greater access to student files and
administrative databases, which may allow law enforcement to make schools a favored
place to search for suspects (Simon, 2007). However, the governing through crime
metanarrative does not account for some provisions in recent legislation that promotes
violence prevention and conflict resolution programs, which are not in step with a crime
control paradigm (Casella, 2003b; Hirschfield, 2008).
Hirschfield (2008) developed another metanarrative that acknowledges two
emergent structural realities, which have surfaced under recent political-economic
conditions marked by deindustrialization and mass incarceration. These realities include
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the following: (1) that prison awaits African American youth who fail or dropout of
school, and (2) that schools do not possess the necessary resources to reverse the
wayward paths of problematic students without also detracting from the quality of
teaching and services meant for those perceived as more deserving and promising
students (Hirschfield, 2008). When coupled with school criminalization policies, such as
zero tolerance, the realities imply that troublesome, African American students are
“unsalvageable,” and thus, teachers and administrators project criminal futures onto their
most disruptive and chronically disobedient African American students (Hirschfield,
2008, p.92). This classification and socialization narrative identifies the anticipatory
labeling of students, by education professionals, as “future prisoners” who must be
controlled or excluded for the sake of other students (Hirschfield, 2008, p.92).
It is argued by many sociologists that structural forces “condition” and
“constrain” individual perceptions and interactions with others (Bourdieu & Passeron,
1977; Hirschfield, 2008, p. 91). Therefore, changes in the political-economic system,
which may affect social class status, can influence teachers’ perceptions of students’
future prospects by linking social structure with students’ educational and occupational
aspirations and classroom effort (Hirschfield, 2008). As a result, how teachers decide to
call upon school resource officers to remove a disruptive student or how principals
determine if they want to refer a student to law enforcement for arrest is all mediated by
individual interpretation of social and structural realities (Hirschfield, 2008). If a poor,
African American student is already being labeled as “bound for jail,” then a teacher is
more likely to have that student removed to hasten his or her projected future reality, so
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instruction can be focused on more economically viable students (Ferguson, 2000, p. 9;
Hirschfield, 2008).
Zero tolerance policies make it possible for school officials to “fast track”
undesirable and disruptive students into the school-to-prison pipeline (Hirschfield, 2008,
p. 92). In addition, the neoliberal push for the accountability of underperforming schools
creates an added impetus to motivate teachers to control and remove disaffected or
disruptive students, who hinder the collective improvement on standardized test scores
(Hirschfield, 2008). For these reasons, school officials, who may be politically
progressive, tend to comply with school criminalization policies that are consistent with
neoliberal ideals (Hirschfield & Celinska, 2011).
Criminal justice agents, including school resource officers (SROs), police
officers, and judges also play a crucial role in the recent transformation of school
disciplinary practices and policies (Arum, 2003; Hirschfield, 2008; Simon, 2007). Justice
system professionals constantly strive to preserve and increase their legitimacy, and a
thorough theoretical explanation of zero tolerance policies must explicate their role in
conjunction with other actors (e.g., teachers, school administrators, and policymakers),
who also promote the prevailing neoliberal political agenda underpinning school
criminalization (Giroux, 2003: Hirschfield & Celinska, 2011; Kupchik & Monahan,
2006; Lyons & Drew, 2006). The metanarratives described above all contribute to the
theorizing of the emergence and expansion of zero tolerance policies (Hirschfield, 2008;
Hirschfield & Celinska, 2011). However, the manner in which these theoretical
components function to also promote the neoliberal goal of limited government, the
retraction of social welfare, and the coercive control over marginal populations in
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educational settings needs to be further developed (Hirschfield, 2008; Hirschfield &
Celinska, 2011; Lyons & Drew, 2006).
Undoubtedly, the methods of school criminalization have been recognized as
reinforcing the dominant neoliberal political agenda and governing model (Giroux, 2003;
Kupchik & Monahan, 2006; Lyons & Drew, 2006). Furthermore, zero tolerance policies
aid the government in concealing social injustices and underinvestment in public schools
by removing discretion and the relevance of mitigating circumstances (Giroux, 2003).
Hence, the penetration of the neoliberal agenda into school governance encourages a
contracted public sphere and a docile citizenry (Hirschfield & Celinska, 2011; Lyons &
Drew, 2006). How this neoliberal agenda and its various agents of enforcement overcome
legal challenges, which are often based on a lack of due process and fairness and threaten
the perceived legitimacy of school disciplinary reform, requires further investigation
(Hirschfield & Celinska, 2011).
Extending the Neoliberal State and the Crisis of Liberal Democracy
According to neoliberal theory, the state should support strong individual property
rights, legal certainty, and the strengthening of financial institutions of free markets and
trade (Harvey, 2005). These aims are best achieved through privatization and
deregulation of economic sectors, which are expected to promote and guarantee
individual freedoms (Harvey, 2005). As such, competition (between individuals,
companies, and other entities) is a virtue necessary to garner in new modes of efficiency,
economic growth, innovation, and prosperity for all (Harvey, 2005; Kotz, 2003). Thus,
unbridled individualism is championed over social solidarity, which has long been a
hallmark of social justice (Harvey, 2005).
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Government intervention in the functioning of free markets and free trade is seen
only as an obstruction that will hinder the establishment of a healthy business climate
(Harvey, 2005). Therefore, privatization and deregulation, coupled with competition, are
perceived to eradicate bureaucratic red tape, enhance productivity, increase product and
service quality, and lower costs to the consumer by generating cheaper commodities and
reducing tax burdens (Harvey, 2005). Increased productivity is expected to raise the
standard of living for everyone, because neoliberal theory assumes that “a rising tide lifts
all boats,” and poverty can be eliminated only by freeing markets and trade from
government constraints (Harvey, 2005, p.64).
The theory holds the individual accountable and personally responsible for his or
her actions and overall well-being (Harvey, 2005; Wacquant, 2009a, 2009b).
Furthermore, this principle of individual responsibility encompasses the domains of
welfare, education, healthcare, and social security (Harvey, 2005). Neoliberal theory
assumes that every citizen has equal access to information and opportunity; therefore,
there are no power imbalances that would allow more powerful people to take advantage
of the free market system (Harvey, 2005). Those who fail to succeed where others have
are simply lazy and unwilling to work hard (Harvey, 2005). So individual success or
failure is perceived to be blamed on the individual, while structural and social inequalities
are overlooked and dismissed (Harvey, 2005).
As Margaret Thatcher stated, there is “no such thing as society, only individual
men and women” (Harvey, 2005, p.23). Under a neoliberal state, all forms of social
solidarity are replaced with individualism, private property, personal responsibility, and
family values (Harvey, 2005). Ironically, according to this logic, individuals are allegedly
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free to choose, but they should not choose to organize collectively in the form of worker
unions or social movements (Harvey, 2005). The neoliberal state is overtly hostile to
organized labor, or any form of social solidarity for that matter (Harvey, 2005).
Neoliberals are seriously suspicious of democratic governance, and they see majority
rule, under a democracy, to clearly be a potential threat to individual rights and liberties
(Harvey, 2005). Consequently, neoliberals prefer a government run by elites and laws
determined by executive order or judicial decision making rather than democratic
decision making by a representative legislature (Harvey, 2005).
In practice, the neoliberal state treats labor and the environment as mere
commodities to be exploited in order to benefit the financial system regardless of the
means (Harvey, 2005). The health of workers and the protection of the environment are
sacrificed for the freedom of the market from intrusive government regulations (Harvey,
2005). Unsafe working conditions and polluted ecosystems are necessary side effects to a
robust, global financial market (Harvey, 2005). Neoliberals desire flexible specialization
in labor markets, which allow real wages to be suppressed, job insecurity to be increased,
and the reduction of benefits and job protections to workers (Harvey, 2005). These
conditions create a labor market that is void of bargaining power and a welfare state that
is greatly reduced (Harvey, 2005; Kotz, 2003, 2008, 2009). In fact, the only thing in need
of strict regulation in the neoliberal state is the labor market, which enables wages to be
low and the labor force compliant (Harvey, 2005).
To better understand why the US political economy recently underwent a
neoliberal restructuring, one must first reflect on the historical conditions and social
climate that permitted this transformation. Then it is easier to recognize the
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contradictions between neoliberal theory and representative democracy. Additionally, one
may also begin to comprehend how a neoliberal agenda can extend into other institutions,
such as public education.
After World War II, the US government chose a tightly regulated economy under
a Keynesian framework (Harvey, 2005; Kotz, 2008). The US government feared a return
to the conditions that led to the Great Depression; thus, the Keynesian model permitted
the state to regulate the market, create a number of social welfare programs, and
empower strong trade unions (Harvey, 2005; Kotz, 2003, 2008). Keynesian economics
authorized the state to pursue full employment, economic growth, and the welfare of the
citizenry by using its power to intervene and regulate business cycles and influence sound
fiscal policies (Harvey, 2005).
This form of political-economic organization is known as “embedded liberalism,”
whereby several social and political restrictions are placed on market processes and
actions by corporations (Harvey, 2005, p.11). Neoliberlism seeks to disembed the market
and capital from such restraint (Harvey, 2005). The 1950s and 1960s were marked by
high rates of economic growth, and these successes were largely attributed to effective
functioning of embedded liberalism and an interventionist state (Harvey, 2005).
However, by the end of the 1960s, embedded liberalism was threatened by a serious crisis
of capital accumulation that saw a surge in unemployment and inflation (Harvey, 2005;
Kotz, 2003, 2008). This stagflation lasted well into the 1970s where a social and
economic crisis reached critical levels (Giroux, 2003; Harvey, 2005, Kotz, 2008).
Keynesian policies and social democratic solutions proved inconsistent by the
mid-1970s (Harvey, 2005). As a result, corporate and conservative groups from the
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political right blamed the crisis on government meddling in the economy (Harvey, 2005;
Kotz, 2003). Moreover, economic elites and the ruling class felt threatened by the
widespread reforms and state interventions under the Keynesian model (Harvey, 2005).
The growth collapse of the 1970s, which saw real interest rates plummet into the negative
range and dividends and profits dwindle, gave the ruling classes plenty of reason to feel
threatened (Harvey, 2005).
In October 1979, Paul Volcker, chairman of the US Federal Reserve Bank, shifted
US fiscal policy to abandon the Keynesian model and implement policies with the sole
purpose to quash inflation regardless of the effects on unemployment rates (Harvey,
2005). After all, neoliberal theory contends that unemployment is always voluntary and a
reflection of the ability of the worker (Harvey, 2005). As a result, the nominal rate of
interest rose immediately, and the newly elected Reagan administration ushered in a new
era of neoliberal reforms that sought further deregulation, tax cuts, budget cuts, and an
assault on trade unions and organized labor (Harvey, 2005). Tax cuts on investment led to
capital flight out of the unionized Northeast and Midwest into the non-union South and
West, as well as markets abroad (Harvey, 2005). Under Reagan, deindustrialization
rapidly increased and manufacturing moved to countries like China and India, where
taxation and environmental regulations were much more lax (Harvey, 2005). In addition,
Reagan lowered corporate taxes and reduced the top personal tax rate from 70 to 28%,
which created a wider gap between the rich and the poor, as well as a restoration of
economic power to the upper class (Harvey, 2005). US investment banks increased the
amount of capital loaned to foreign governments, which required the further liberalization
of international credit and financial markets (Harvey, 2005). Among the many
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institutional reforms, there were cuts to welfare programs and the establishment of more
flexible labor market laws (Harvey, 2005). This neoliberal restructuring led to the slow
growth and economic instability until the economic expansion of the 1990s (Kotz, 2003).
The Clinton administration continued the neoliberal agenda by cutting
government spending, advocating free trade agreements (e.g., NAFTA), and freeing
markets and trade from barriers (Kotz, 2003). The rate of profit reached its peak in the
1990s, while real wages continued to decline and the tax burden was shifted from capital
to labor (Kotz, 2003). The rate of profit refers to “the ratio of total surplus value to capital
invested, where total surplus value includes not just profit narrowly defined but also
interest, some tax payments, and some wage and salary incomes” (Kotz, 2008, p.3).
There was also a shift from high-wage jobs to temporary or part-time work in the service
sector, which brought in lower wages for employees (Kotz, 2009). Tax cuts on business
and the wealthiest Americans created drastic income inequality where the ratio of average
CEO’s salary compared to the average worker’s salary was 500 to 1 by the year 2000
(Harvey, 2005). Business and technology investments and consumer spending rose
rapidly in the late 1990s, and eventually led to the speculative stock market bubble (Kotz,
2003).
Consumers were able to continue to spend in spite of decreasing wages by
borrowing against appreciating assets (Kotz, 2003). Stock prices rose by 24% per year
from 1995 to 1999, and middle-class Americans felt the momentary benefits, which were
followed by a stock market crash in 2000 and the 2001 recession (Kotz, 2003). Consumer
spending, which was financed by Americans leveraging assets by adding debt, prevented
the 2001 recession from becoming severe (Kotz, 2008). Asset bubbles tend to emerge
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under neoliberal structure, because increased borrowing against assets, like home equity,
is necessary in order to keep economic expansion growing under neoliberal capitalism
and offset crises of overproduction (Kotz, 2008, 2009). Thus, further financial
deregulation, speculative and high-risk activities of the financial sector, and the
development of the housing bubble led to the economic crisis of 2008 and the current
recession (Kotz, 2009).
Neoliberal theory adheres to the free market principles of neoclassical economics,
which developed in the late nineteenth century (Harvey, 2005; Wolfe, 1977). However,
the neoliberal theoretical framework is not very compatible with its political obligation to
individual freedom, and its demand for a strong coercive state that will defend property
rights and individual liberties does not mesh well with its distrust of all state power
(Harvey, 2005; Wolfe, 1977). Karl Polanyi (1954) stated that the neoliberal interpretation
of freedom may very well mean the freedom to exploit others, the freedom to make
excessive gains without reinvesting them in the community, the freedom to prevent the
public from benefiting from certain technological innovations, and the freedom to profit
from national catastrophes that are secretly concocted for private gain. Appeals to
tradition and fear were used by the economic elite to drum up support for neoliberalism
in the late 1960s (Harvey, 2005).
The political movements of the late 1960s, especially the student movements for
greater due process rights, demanded freedom from parental, educational, corporate,
bureaucratic, and state constraints (Arum, 2003; Harvey, 2005; Toby, 1998). However,
the enhanced individual freedoms sought in the student movement clashed with the
traditional objectives of social justice (Harvey, 2005). Social justice assumes that
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individual wants, needs, and desires will be suppressed in favor of striving for a more
collective good, such as social equality (Harvey, 2005). Neoliberal reformers, in the
economically troubled 1970s, used the rhetoric of individual freedoms to bolster popular
support against the interventionist and regulatory policies of the Keynesian model
(Harvey, 2005). Neoliberalism offered a message of differentiated consumerism and
individual libertarianism, which would combat the intrusive state and allow individual
freedoms to triumph (Harvey, 2005). Individualism is grounded in the American culture
and history, so neoliberal perspectives were easily disseminated and well-received by
academics, politicians, corporations, and citizens who were tired of the economic slump
of the late 1970s (Harvey, 2005). Thus, the neoliberal appeal to individualism constructed
the necessary consent from the public to elect political leaders, like Reagan, who
promised to carry out the neoliberal restructuring of the US economy (Harvey, 2005).
The duality of liberal democracy, within the US, currently faces a crisis of
legitimacy (Habermas, 1975; Harvey, 2005; Wolfe, 1977). Classical liberalism refers to a
market-based ideology, which justifies a capitalist mode of production by freeing the
market from government regulations and encouraging self-interested individualism
among citizens (Harvey, 2005; Wolfe, 1977). Conversely, democracy promotes the
maximization of civic participation by the populace in an effort to establish a community
defined by equality, mutual respect, and cooperative interaction among citizens toward
commonly agreed-upon goals (Harvey, 2005; Wolfe, 1977). The logic behind these
dueling ideologies presents a contradiction, whereby liberalism creates inequality via
power imbalances across rigid class lines, while democracy struggles to respond by
promoting social welfare remedies and state regulations to alleviate social ills (Habermas,
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1975; Harvey, 2005; Wolfe, 1977). Neoliberalism exerts an ideology that is highly
suspicious of democracy (Harvey, 2005). Neoliberal policies and practices are
determined to return all responsibility to the individual, and in the process, severely
diminish welfare provisions, such as healthcare, public education, and other social
services that will leave greater segments of society impoverished (Harvey, 2005;
Wacquant, 2009a, 2009b). The social safety net created in the era of embedded liberalism
is reduced to a “bare minimum” under a neoliberal system emphasizing individual
accountability (Harvey, 2005, p.76). Neoliberal theory embraces the rule of law and any
conflict or opposition must be “mediated through the courts” (Harvey, 2005, p.66).
Therefore, judicial rulings may serve as the vehicle by which neoliberal contradictions
are legitimized in a representative democracy, like the US.
Loïc Wacquant (2009a, 2009b) argues that contemporary, neoliberal restructuring
of capitalism in the US continues to greatly reduce the welfare state, privatize state
enterprises, and eliminate state regulations on the economy. The consequence is the
restriction of forces of controls that would seek to redistribute resources more equitably
(Wacquant, 2009a, 2009b). Ironically, in order for the markets to enjoy such freedom
from controls, social controls on marginal populations representing the surplus labor
force and underclass must be exerted to weaken trade unions, reject worker’s bargaining
power, regulate the poor, and repress wages (Harvey, 2005; Kotz, 2003, 2008, 2009;
Wacquant, 2009a, 2009b). Thus, neoliberal capitalism frees the mobility of capital across
markets from government regulations, while also increasing formal social controls on
marginal populations to manipulate the labor market and perpetuate the existing class
structure (Harvey, 2005; Kotz, 2003, 2008, 2009; Wacquant, 2009a, 2009b). As Polanyi
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(1954) feared, the freedoms of the masses are controlled to secure the freedoms of the
few. The social controls which are exerted, tend to be punitive and carceral in nature
(Wacquant, 2009a, 2009b). Thus, the neoliberal state resorts to coercive legislation and
policing tactics to quell and subdue any collective forms of opposition to corporate power
(Harvey, 2005; Wacquant, 2009a, 2009b). In the US, incarceration becomes the ideal
strategy to overcome problems coming from discarded workers and marginalized
populations (Harvey, 2005; Wacquant, 2009a, 2009b). In addition, zero tolerance policies
and practices are expected to be increasingly applied to marginalized groups, such as
impoverished minorities (Wacquant, 2009a, 2009b).
According to Wacquant (2009b), the regulation of the poor is accomplished
through two processes: prisonfare and workfare. Prisonfare refers to the hyper-intensive
and extensive use of punitive controls over the economically superfluous, while workfare
refers to the retraction of welfare safety nets through new responsibilities, obligations,
and surveillance (e.g., welfare-to-work requirements) associated with access to public
services (Wacquant, 2009b). The penal arm of the state (i.e., the police, the courts, and
corrections) serves not only to enforce law but also as a mechanism to produce the
political reality favored by the ruling upper class (Harvey, 2005; Wacquant, 2009b). The
neoliberal reshaping of the state exerts control over all facets of social life except for the
economy (Wacquant, 2009b). The “rolling out of the police-to-prison dragnet” and the
“rolling back of the social safety net” is the state’s response to contain poor, marginalized
populations produced by neoliberal practices (Wacquant, 2009b, p.304). Thus, Wacquant
(2009b) argued that for the neoliberal state to be fully actualized four institutional logics
must be achieved: (1) economic deregulation, (2) welfare state retraction and
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reconfiguration, (3) societal emphasis on individual responsibility, and (4) an extensive
and proactive penal apparatus. This recipe permits the state to embrace laissez-faire
market values to benefit the wealthiest Americans, while providing the means to
punitively deal with the social insecurity arising from the growing poor populations and
surplus laborers (Wacquant, 2009b).
Public schools did not escape the neoliberal offensive (Hirschfield, 2008;
Hirschfield & Celinska, 2011; Noguera, 2003; Nolan & Anyon, 2004). Neoliberal
initiatives to enhance school accountability have made it easier for school officials to
rationalize the use of zero tolerance policies in order to isolate disruptive students who
are believed to be “bound for prison” and incapable of functioning in today’s economy
(Ferguson, 2000, p. 9; Fuentes, 2003; Hirschfield, 2008; NAACP, 2005). Wacquant
(2001) argues that just like ghettos have become more like prisons, so have inner-city
public schools become like “institutions of confinement” (p.108). He further argues that
the neoliberal transformations of the political economy have repositioned inner-city
public schools to act as lockdown environments to “neutralize” disadvantaged African
American and Latino youths who are deemed “unworthy” and “unruly” (Wacquant,
2001, p. 108). Thus, the political practices of the penal realm of the state have infiltrated
the educational system (Giroux, 2003).
Zero tolerance policies emerged as a mechanism in which to punish and remove
students perceived to have no market value and identified as flawed consumers because
they are associated with crime, redundancy, poverty, and expendability (Giroux, 2003;
Hall & Karanxha, 2012; Hirschfield, 2008; Wacquant, 2001). Subsequent referrals to the
justice system hinder future hopes of higher education and jeopardize the economic
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viability for these stigmatized youth (Hall & Karanxha, 2012). Thus, the nation’s most atrisk youth are controlled and funneled into confinement, which perpetuates their
marginalization prior to entering the workforce (Hall & Karanxha, 2012). The neoliberal
agenda advanced through school criminalization promotes a “narrow public sphere” and
a “docile citizenry” (Hirschfield & Celinska, 2011, p.7). Whereas public schools
traditionally provided the arena for battles over full citizenship and equal opportunity,
their role has now transformed to serve as a model of disempowered citizenship where
students’ rights are weakened and their movements are controlled (Lyons & Drew, 2006;
Nolan & Anyon, 2004). School criminalization may aid in instilling a “passive
acquiescence to state and corporate power” among the student population and their
parents (Lyons & Drew, 2006, p. 195). Furthermore, state legislators, with vested
interests in building or expanding prisons, are likewise able to vote on the funding of
urban education, school security, and punitive school policy (Hirschfield, 2008). Thus,
states with large prison populations may benefit more politically by expanding
exclusionary school policies in order to keep prisons full rather than finance urban
schools that lack adequate resources (Hirschfield, 2008). In addition, school
criminalization may facilitate teacher disengagement, which reduces their ability to
understand and confidently address their students’ problems (Hirschfield & Celinska,
2011). Disengagement coupled with aggressive, exclusionary practices that result in
racial disparities may erode students’ trust and threaten the perceived legitimacy of
school rules because they are seen as unfair given their lack of due process (Brotherton,
1996; Hirschfield & Celinska, 2011; Kupchik, 2010).
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The American educational system reproduces the structure of capitalist society by
socializing students in the values of the market place as favored by the economic ruling
class (Shapiro, 1984). At the same time, schools face a legitimation crisis since they also
serve to represent democratic principles, such as equality of access, mutuality, universal
responsibility, and collective obligation (Shapiro, 1984). Democratic ideals are
increasingly opposed by the neoliberal imperatives of a class-divided society (Shapiro,
1984). When students experience unfairness in regard to the limitation of due process via
mandatory zero tolerance policies, they are acknowledging the contradictory nature of the
socialization processes that promotes the values and norms of a dominant economic class
while drawing into question the legitimacy of a public educational system claiming to
serve as a communal good (Shapiro, 1984). The legitimation problem facing education is
inflamed by the neoliberal goals of the ruling class conflicting with the traditional
democratic aims of an educational system based on equity and fairness (Shapiro, 1984).
Therefore, as neoliberal theory affords, challenges to the contradictory nature of the
expansion of the neoliberal agenda into school disciplinary policy must be “mediated
through the courts” (Harvey, 2005, p.66). As such, affirmation of zero tolerance policies
through court decisions may legitimate the state’s control of marginal populations in
school settings and the neoliberal influence on educational policy, regardless of the
infringement on democratic rights and liberties of students.

59

CHAPTER THREE
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Scholars have developed comprehensive, theoretical causal narratives to
conceptualize school criminalization efforts in recent decades (Hirschfield, 2008).
Indeed, five meta-narratives, which were described in detail above, are currently the
predominate theoretical explanations for the emergence of zero tolerance policies. While
these explanations define theoretical mechanisms that are necessary for the creation and
longevity of such policies in the American educational system, they are not adequately
sufficient to explain this phenomenon on an individual basis. Moreover, while a couple of
the narratives allude to neoliberal influences, most are not grounded in the context of
recent social and political-economic transformations in the US. In other words, these
metanarratives collectively contribute to a better understanding of some of the root causes
behind the emergence of zero tolerance in schools.
However, a more complete theoretical framework that accounts for the historical
context of the neoliberal restructuring of the US political economy is needed to explicate
how these theoretical mechanisms function processually in order to overcome threats to
legitimacy, which the neoliberal agenda faces as it conflicts with the traditional
democratic aims of the American educational system (Shapiro, 1984). What follows is a
new conceptualization that reconfigures components of the prevailing theoretical
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narratives along with neoliberal theory to better construct a theoretical framework that
accounts for historical context and incorporates descriptions of the political,
organizational, and structural forces that enable school criminalization to become
institutionalized and legitimized in America (see Appendix A for visual depiction).
The Backdrop of Neoliberal Restructuring
Neoliberal restructuring of the US economy began amid the crisis of capital
accumulation in the middle to late 1970s, which led to a shift away from the Fordist
model of mass production and toward a more flexible, service-oriented economic system
in the 1980s and 1990s (De Giori, 2006, 2007; Harvey, 2005; Kotz, 2003, 2008, 2009;
Kupchik & Monahan, 2006; Lynch, 2007, 2010). The practices performed during this
restructuring of the political economy reflect the principles of neoliberal theory, which
holds that the state should not interfere in the economy and should only concern itself
with providing stronger individual property rights to individual citizens and corporate
entities, while reinforcing legal certainty and further strengthening financial institutions
of free markets and trade (Harvey, 2005). Under this neoliberal logic, several practices
were put into play, such as deregulation, labor outsourcing, decentralization, moving
production abroad, computerized automation, privatization, and displacement of workers
into low-wage, service sector jobs where temporary employment is more common
(Harvey, 2005; Kotz, 2003, 2008, 2009; Kupchik & Monahan, 2006; Lynch, 2007, 2010).
The neoliberal principles of individualism and personal responsibility were rhetorically
used to reinforce the movement to deregulate industry and promote competition among
individuals and companies (Harvey, 2005; Kotz, 2003; Lynch, 2007). In the neoliberal
state, the individual is to blame for success or failure, while economic, racial, and social
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inequalities are ignored because it is assumed everyone has equal access and opportunity
(Harvey, 2005).
Deindustrialization and mass incarceration are two major developments that
occurred in the neoliberal era of American capitalism. In fact, in 1973 the rate of
imprisonment began to steadily rise in the US just as the US economy was experiencing a
contraction of the manufacturing sector and an expansion of the service sector (Lynch,
2007, 2010). These two trends are characteristic of how the neoliberal transformation of
the American economy produces economic marginalization and the need for social
control to manage class conflict (De Giorgi, 2007; Harvey, 2005; Kupchik & Monahan,
2006; Lynch, 2007, 2010; Wacquant, 2009a, 2009b). Rusche and Kirchheimer (1939)
argued that every system of production discovers punishments consistent and compatible
with the primary focus of that system’s form of production. Their work examined the
relationship between rates of unemployment and incarceration, and they found that
imprisonment, in capitalist societies, served to control surplus labor populations,
potentially provide production of goods without labor costs, and resocialize marginalized
workers through hard work (Lynch, 2007, 2010; Rusche & Kirchheimer, 1939).
However, counter to Rusche and Kirchheimer’s labor market model, imprisonment did
not decline in the 1980s and 1990s as the US experienced a mild economic recovery and
unemployment rates decreased due to the expansion of service sector employment
(Lynch, 2007, 2010). The unique transformation that the US system of production
underwent must be taken into account in order to understand why incarceration exploded
while unemployment rates vacillated (Lynch, 2007, 2010).
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Michalowski and Carlson (1999) addressed this phenomenon with their
empirically-based argument that the economy passed through stages of social structures
of accumulation (SSAs), which include economic exploration, decay, consolidation, and
expansion. Thus, the relationship between unemployment and incarceration is
conditioned by the characteristics of the stage the economy is experiencing as it
progresses through the long cycles of SSA (Lynch, 2007; Michalowski & Carlson, 1999).
SSAs also affect how imprisonment is used to control economically marginalize groups
(Lynch, 2007; Michalowski & Carlson, 1999). The contraction of manufacturing and the
expansion of the service industry, during the neoliberal restructuring of the economy, was
characterized by job losses due to technological automation, moving production abroad,
deregulation, and privatization (Lynch, 2007, 2010).
Deindustrialization displaced workers into lower-paying service sector jobs or
into the ranks of the marginalized unemployed (De Giorgi, 2007; Harvey, 2005; Kotz,
2003, 2008, 2009; Kupchik & Monahan, 2006; Lynch, 2007, 2010). Economic
marginalization encompasses more than just unemployment, and it can include partial
and seasonal employment, economic exploitation common in wage-based economies
where class membership defines owning and laboring options, and broad shifts in the
salary structure correlated with service sector expansion (Lynch, 2007, 2010). From the
1970s through the 1990s, there was a long-term decline in unemployment; however,
economic marginalization continued because income inequality expanded during this
same period (Lynch, 2007, 2010). Aggregate income growth grew for the top 20 percent
of families, while the bottom 20 percent experienced an approximate $2,000 decrease in
average income (Lynch, 2007). The gap between the rich and poor has never been as
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wide as it is currently, and the social insecurity stemming from the growing economic
inequality has created the conditions in which social safety nets can be retracted and
punitive penal practices of social control can be extended by the state, while enjoying
popular public support that driven is by fear (Harvey, 2005; Wacquant, 2009a, 2009b).
In the service sector, capitalists desire commodities or services that have a
relatively frequent replacement cycle (e.g., barber shop) and long-term inelastic demand
(e.g., food) compared to commodities with longer consumption cycles, such as
automobiles (Lynch, 2007). Moreover, the service-sector capitalist wants an inelastic
market that is also expanding to maximize accumulation (Lynch, 2007). The prison
apparatus provides such a marketplace because the correctional system requires services,
such as data storage and retrieval; food services; laundry and clothing services;
telecommunications services; Internet services; electronic monitoring systems; healthcare
services; insurance; mailing services; financial services; transportation services;
maintenance services; educational and vocational services; housing services; building
services; and security (correctional officers) services (Lynch, 2007). Of course,
unemployment cannot be the only reason why the correctional industrial complex has
become a “service marketplace” and “viable financial investment,” especially since the
service sector offset some of the rise in unemployment (Lynch, 2007, p. 133).
The increase in economic inequality creates the potential for class conflict, and
social control is used to manage this conflict and prevent it from upending the existing
power structure (De Giorgi, 2006, 2007; Lynch, 2007, 2010; Wacquant, 2009a, 2009b).
In addition, the privatization of state services, which started under the Reagan
administration, allows for billions of tax dollars to be redirected to the purchase of private
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sector services rather than the state providing them (Lynch, 2007). The growth of the
private prison apparatus parallels the Reagan-initiated privatization efforts (Lynch, 2007).
Furthermore, the private prison sector has a powerful lobby, political action committees
(PACs), and industry groups to pressure politicians to support expanding prison growth
and the services it requires (Lynch, 2007). Therefore, privatization permits the state to
spend revenue it has obtained through taxation on private service providers who absorb a
portion of the state’s social expense bill as profit via a service provision fee before the
services are provided to the state (Lynch, 2007). Through this process, the American
taxpayer bears the burden of operating the US correctional system and private entities get
to profit from prison expansion (Lynch, 2007). In fact, the per capita expenditures, via
taxpayer dollars, on the correctional system increased to over 480 percent since 1980,
while imprisonment rose by 243 percent and the number of inmates rose by 318 percent
in the same time period (Lynch, 2007).
Recent U.S. Census Bureau data on income distribution, as measured by the GINI
index of income concentration, revealed that income inequality between the 20 percent of
households making the lowest level of income and the top 5 percent making the greatest
amount of income has increased by 25 percent since 1968 (Lynch, 2007). Class conflict
typically goes unnoticed but is waged through the mechanisms of the criminal justice
system, which magnifies the crimes of the marginal classes and minimizes the crimes of
the rich and powerful (Lynch, 2007; Wacquant, 2009a, 2009b). Social control achieves
the conditions required by capitalism in a number of ways. First of all, mass incarceration
reinforces individual and private property rights, because the majority of criminals
punished in the US have committed property crimes (Lynch, 2007). Next, imprisonment
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attaches a criminal label to offenders, who predominantly come from the lower and
working classes, which further marginalizes them into the surplus labor market of
unemployable workers (Lynch, 2007). Finally, mass incarceration expands the
marketplace for goods and services sold by the ruling capitalist class, who profit from
this social control process via the prison apparatus (Lynch, 2007). Additionally, keeping
class conflict manageable requires the average citizen to pay more in taxes for the
growing prison industrial complex through the privatization of state services, which
enables for-profit, private service providers to benefit from the social control of the
economically marginalized populations produced by neoliberal capitalism (Lynch, 2007).
In order for prison to remain a viable financial investment, a mechanism must be
in place to continually expand the types and numbers of people who are defined as
“dangerous” and in need of social control (Di Giorgi, 2007; Lynch, 2007, p. 133). In the
US, incarceration becomes the ideal strategy to overcome problems coming from
discarded workers and marginalized populations (Harvey, 2005; Wacquant, 2009a,
2009b). In addition, zero tolerance policies and strategies are expected to be increasingly
applied to marginalized groups, such as impoverished minorities (Lynch, 2007;
Wacquant, 2009a, 2009b).
Public schools were also influenced by the neoliberal conversion of the political
economy, especially since they reproduce the economic and racial inequalities present in
the community and society at large (Hirschfield, 2008; Hirschfield & Celinska, 2011;
Noguera, 2003; Nolan & Anyon, 2004; Shapiro, 1984). Zero tolerance policies in public
schools now serve as one such mechanism to identify troublesome students who are
considered a danger to the success of other more promising students who are expected to
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adapt well to a more flexible, service-oriented economy (Giroux, 2003; Hall & Karanxha,
2012; Hirschfield, 2008; Wacquant, 2001). How zero tolerance policies emerged as a tool
of neoliberal social control in American public schools to isolate at-risk, marginalized
youth and funnel them away from education and toward imprisonment before they may
compete in an increasingly competitive labor market (Hall & Karanxha, 2012) will now
be further discussed and theorized.
School Violence, Media Effects, and Moral Panic Amidst Child-Saving Rhetoric
High-profile instances of school shootings and violence captured immediate
media attention in the late 1980s and 1990s, just as neoliberal changes in the political
economy were taking hold (Blumstein & Wallman, 2006; Boccanfuso & Kuhfeld, 2011;
Chen, 2008; DeMitchell & Cobb, 2003). The media’s coverage of school-based crime
and violence depicted this social issue as a crisis that threatened the safety of school
children across the US (Burns & Crawford, 1999; Hirschfield, 2008). Media portrayals of
gruesome murder scenes at schools depicted assailants as extremely dangerous threats,
risky “others,” and even “folk-devils” in need of control and harsh punishment (Burns &
Crawford, 1999; Hirschfield, 2008; Hirschfield & Celinska, 2011). The exaggerated
perception of defenselessness in America’s relatively low-violence schools is shaped by
the media’s framing of this social issue, which feeds off of the fears of an already
frightened and hyper-vigilant public (Burns & Crawford, 1999; Giroux, 2003; Hirschfield
& Celinska, 2011; Lyons & Drew, 2006; Simon, 2007). These alarming media portrayals
spark moral panics that are fueled by public outrage and “parental insecurity,” which are
later seized by politicians as opportunities to bolster popular support in order to seek
punitive policy changes that enable broader social controls over the perceived threats to
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school safety (Burns & Crawford, 1999; Hirschfield, 2008; Giroux, 2003; Simon, 2007,
p. 230).
Media framing of social problems can have an impact on public opinion through a
variety of agenda setting and priming techniques that have previously been discussed
(Kim et al., 2002; Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007). Often the media’s primary agenda is to
increase viewer ratings and seek profits by providing news coverage that is controversial
and entertaining; therefore, a logic of “if it bleeds, it leads” is often applied (Beale, 2006).
By increasing the amount of time a particular news story is accessible to viewers and
what aspects of it are predominantly presented (e.g., placement of coverage, exclusion of
factual material, emotional word choices, and repetition of startling information), the
media is able to tailor the public’s perception of violent crime in schools as out-ofcontrol, regardless of evidence suggesting the contrary (Beale, 2006; Blumstein &
Wallman, 2006; Bullock, 2007; Bullock & Cubert, 2002; De Voe et al., 2004; Dorfman
& Schiraldi, 2001; Entman, 1993; FBI, 2008; Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007). In fact,
fatal assaults in or around schools are rare and make up less than one percent of the
violent deaths of school-age children (Blumstein & Wallman, 2006).
Indeed, despite statistics revealing falling crime rates in the 1990s, media
networks intensified their coverage of crime-related newscasts during prime time viewing
slots (Beale, 2006; Dorfman & Schiraldi, 2001). The increased prevalence of violent
crime stories (including school shootings and other school violence) in the news during
the 1990s and 2000s was a result of economic pressures driven by profit motives that
forced networks to shift away from objective news toward “tabloid-style” crime stories
(Beale, 2006, p. 424). Neoliberal-style mergers and deregulation changed how network
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news operated in the 1980s and 1990s (Beale, 2006). The new economic environment
made it so that the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) no longer policed the
public service requirements of networks, and large-scale mergers made it so that the
majority of news networks were owned by only a few corporate conglomerates (Beale,
2006). The pressure from corporate owners to increase profit margins forced network
news to seek programming that was deemed more entertaining, so it would attract and
maintain viewers (Beale, 2006). Thus, a focus on violent crime stories was pursued
across news networks since the 1980s (Beale, 2006).
Research in crime and media studies has found that racial typification, which is
the media’s stereotypical portrayal of crime as a minority phenomenon, is associated with
increased punitiveness among viewers (Beale, 2006; Chiricos & Eschholz, 2002;
Chiricos, Eschholz, & Gertz, 1997). Moreover, several studies examining race in crimerelated news found that African Americans are disproportionately depicted as dangerous
and that they appear more frequently in crime news stories overall (Dorfman & Schiraldi,
2001). In 75 percent of studies examined by Dorfman & Schiraldi (2001), minorities
were overrepresented as perpetrators of crime. Furthermore, 86 percent of the studies
paid more attention to White victims than to African American victims, and their
conclusions argued that the story was deemed more newsworthy when the victim was
White (Dorfman & Schiraldi, 2001).
Dorfman & Schiraldi (2001) also found that when youth appeared in the news,
they were linked to crime and violent contexts, suggesting that juveniles, as well as
minorities, are more criminally dangerous than others (also see Beale, 2006; Schiraldi,
1999). Likewise, researchers found that media coverage inflates the prevalence of
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juvenile crime, which in turn, inflames the public’s fear of youthful “predators” (Soler,
2001, p. 5; Schiraldi, 1999). Several scholars argue that root fears of school violence and
crime are actually generalized fears of youth (Giroux, 2003; Hirschfield, 2008; Lyons &
Drew, 2006; Simon, 2007), which are influenced by the media. Some empirical evidence
suggests that skewed news coverage, which typifies crime according to race and youth,
contributes to increased punitiveness among a viewing public (Beale, 2006; Chiricos et
al., 1997). For example, researchers surveyed the public about their attitudes toward
punishment and African American involvement in crime, as depicted in the news, and
they found that white participants who associated crime with African Americans
exhibited more punitive attitudes (Chiricos et al., 1997).
Thus, well-publicized and sensationalized media coverage of school shootings in
the 1980s and 1990s served as a catalyst to intensify fear among parents, school officials,
and local politicians, which resulted in an emotionally driven and media-fed moral panic
(Burns & Crawford, 1999; Hirschfield, 2008). These media representations captured the
attention of political elites who then become compelled to respond (Burns & Crawford,
1999). Such a climate provided the opportunity for political power brokers to pursue new
legislation that would reflect a neoliberal-influenced agenda of zero tolerance for
“dangerous” youth in public schools.
Therefore, students became the new potentially dangerous offender group in need
of social control. Politicians seized the opportunity to encourage popular public support
in an attempt to swiftly remedy the media-inflated problem of school violence by
instituting new social controls for this group of perceived deviants and dangerous youth
(Burns & Crawford, 1999). As a result, troublesome and marginalized youth served as the
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scapegoats onto which the media and politicians shifted social anxieties about urban
social pathologies, economic inequality, and the diminishing ability of the government
and corporations to insulate the white ruling majority from them (Giroux, 2003;
Hirschfield, 2008; Kupchik & Monahan, 2006; Lyons & Drew, 2006, Simon, 2007).
Policy makers generated public support in favor of the application of zero
tolerance policies that would act as new mechanisms of social control to further advance
neoliberal trends across the public sector and institute the adoption of market logics that
harmonize public education with the needs of the post-industrial, neoliberal economy
(Kupchik & Monahan, 2006). The tightening of school disciplinary practices serves to
mold students into compliant future employees who conform to the service-oriented
needs of the neoliberal economy (Kupchik & Monahan, 2006; Hirschfield, 2008). In
other words, the production of “compliant bodies” for the demands of the
deindustrialized neoliberal state requires a reconfiguring of social control agents and
mechanisms within public schools (Kupchik & Monahan, 2006).
As described by Kupchik and Monahan (2006), “These idealized students embody
extreme and flexible compliance to the vicissitudes of the marketplace; they submit
willingly to scrutiny and manipulation; they demand nothing more than a chance to
participate in rituals of mass consumption; and, when required, they provide a criminal
counterpoint to justify the system’s necessary exclusions and deferrals” (p. 627). Thus,
under these reconfigurations, schools would serve to prepare students for the volatile
labor markets and uncertain service sector employment, which are characteristic of the
neoliberal state, by socializing them into class-defined roles, while the school
environment transformed to resemble and contribute to mass incarceration (Hirschfield,
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2008; Kupchik & Monahan, 2006; Kim et al., 2010). Additionally, students were
socialized to expect a police presence in their lives as pro-law enforcement views were
fostered among students since SROs and other security personnel maintained a constant
visible presence in schools (Horne, 2004; Kupchik & Monahan, 2006). Therefore, the
media-driven moral panic resulting from episodes of school violence in the 1980s and
1990s presented the window of opportunity necessary for policy makers to gain public
support to push through policies that would allow this reconfiguration of neoliberal social
control mechanisms to be enforced in the public educational system (Burns & Crawford,
1999; Hirschfield, 2008; Kupchik & Monahan, 2006).
In order to obtain the necessary public support for zero tolerance policies in
schools, policy makers needed to employ the political utility of fear mongering in an
effort to convince parents and school officials that schools should and could be safer
through the implementation of such policies (Giroux, 2003; Hirschfield, 2008; Lyons &
Drew, 2006). In congruence with the media messaging of fear, politicians employed
rhetoric similar to the child-saving movement of the late 19th and early 20th centuries to
manipulate and bolster public opinion.
The child-saving movement was led predominantly by politically conservative,
socially prominent, middle-class women who sought to serve as caretakers for juveniles
identified as delinquent or troublesome youth (Platt, 2009). However, the underlying
motivation to the child-saving movement was to reinforce a code of White, middle class
moral values, which were threatened by the rapidly changing and complex urban life of
the working classes during industrialization at the beginning of the 20th century (Platt,
2009). While progressive, middle-class women’s groups and professionals where the
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most active figures in the child-saving movement, their vision was shared and financed
by the ruling class elites (Platt, 2009). Thus, the child-saving movement sought to
properly socialize and expand government control over the movements and actions of
working class, urban youth, which typically was informally handled (Platt, 2009). The
movement was also an “attempt to regulate deviant behaviors of working class men and
women, using ‘panics’ to either establish new or re-instate fragile, social norms” (Evans,
Davies, & Rich, 2008, p. 119).
The child-saving movement directly affected the children of the urban poor as
they were depicted as “sick,” “maladjusted,” “unsocialized,” “pathological,” or
“troublesome” youth, who needed to be confined “for their own good” (Platt, 2009, p.
177). Therefore, the movement focused on delinquent youth via a social Darwinian
perspective, which perceived the working class poor as morally bankrupt (Platt, 2009).
Thus, delinquent youth where stigmatized as dangerous “others” in the political rhetoric
during the movement (Mills, 1943). The child-saving movement brought about new
forms of control, restraint, and punishment for poor, urban youth with the creation of the
juvenile court, reformatories, detention centers, and new categories of youthful crime
(Platt, 2009). The political rhetoric of the child-saving era functioned under the distress
of a media-influenced moral panic, which argued for the immediate need to control
juvenile delinquency and crime that was perceived to be increasingly unmanageable
(Platt, 2009).
The founders of the child-saving movement argued that it was an effort to
alleviate the miseries of urban life resulting from the structural inequalities of unregulated
capitalism (Platt, 2009). However, this so-called, benevolent rhetoric from the child
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savers was really masking a class-based system of harsh punishment, which deprived
impoverished youth of due process while increasing the role the state played in the daily
lives of the working class (Platt, 2009). One of the overarching aspects of the childsaving movement was the characterization or demonization of lower- and working-class
youth as problematic and deserving of intervention from law enforcement and the courts
(Platt, 2009).
Over time, media-based “child saving” techniques have been employed to
manufacture biased and misguided opinions about the need to regulate dangerous youth.
Indeed, rhetoric from James Alan Fox, John J. DiIulio, William Bennett, John Walters,
and William J. Bratton exaggerated the reports being publicized by the mass media in the
1990s of youth “wilding” and the growing legions of juvenile “superpredators” (Bennett,
DiIulio, & Walters, 1996; Fuentes, 2003; Welch, 2005, p. 168-169; Welch, 2011, p. 216217). Of course, this political rhetoric coincided with the neoliberal restructuring of the
US economy in the 1990s (Harvey, 2005; Simon, 2007). Collectively, their descriptions
of inner city adolescent offenders as being criminogenic, valueless, and “new threats to
public safety” received constant and sustained media coverage (Welch, 2011, p. 216).
In addition, the school shootings of the 1990s were linked to this growing juvenile
crime problem (Hirschfield, 2008; Stinchcomb et al., 2006; Sullivan, 2010). This
stigmatizing rhetoric was reiterated by policy makers and the media, which played a
crucial role in vilifying and demonizing disruptive and troublesome youth in America’s
schools (Burns & Crawford, 1999; Hirschfield, 2008; Hirschfield & Celinska, 2011). As
a result, minority, urban youth were targeted as threats to society, while racial and
economic inequalities were reinforced by the state legislatures’ ever-increasing, “get
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tough” responses to the perceived panic over youth crime (Welch, 2005; 2011).
Moreover, increased security, surveillance, and formal sanctions for disruptive and
violent behavior in schools were proclaimed as essential to restoring a controlled,
disciplined environment in which educational processes could be effective, because
students would conform to school norms or face strict consequences for misbehaviors
(Bowditch, 1993; Toby, 1998). Zero tolerance policies served as the legislative answer to
controlling school violence and crime caused by a perceived growing number of
“dangerous” youth in American schools (Boccanfuso & Kuhfeld, 2011; Hirschfield,
2008; Hirschfield & Celinska, 2011; Stinchcomb et al., 2006).
The political-economic pressures to prepare American students for the
deindustrialized, service-oriented labor market of the neoliberal state has also played an
influential role in the political rhetoric that seeks to strengthen school disciplinary
policies (Kupchik & Monahan, 2006). The punitive responses from policy makers to the
moral panic caused by media portrayals of school violence have allowed the juvenile
justice system to broaden its reach into school disciplinary practices (Boccanfuso &
Kuhfeld, 2011; Chen, 2008; Hirschfield, 2008). Over time, zero tolerance policies have
undergone net-widening, which allows rather minor offenses, such as disruptive
behavior, speech, excessive tardiness, shoving matches, dress code violations, profanity,
and insubordination to receive suspension and expulsion penalties (Black, 1999;
Hirschfield, 2008; Insley, 2001; Morrison & Skiba, 2001; Scott & Steinberg, 2008;
Sughrue, 2003). The mass hysteria over schools shootings enabled policy makers to
garner the essential public support for zero tolerance policies that would attempt to deter
the presence of guns and drugs on school campuses; however, once in place, these
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policies have been extended to criminalize troublesome behaviors that might inhibit
teachers’ roles in socializing the “compliant bodies” needed for the flexible labor force of
the new neoliberal state (Kupchik & Monahan, 2006).
Students who exhibit these forms of disruptive behaviors are stigmatized and
labeled as “at-risk of failing,” “unsalvageable,” and “bound for jail,” which mirrors the
otherizing rhetoric of the original child-saving movement that sought to contain and
control problematic youth because their behavior was not in accordance with the
mainstream American values and norms (Ferguson, 2000, p. 9; NAACP, 2005; Platt,
2009). In the case of broadening zero tolerance policies, the tightening of school
disciplinary practices attempts to mold students into compliant future employees who
conform to the service-oriented needs of the neoliberal economy (Kupchik & Monahan,
2006; Hirschfield, 2008). Those students who disturb this socializing process are
perceived to hinder the future prospects of other “promising” students who are expected
to be economically viable laborers and consumers in the neoliberal economy (Hirschfield,
2008; Kupchik & Monahan, 2006). Media depictions of school violence and the political
efforts of policy makers have shaped public opinion so that harsh punishment of those
who violate school policies is considered necessary to control the “folk devils” deemed
risky threats to the safety of their children, as well as threats to their children’s future
occupational prospects if their education is obstructed in any way (Burns & Crawford,
1999; Hirschfield, 2008).
The labeling and categorizing of particular groups of students as “unworthy,”
“unruly,” and “unsalvageable” (Ferguson, 2000, p. 9; Wacquant, 2001, p. 108) is
reminiscent of the child-saving movement of the 19th and 20th centuries that was harmful
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to poor, urban youth identified as delinquents and treated as dangerous (Platt, 2009).
Such rhetoric suggests that certain groups are indeed different and require social control,
which may perpetuate racialized fears of urban youth. Numerous studies and national
statistics reveal that the exclusionary practices enforced by zero tolerance policies in
schools are disproportionately applied to racial and ethnic minorities, especially African
Americans (APA Zero Tolerance Task Force, 2008; Skiba et al., 2002; USDOE, 2012;
Witt, 2007).
The child savers established a movement that responded to a media-driven moral
panic in which the threat posed by marginalized, urban youth to society and the economy
required new forms of social control (Platt, 2009). Essentially, the child-savers movement
was motivated by class warfare that pitted White, middle-class values and norms against
the delinquent behaviors of wayward, working-class youth (Platt, 2009; Sutherland,
1969). Similar to the original child-savers movement, current school criminalization
efforts have further stigmatized marginal populations of poor, inner-city youth, which
predominantly consist of racial and ethnic minorities (Giroux, 2003; Hirschfield, 2008;
Wacquant, 2001). Thus, zero tolerance policies effectively function as the neoliberal
social control mechanisms needed to punish and remove students perceived to have no
market value and identified as flawed consumers because of their associations with
crime, redundancy, poverty, and expendability (Giroux, 2003; Hall & Karanxha, 2012;
Hirschfield, 2008; Wacquant, 2001). The school criminalization policies and practices
enforced in the neoliberal state attempt to instill a “passive acquiescence to state and
corporate power” among the student populations and their parents (Lyons & Drew, 2006,
p. 195). This goal is pursued by isolating and funneling those students, who disrupt this
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socialization process, out of school and onto a path leading to confinement and perpetual
marginalization before they can even enter the labor force (Hall & Karanxha, 2012).
Thus, the new American educational apparatus assists in the criminalization of poor
students, which aids in the establishment and maintenance of a criminal class that
legitimates systems of inequality in modern capitalist societies, while flexible students
who adapt or succumb easily to the labor instability, invasive monitoring, and
exploitative working conditions of the neoliberal state are rewarded (Kupchik &
Monahan, 2006).
Legislation Reflecting Neoliberal Agenda of Zero Tolerance
In 1990, original federal legislation efforts by policy makers to create safer
schools made the possession of firearms within 1,000 feet of school campuses a federal
felony, but this was found unconstitutional (see US v. Lopez, 1995). Later, the Gun-Free
School Act (GFSA) of 1994 required all federally funded schools to automatically expel
any student who brought a firearm to school for no less than a year. Subsequently,
amendments to the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 required federal
funding to be withheld from schools that did not abide by the mandatory expulsion policy
for students possessing firearms within 1,000 feet of school under the GFSA (Casella,
2003b). Thus, the initial legislation appeared to be responding solely to the issue of gun
violence in schools as supported by the public, which was struggling to recover from the
media-fed moral panic. However, the GFSA was later amended in 1995 to broaden the
categories of weapons and items that could potentially be used as weapons that would
also result in mandatory expulsion if found in a student’s possession (Casella, 20003b).
The application of formal social controls in schools quickly became a slippery slope in

78

which a variety of student behaviors faced swift and harsh punishments (Heitzeg, 2009).
Legislative efforts widened to further implement zero tolerance policies for
students possessing drugs, including alcohol, tobacco, and drug paraphernalia, while on
school property (Beger, 2002). Moreover, under the new policies, if students were found
with weapons or drugs, they also faced referral to the juvenile or criminal justice systems
on top of the automatic suspension or expulsion they would receive for violating the zero
tolerance policies of the school (Berger, 2002; Education Law Center, 2012). Netwidening continued through the 1990s and 2000s, so that zero tolerance policies are now
regularly applied to very minor and non-violent school infractions, such as tardiness, the
use of profane language, disruptive behavior, insubordination, possession of health aids
(e.g., Advil, mouthwash, cough drops), cheating, violating dress code, engaging in
horseplay, being excessively noisy, failing to bring homework to class, throwing temper
tantrums, shoving, speech, and writing on topics with violent or criminal themes
(Fuentes, 2003; Giroux, 2003; Heitzeg, 2009; Hirschfield, 2008; Justice Policy Institute,
2009; Schoonover, 2007; Skiba, 2000; Stinchcomb et al., 2006; Sullivan, 2010). These
policies are now punishing minor infractions with force and arrest (Giroux, 2003;
Heitzeg, 2009; Justice Policy Institute, 2009).
Net-widening effects reveal an elevated effort between schools and the justice
system to cooperate in the implementation of zero tolerance policies and the execution of
punishment for violators (Heitzeg, 2009). Under the Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act of 1994, over $30 billion was authorized to fund more police officers
and new prison construction that was related to school safety efforts (Yell & Rozalski,
2000). Additionally, the Department of Justice’s Office of Community Policing Services
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(COPS) was given over $350 million to hire new SROs across the US (Beger, 2002). As
a result of this funding, public schools in the US added more full-time police officers and
security personnel to their staffs since 1990, and the number of SROs continues to grow
rapidly (Beger, 2002; Kupchik & Monahan, 2006). While these officers are stationed in
schools throughout American cities, they are typically concentrated in schools found in
areas marked by adverse poverty (Devine, 1996; Kupchik & Monahan, 2006).
Surveillance technologies, such as metal detectors, video recording devices, Internet
tracking, biometrics, ID cards, transparent lockers and book bags, electronic gates, and
two-way radios were also increasingly used in schools throughout the 1990s and today
(Kupchik & Monahan, 2006). The increased presence of police officers and surveillance
technologies makes it easier for students to be socialized into disciplinary roles and for
zero tolerance policies to be enforced efficiently (Kupchik & Monahan, 2006).
The practices put in place in accordance with zero tolerance disciplinary reforms
reflect many of the principles of the neoliberal agenda. Specifically, legislation like the
No Child Left Behind Act (2001) introduced the neoliberal imperative of school
accountability by connecting school funding directly to scores on annual achievement test
in reading and math (Fuentes, 2003; Heitzeg, 2009). Under the accountability standards
enforced by this legislative act, neoliberal concepts of market competition, performance
monitoring, and accountability for underperformance and failure infiltrated the American
educational system (Fuentes, 2003; Hirschfield, 2008; Kupchik & Monahan, 2006).
These neoliberal embodiments served to promote more efficiency and increase
culpability for students and teachers, while enhancing the mechanisms of social control
available to school administrators and law enforcement (Fuentes, 2003; Hirschfield,
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2008; Kupchik & Monahan, 2006). Additionally, the market mechanisms embraced by
the No Child Left Behind Act (2001) creates a climate of competition for resources,
which is expected to motivate school officials to obtain better scores regardless of the
means (Simon, 2007).
Thus, under the neoliberal push for accountability requirements, teachers and
administrators at “financially strapped schools” are under such tremendous pressure to
improve standardized test scores and attendance rates that they are prepared to exclude
underachieving students to benefit of high-achieving students (Fuentes, 2003; Heitzeg,
2009; Hirschfield, 2008, p. 85). The expanded application of zero tolerance policies to a
wide array of disciplinary problems provides school officials with the social control
mechanism in which teachers can weed out low-performing students who affect the
overall standardized test scores for struggling schools (Fuentes, 2003; NAACP, 2005).
Because of net-widening, school officials are able to enforce suspensions and/or
expulsions for disruptive behaviors, insubordination, cheating, failure to complete
homework, and other infractions common among failing students while concealing
educational deficits caused by a lack of resources and poor teaching quality (Fuentes,
2003; NAACP, 2005). Therefore, by using zero tolerance exclusionary practices, school
administrators and educators are able to focus on the best performing students and
remove those students who threaten overall school performance, as well as undermine the
controlled and disciplined school environment required for the didactic socialization
efforts promoted under the neoliberal state to produce students who accommodate the
needs of the restructured economy (Bowditch, 1993; Fuentes, 2003; Giroux, 2003;
Hirschfield, 2008; Kupchik & Monahan, 2006; Toby, 1998).

81

This form of zero tolerance discipline assists the neoliberal state in masking social
injustices, economic inequality, and underinvestment in public education by explicitly
denying the significance of political, structural, and social factors underpinning school
misconduct and focusing on the individual student offenders (Giroux, 2003; Hirschfield
& Celinska, 2011; Lyons & Drew, 2006). School criminalization, in the new zero
tolerance culture, transfers disciplinary authority away from traditional school authorities
and into the control of inflexible disciplinary codes, law enforcement, and the justice
system (Beger, 2002; Hirschfield & Celinska, 2011; Lyons & Drew, 2006). The students’
rights movement of the 1960s and 1970s secured due process for students by curbing
arbitrary and capricious disciplinary practices by school officials and standardizing many
of the existing disciplinary practices (Arum, 2003; Toby, 1998). Some scholars believe
that the added due process undermined the traditional moral authority exhibited by school
administrators and emboldened students to defy their teachers (Arum, 2003; Toby, 1998).
This perspective suggests that the ineffectiveness of school discipline, coupled with low
educational achievement, was associated with the erosion of moral authority in schools,
which created an “atmosphere of disorder” (Arum, 2003, p. 3). However, after the
judicial rulings of the 1960s and 1970s, school principals were reluctant to administer
suspensions and/or expulsions for fear of litigation (Arum, 2003; Hirschfield, 2008).
By increasing the role that the police and the justice system play in school
disciplinary matters by way of school criminalization and zero tolerance, school
administrators are able to reduce their likelihood of being sued (Hirschfield, 2008). Thus,
discipline is “outsourced” to other law enforcement and state agencies, so that teachers
are now simply responsible for students’ minds while security staff are responsible for
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their bodies (Beger, 2002; Devine, 1996; Kupchik & Monahan, 2006). Furthermore, the
transfer of disciplinary authority to strict zero tolerance codes and law enforcement
entities allows school administrators to circumvent litigious claims from students who
believe their constitutional privacy and due process rights have been violated by zero
tolerance practices (Arum, 2003; Hirschfield, 2008). Consequently, the manner in which
neoliberal social controls are exerted via school-based zero tolerance policies and an
increased law enforcement presence at schools has reinforced the formation of a crime
control model where students’ rights are weakened, due process is minimized, and the
movements of students are controlled (Lyons & Drew, 2006; Nolan & Anyon, 2004).
School criminalization teaches students three things: (1) they have no meaningful
influence over their schools, (2) they have little recourse should the government violate
their rights, and (3) they have few rights to begin with (Hirschfield & Celinska, 2011;
Kupchik & Monahan, 2006; Lyons & Drew, 2006).
Zero tolerance furthers the neoliberal agenda in public schools by supporting a
governing through crime initiative, which approaches problems faced by schools or
students as criminal problems rather than social or counseling problems (Kupchik &
Monahan, 2006; Simon, 2007). As such, disruptive students and failing schools are recast
as criminals, while high-performing students and their parents are recast as victims, and
educational policymakers are elevated to the role of prosecutor and judge (Simon, 2007).
Under this governing through crime logic, the criminal element threatening schools must
be identified and expelled in order to improve the prospects and performance of
deserving students, such as those who are flexible and compliant to the needs of the
economy that awaits them (Kupchik & Monahan, 2006; Simon, 2007).
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Thus, the classification of students, via anticipatory labeling, allows teachers and
school administrators to project perceived future social and structural realities onto their
disaffected and disruptive students (Hirschfield, 2008). Sociologists argue that structural
forces, like those relevant to neoliberal restructuring, “condition” and “constrain”
individual perceptions and interactions with others (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1977;
Hirschfield, 2008, p. 91). Therefore, the neoliberal transformation of the US political
economy can influence teachers’ perceptions of students’ future prospects by linking
social structure to the students’ educational and occupational aspirations and classroom
effort (Hirschfield, 2008). Teachers are able to perceive the changes in occupational
structure and acknowledge which students will be able to perform best in the flexible,
service-orient labor market of the neoliberal state (Hirschfield, 2008).
Students who are already being labeled as “at risk of failing,” “bound for jail,”
“unsalvageable,” “unworthy,” and “unruly” are more likely to be removed in order to
accelerate their projected future reality, and in the process, allow educators to focus
classroom instruction on more economically viable students (Ferguson, 2000, p. 9;
Hirschfield, 2008; Kupchik & Monahan, 2006; Wacquant, 2001, p. 108). Zero tolerance
policies serve as the neoliberal social control mechanism that allows school officials to
“fast track” undesirable and disruptive students into the school-to-prison pipeline
(Hirschfield, 2008, p. 92). The tasks of classification and socialization forces teachers to
consciously and unconsciously prepare students for their rightful position in the social
strata by sorting future “dropouts” from those students who have a legitimate chance at
functioning in the new workplace environment (Bowditch, 1993; Ferguson, 2000;
Hirschfield, 2008). Moreover, the pressure to achieve neoliberal standards of
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accountability for underperforming schools further motivates educators to control and
remove disaffected and disruptive students, who obstruct the socialization processes that
promote the values and norms of a dominant economic class (Kupchik & Monahan,
2006; Shapiro, 1984).
In practice, the exclusionary practices enforced by zero tolerance policies
disproportionately affect minority students, especially African American males (APA
Zero Tolerance Task Force, 2008; Casella, 2003b, Fenning & Rose, 2007; Giroux, 2003;
Skiba & Rausch, 2006; USDOE, 2012). A large proportion of minority students attend
inner-city schools in low-income neighborhoods (Christle et al., 2004; Giroux, 2003;
Skiba et al., 2002). There are often bleak employment and imprisonment prospects for
inner-city students, which affects the future realities that teachers and school
administrators project for these students (Hirschfield, 2008). The reasons for why
minority students engage in disruptive or disobedient behaviors while at school may be a
reflection of the extreme poverty, economic inequality, and social marginalization they
experience daily in their communities and home environments (Ferguson, 2000;
Hirschfield, 2008).
Two structural realities emerged from the neoliberal transformation, which
include the following: (1) that prison awaits African American youth who fail or dropout
of school, and (2) that schools do not possess the necessary resources to reverse the
wayward paths of problematic students without also detracting from the quality of
teaching and services meant for those perceived as more deserving and promising
students (Hirschfield, 2008). These structural realities are produced by unregulated
neoliberal capitalism (Harvey, 2005; Kotz, 2003, 2008, 2009; Wacquant, 2001, 2009a,
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2009b). Regardless of the potentially numerous sources for disruptive behavior, which
likely stems from the polarizing social conditions of the neoliberal state, chronically
disobedient African American boys are consistently viewed by school authorities as
“bound for jail” and “unsalvageable” (Ferguson, 2000). As a result, poor, urban minority
youth are disproportionately suspended and expelled, which further perpetuates their
marginalization in society (APA Zero Tolerance Task Force, 2008; Casella, 2003b,
Fenning & Rose, 2007; Giroux, 2003; Skiba & Rausch, 2006; USDOE, 2012; Wacquant,
2001).
Legitimacy Crisis and the Role of the Courts
Neoliberal initiatives, which reconfigure social control agents and mechanisms
within public schools, as well as enhance the accountability for underperforming schools
has transformed public schools to become more like “institutions of confinement”
(Wacquant, 2001, p. 108). Now school-based zero tolerance policies serve as a social
control mechanism to punish and remove those students perceived to have no future
market value in the restructured labor market that is more flexible and service-oriented
(Giroux, 2003; Hall & Karanxha, 2012; Hirschfield, 2008; Lynch, 2007; Wacquant,
2001). The neoliberal agenda applied to school criminalization efforts endorses a “narrow
public sphere” and a “docile citizenry” (Giroux, 2003; Hirschfield, 2011, p. 7). In the
past, public schools provided the venue for battles over full citizenship and equal
opportunity; however, their role has now converted to replicate a model of disempowered
citizenship that is similar to neoliberal labor dynamics, where students’ rights are
weakened and their movements are controlled and scrutinized (Giroux, 2003; Lyons &
Drew, 2006).
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The pedagogical imperatives of the neoliberal agenda conflicts with the
traditional, more progressive pedagogical imperatives of public education rooted in
values of liberty, equality, tolerance, citizenship, and personal growth (Giroux, 2003;
Hirschfield, 2008). Liberal democracies confront crises of legitimation because economic
liberalism creates inequality through power imbalances across rigid class lines, while
democracy struggles to respond by upholding social welfare through the promotion of
social equality, mutual respect, and cooperative interaction among citizens (Habermas,
1975; Harvey, 2005; Wolfe, 1977). American schools can reproduce the structure of
capitalist society by socializing students in the values of the market place as preferred by
the ruling elites (Kupchik & Monahan, 2006; Shapiro, 1984). Schools, similar to other
social institutions, serve as “sites of dynamic social interaction” in which the dueling
ideologies of liberal democracy are continuously negotiated to legitimize these
conflicting forces (Hirschfield, 2008).
Public schools represent democratic ideals and principles, such as equality of
access, mutuality, universal responsibility, and collective obligations, which oppose the
neoliberal imperatives of a class-divided society (Giroux, 2003; Shapiro, 1984). Thus, the
enforcement of the neoliberal agenda by way of school criminalization has put the
traditional role of public schools as a public good at odds with itself (Giroux, 2003;
Shapiro, 1984). School criminalization alters the role of teachers so that they manage and
classify students much like employees would be treated in a neoliberal economy
(Hirschfield & Celinska, 2011; Kupchik & Monahan, 2006). In addition, school
criminalization facilitates teacher disengagement, because their new role reduces their
capacity to understand and address the needs of their students (Brotherton, 1996; Devine,
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1996; Hirschfield & Celinska, 2011). This disengagement, along with racially disparate
exclusionary disciplinary practices, serves to erode students’ trust of their teachers and
threatens the overall legitimacy of school rules because students interpret their treatment
as unfair due to a perceived lack of due process (Brotherton, 1996; Hirschfield &
Celinska, 2011; Kupchik, 2010).
According to neoliberal theory, any challenges to the expansion of the neoliberal
agenda into school disciplinary policy must be mediated through the courts (Harvey,
2005). School criminalization subjects students to conditions of constant monitoring,
which reinforces a surveillance culture that individualizes students and presumes their
guilt until proven otherwise (Kupchik & Monahan, 2006). Civil liberty advocates have
targeted the application of school criminalization efforts from an approach that focuses
on violations of privacy (ACLU, 2001). However, the net-widening of zero tolerance
policies broadens the number of constitutional rights that they potentially violate. In
addition to students’ privacy rights, their freedom of speech protections, protection from
unlawful searches and seizures, protections from cruel and unusual punishments, and due
process rights are also potentially violated when zero tolerance policies are enforced.
Attempts by youthful defendants to challenge zero tolerance outcomes on the
grounds of violations of the First, Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights have
largely been dismissed by the courts (Kim et al., 2010; Sullivan, 2010; Yell & Rozalski,
2000). The courts interpret and apply the law in order to arbitrate legal disputes between
parties in accordance with the rule of law, and they are the primary means for dispute
resolution in the neoliberal state (Harvey, 2005). When court rulings uphold zero
tolerance policies in light of challenges based on constitutional violations, they create a
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precedent, which establishes the policies and practices of the state as legitimate under the
law. Thus, it is theorized that affirmation of zero tolerance policies through court
decisions serves to legitimate the state’s social control of marginal populations in schools
and the neoliberal influence on educational policy by declaring that they do not infringe
on the democratic rights and liberties of students. Verification by the courts that zero
tolerance policies are legitimate allows neoliberal social control mechanisms to be
institutionalized and further applied in the American educational system.
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CHAPTER FOUR
METHODOLOGY

Qualitative Research Design
Attempts by student defendants to challenge zero tolerance outcomes on the
grounds of violations of First, Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights have
largely been dismissed by the courts (Kim et al., 2010; Sullivan, 2010; Yell & Rozalski,
2000). Given the neoliberal influence over the transformation of school disciplinary
practices, which is documented in the literature, affirmation of zero tolerance policies
through court decisions may serve to legitimate how the state controls marginal
populations in educational settings through zero tolerance. Examination of both the state
appellate and Supreme Court decisions surrounding the possible constitutional rights
violations exhibited by zero tolerance policies is warranted to extract this jurisprudential
intent, which permits and regenerates these crime control processes.
Jurisprudential intent refers to an evaluation of the “judicial construction of the
opinion,” which is derived from a close analysis of specific phrasing or language used to
express the plain meaning of the ruling more thoroughly (Arrigo, 2003, p.59). Court
decisions, like other legal documents, serve as archival data that record mainstream legal
thought on several justice-related matters, and as such, they can be interpreted to reveal
societal meaning (Arrigo, Bersot, & Sellers, 2011). Therefore, legal inquiries of existing

90

case law permit researchers to identify the many facets of juridical decision making that
influence how the law is socially structured to reflect the dominant ideology of the
political economy (Banaker & Travers, 2005, p. 134). A qualitative textual and discourse
analysis via a case law method is proposed to investigate the underlying jurisprudential
intent guiding these legal decisions, which provide legitimacy to the practice of zero
tolerance in the education system and promote disciplinary strategies that will be
consistent with neoliberal ideals.
Legal anthropology is the study of how societies construct and implement laws
and legal systems to control antisocial deviance and other forms of behavioral patterns
among citizens, as well as control access to justice (Conley & O’ Barr, 1993). Thus, legal
anthropologists investigate both how the law works and how society is regulated (Conley
& O’ Barr, 1993). Regardless of the research questions posed or the theoretical positions
taken, legal anthropologists usually rely on court cases as the basic unit of analysis and
the case method as a qualitative analytic paradigm (Conley & O’ Barr, 1993). Case law
will be the unit of analysis in the study at hand. Court decisions are forms of narratives,
and as narratives, they portray a meaningful sequence of temporal events that organize
human experience and understanding through documented language and discourse
(Rapport, 2000). Narratives articulate and “emplot” events, experiences, sensations,
rationales, and interpretations, which serve as a rich source for ethnographic examination
from which legal reasoning and contextual meaning may be unearthed (Conley & O’
Barr, 1993; Rapport, 2000, p. 76). Thus, the narrative of the court decisions becomes the
landscape that the embedded legal researcher uses to construct the field of legal inquiry
(Rapport, 2000).
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Qualitative research of this nature requires the qualitative evaluation concept of
justifiability of interpretation in order to take into account subjectivity, interpretation, and
context rather than apply quantitative concepts of reliability and validity (Auerbach &
Silverstein, 2003). Qualitative methodologists believe it is justifiable and often inevitable
for a researcher to use his or her subjectivity in analyzing and interpreting data; however,
it is never justifiable for a researcher to impose his or her own subjectivity in an arbitrary
manner that is not grounded in his or her data (Auerbach & Silverstein, 2003). Thus,
qualitative studies employ different criteria for methodological rigor compared to
quantitative studies (Auerbach & Silverstein, 2003; Whitley & Kite, 2012).
The criteria used to check against the tendency of a qualitative researcher
imposing his or her own subjectivity in data analysis includes transparency,
communicability, coherence, and confirmability (Auerbach & Silverstein, 2003). In order
for qualitative data analysis to be justifiable it must be transparent, which means that
others are made aware of the steps by which the researcher arrived at his or her
interpretation (Auerbach & Silverstein, 2003). This check is accomplished through
clearly describing the process of data collection and analysis and being consistent
(Whitley & Kite, 2012). Transparency, also referred to as dependability (see Whitley &
Kite, 2012), does not mean that other researchers need to actually agree with the
researcher’s interpretation; however, they only need to know how he or she arrived at it
(Auerbach & Silverstein, 2003). In this study, each step of the case law method procedure
will be explained; so that others will know exactly how theoretical themes were built up
from the repeating ideas that were derived from relevant text (see Auerbach &
Silverstein, 2003). Identifying relevant text segments, or passages, from the court cases
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allows for repeating concepts to be grouped into themes in an understandable way that
will tie them to theoretical mechanisms, which reflect the patterns among the themes (see
Auerbach & Silverstein, 2003).
In order for the data analysis to be communicable, the themes and constructs must
be understood by, and make sense to, other researchers (Auerbach & Silverstein, 2003).
Communicability does not mean that other researchers would have to come up with the
same themes, constructs, or concepts, or agree with them; however, it does means that the
themes or constructs need to be explainable so others will understand why the researcher
has arrived at his or her conclusions (Auerbach & Silverstein, 2003). Communicability is
achieved in the second level of analysis in the case law method procedure. In this second
step, the researcher explains how the plain meaning of particular text segments reflects
language that identifies with constructs and conceptual mechanisms in the theoretical
framework (see Arrigo et al, 2011; Bersot & Arrigo, 2010; Sellers & Arrigo, 2009).
Coherence means that theoretical constructs or concepts must fit together so that
the researcher can tell a coherent story (Auerbach & Silverstein, 2003). Of course,
coherence does not require that the story developed by the researcher be the only possible
version, but that his or her story helps to organize the data to produce coherent ideas by
identifying themes and constructs that fit into an organized theoretical narrative
(Auerbach & Silverstein, 2003). Coherence is achieved in the third level of the case law
method in which a thematic analysis is conducted across the cases to identify the
theoretical mechanisms that are predominantly applied to the court decisions and how
they allow for the larger theoretical framework to be evidenced in the body of relevant
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case law under investigation (see Arrigo et al, 2011; Bersot & Arrigo, 2010; Sellers &
Arrigo, 2009).
In order to obtain confirmability, the qualitative researcher must actively seek out
instances within his or her data that does not fit with initial conclusions or fails to support
research hypotheses (Auerbach & Silverstein, 2003; Whitley & Kite, 2012). This step
also helps to reinforce that the data analysis is transparent (Auerbach & Silverstein,
2003). In the case law method, the researcher keenly searches the court decisions for text
segments that either support or fail to support the research questions, which are used to
guide the careful reading of each case (see Arrigo et al, 2011; Bersot & Arrigo, 2010;
Sellers & Arrigo, 2009). Qualitative data that supports or fails to support hypotheses or
research questions will be gleaned and documented via written field notes. To be clear,
text segments that represent, or fail to represent, plain meaning responses to the research
hypotheses will be highlighted in the court decision and written down as evidence for or
against, the corresponding research hypothesis. In this study, eight research questions are
applied to the textual analysis. If no data can be found in a court decision that either
supports or fails to support a hypothesis, then “no data could be ascertained” will be
documented in the field notes (see Arrigo et al, 2011; Bersot & Arrigo, 2010; Sellers &
Arrigo, 2009).
In qualitative research, transferability of theoretical constructs is used instead of
the quantitative concept of generalizability (Auerbach & Silverstein, 2003; Whitley &
Kite, 2012). If a qualitative study is transferable, then its theoretical constructs or
concepts can be applied to different samples (Auerbach & Silverstein, 2003). In other
words, the theoretical constructs defined and identified in the study at hand will serve as a
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guide for investigating a new sample, and once applied, these constructs will help the
researcher to understand textual patterns in the new sample (Auerbach & Silverstein,
2003). Of course, theoretical constructs may not apply automatically, and the researcher
may need to extend their meaning or develop them further, which will refine and further
develop the theory (Auerbach & Silverstein, 2003). It is expected that the theoretical
constructs in the current study will serve as transferable in other empirical applications of
this theory in new samples of case law, where neoliberal social controls in either similar
or different social institutions are being applied.
Criterion-based Sampling. A selective criterion-based sampling design was
employed. Criterion-based sampling is a form of purposive sampling, which allows the
researcher to purposely select court cases for their relevance to the issue being studied
(see Gray, Williamson, Karp, & Dalphin, 2007). This sampling strategy is typically used
in studies of social phenomena that are either extremely rare or so specific that a
representative cross section of a population would not be effective (Gray et al., 2007).
Samples for qualitative content analyses typically consist of purposively selected texts,
which may inform the research questions under examination (Zhang & Wildemuth,
2009). Thus, criterion-based sampling ensures that at least some information from legal
data sources, which are either hard to locate and/or essential to the study, are included in
the sample (Gary et al., 2007).
The following case law methodology (Arrigo et al., 2011; Bersot & Arrigo, 2010;
Sellers & Arrigo, 2009) sourced jurisprudential intent as communicated in district court,
state appellate court, and Supreme Court decisions addressing school zero tolerance
policies and privacy rights of students, where the First Amendment’s freedom of speech
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protections, the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unlawful searches and seizures, the
Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment, and the Fourteenth
Amendment’s protection of due process rights are at issue. In order to identify this
judicial temperament, specific criteria were established to determine which court cases
would be considered for examination. The individual court cases will serve as the units of
analysis. First, an initial search on LexisNexis was conducted for key terms and phrases.
Those words/phrases included “zero tolerance,” “school,” “student*,” “privacy right*,”
“First Amendment,” “Fourth Amendment,” “Eighth Amendment,” and “Fourteenth
Amendment.”
“Zero tolerance” was chosen because this term is the one most commonly applied
to school policies that mandate automatic sanctions for students found in violation of
rules without any consideration given to mitigating circumstances. Additionally, “school”
was included because zero tolerance policies can be utilized in various workplace settings
and even public transportation. For the purpose of this investigation, the researcher is
primarily interested in the application of zero tolerance policies in middle or high school
settings only. Any cases involving college settings were excluded from the final data set.
“Student” was also added to the search criteria to identify court decisions where
defendants were actual youths attending school and not teachers or administrative
officials working in the school. Only cases with juvenile defendants were included in the
final data set. Next, “privacy right*” was included to yield all cases involving issues of
the privacy rights of students with regard to the application of zero tolerance practices in
schools. Finally, “First Amendment,” “Fourth Amendment,” “Eighth Amendment,”
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and/or “Fourteenth Amendment” were all included in the search criteria to identify those
cases where violations of these constitutional rights were raised.
Criterion-Sample Results: With these criteria in mind, the LexisNexis search
yielded a preliminary 122 court cases. These initial 122 court cases were examined to
ensure that they substantively met the sampling criteria. Seventy-five cases that did not
specifically address zero tolerance policies in schools, issues of privacy rights, and/or
First, Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment protections for students were excluded
from the final data set. These excluded cases dealt with zero tolerance policies in other
arenas, such as universities, the transit authority, or various workplace settings and not in
public elementary and secondary schools. The 47 remaining cases of interest were
shepardized, and internal cites were scrutinized in order to ascertain any other important
court decisions that should be included in the sample, notwithstanding their lack of
identification as derived from initial LexisNexis inquiries. As a result, 28 additional court
decisions were added to finalize the sample at 75 court cases that met the inclusion
criteria.
Case Law Method. In this inquiry, a recently developed case law methodology
was applied (see Arrigo et al., 2011; Bersot & Arrigo, 2010; Sellers & Arrigo, 2009),
whereby the plain meaning of particular terms within the existing case law of interest was
scrutinized for textual context and usage to unpack jurisprudential intent. There were
several steps to this process.
Probing the legal language of these court decisions for embedded perceptions and
attitudes entailed the first step of the textual analysis. This first step extracted
jurisprudential intent from the documents, which is the plain meaning made apparent in

97

the judicial opinion. The second steps entailed identifying the use of neoliberal
mechanisms embedded within court decisions that reflect the prevailing jurisprudential
perspective on zero tolerance policies, the privacy rights of students, and whether such
practices infringed upon the First, Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights of
students were made explicit. The data extracted in the second step addressed the question
of whether and how the court employed neoliberal justifications to reinforce zerotolerance social control efforts in schools.
Previous studies have utilized textual or narrative inquiry to conduct statutory
analyses, and this strategy is a common form of legal analysis. For example, in order to
unearth legislative intent, legal scholars have investigated the “ordinary usage” of terms
and the “textual context” distinguished within various legislative provisions (Hall &
Wright, 2008; Karkkainen, 1994; Phillips & Grattet, 2000; Randolph, 1994). However,
some researchers have challenged the subjective nature of this qualitative technique,
because it is often difficult to extract the complex meaning behind the perspectives of the
policymakers (Easterbrook, 1994; Posner, 2008). Therefore, critics of this approach
argue that meaning is interpreted based on context. Thus, results from such an approach
may vary according to an individual’s comprehension of the language (Posner, 2008).
However, others (Arrigo et al., 2011; Randolph, 1994) argue that determining a
court’s jurisprudential intent through rigorous textual examination of its judicial decisions
is an essential, although certainly heuristic, approach to interpreting juridical meaning
when experiments are not ethically possible or feasible. Additionally, it is logistically and
physically impossible to observe courtroom proceedings and rulings for all relevant
cases, which may span several decades. Also, quasi-experimental designs using survey
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sampling methods may prove difficult since judges, as elected officials, may be reluctant
to provide candid details on their decision making, especially if the case may undergo
appeal. Thus, interpretive analyses of legal texts are better served by seeking
jurisprudential plain meaning from judicial decisions themselves rather than attempting to
peer into the minds of policymakers in which the “broader systems of meaning” that
justify and rationalize a court’s rulings are determined (Phillips & Grattet, 2000, p. 569;
see also, Easterbrook, 1994; Sellers & Arrigo, 2009). It should also be noted that the
purpose of the legal text that discusses the basis for the legal opinion rendered in a given
case is designed in such a way as to preclude the necessity of directly observing trials, or
surveying judges, who have already self-described their rationale in legal materials.
Therefore, the variant of the plain meaning rule described above was utilized to engage in
an interpretive analysis of the legal language expressed in the court decisions that made
up this data set.
Given the proposed theoretical approach, it was hypothesized that relevant court
decisions regarding zero tolerance school policies would be more likely to embrace
public safety rationales and disciplinary goals rather than the individual rights of
juveniles. In order to conduct an interpretive analysis in which the plain meaning of the
courts’ rhetoric is discerned, a series of research questions were compiled from this
general hypothesis:
(RQ 1 ) Court cases will contain reference to: (A) the control of potential threats of
danger, and/or disruption that are posed by school-based infractions,
regardless of circumstance or context, or (B) the focus on potential
individual rights violations. Empirical evidence favoring A over B would
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support the hypothesis that neoliberal court mechanisms are employed to
reinforce zero-tolerance social control efforts in schools.
(RQ 2 ) Court cases will include reference to (A) the intentions, good or bad, of
the student(s) among the criteria used by the courts for deciding zero
tolerance school policy cases, and (B) will discuss striking a balance
between the intent of students and school safety concerns. If empirical
evidence favors B over A, this finding would support the hypothesis that
courts employ neoliberal mechanisms to reinforce zero-tolerance social
control efforts in schools.
(RQ 3 ) In some court decisions on zero tolerance policies, the court will make
decisions related to the liability of school administrators for alleged
infringement of student rights, and in order to determine if student rights
were violated. The court may exclude or refuse to rule on certain legal
issues, and may find school administrators immune from any charges of
liability for the alleged infringement on the individual rights of students.
At issue in these cases is the content of the ruling and its reference to
neoliberal rationale. Data supporting this interpretation would support the
effort of neoliberal court mechanisms to reinforce zero-tolerance social
control efforts in schools.
(RQ 4 ) The court’s preference for security over individual rights reflects a
preference for neoliberal policy, and will tend to result in decisions to
uphold automatic expulsion or suspension for disruptive behaviors. Thus,
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with respect to decisions, it is hypothesized that the court will more often
decide in favor of schools over individuals.
(RQ 5 ) The court’s preference for neoliberal policy over individual rights will
impact decisions where the security threat presented by students is small.
If this is true, it can be hypothesized that even when the cases involve
student behaviors that poses no imminent physical threat, the court will
preference the use of automatic expulsions and suspensions as appropriate
sanctions over claims that such practices constitute cruel or unusual
punishment.
(RQ 6 ) If the courts are strongly committed to neoliberal policy, then it can be
hypothesized that courts will tend to dismiss allegations of violating
constitutional protections as being without merit and not binding on the
court’s decision. Data supporting this interpretation would support the
effort of neoliberal court mechanisms to reinforce zero-tolerance social
control efforts in schools.
(RQ 7 ) The court’s preference for neoliberal policy will affect the likelihood of
the court accepting non-punitive responses to school infractions. As a
result, it can be hypothesized that the court will reject recommendations
for viable alternative punishments that are rehabilitative in nature or which
seek to continue educational services in place of expulsions or
suspensions. Data supporting this interpretation would support the effort
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of neoliberal court mechanisms to reinforce zero-tolerance social control
efforts in schools.
(RQ 8 ) The court’s emphasis on security is hypothesized to lead to decisions that
promote strict disciplinary actions that preemptively seek to prevent
possible future disruption over school policies that promote restorative
sanctions. Data supporting this interpretation would support the effort of
neoliberal court mechanisms to reinforce zero-tolerance social control
efforts in schools.
These questions guided a careful reading of the legal language used in the various court
rulings in the data set. The words, phases, or passages, which constitute respective
responses to these guiding questions, will reveal the plain meaning of the underlying
judicial intent embedded within each judicial decision.
To summarize, the case law method used in this study engaged in a qualitative
textual analysis of judicial decisions regarding school zero tolerance policies when
challenges were raised on the grounds of violations of First, Fourth, Eighth, and
Fourteenth Amendment rights of students. The first step, in this analysis, elicited
information underpinning the jurisprudential intent by applying the eight research
questions that guided an examination of the plain meaning of the court cases in the data
set. Secondly, the evidence gathered from the first step were contextualized and
examined to unpack terms or expressions that signified principles representative of the
various mechanisms identified in the theoretical framework detailing how neoliberal
court mechanisms supported zero-tolerance social control initiatives in schools. Finally,
the theoretical mechanisms employed by the courts were inspected across the cases to
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determine which mechanisms were predominantly applied to legitimate neoliberal
judicial support for zero tolerance social control efforts in schools.
Quantitative Research Design
There is a surprising dearth of quantitative studies examining school
criminalization measures (Hirschfield & Celinska, 2011). In fact, the few published
quantitative studies that exist are cross-sectional and tend to rely primarily on measures
of school characteristics rather than the political economic dynamics of this social
problem (Brady, Balmer, & Phenix, 2007; Chen, 2008; Kupchik & Ellis, 2008; Mayer &
Leone, 1999). Currently, data collected nationally from the School Survey on Crime and
Safety (SSOCS) by the National Center for Education Research (NCES), provides a
source for information regarding school crime, disciplinary problems, programs, and
policies across several years (United States Department of Education, 2004, 2006, &
2008). SSOCS surveys a nationally representative sample of about 3,500 public
elementary and secondary schools (NCES, 2012). School principals from these roughly
3,500 public schools were asked about the amount of crime and violence, disciplinary
actions, prevention programs and policies, and other school characteristics, including
some demographic variables (NCES, 2012). The SSOCS was administered in the spring
of 1999-2000, 2003-04, 2005-06, 2007-08 school years (NCES, 2012). Three waves of
data were used. Data from 1999-2000 was not used in this study because this wave of
data did not have the variables of interest that are available in the other three waves
(NCES, 2012).
The SSOCS data provides estimates of school crime, discipline, disorder,
programs, policies, and the sociodemographic makeup of the schools (NCES, 2012).
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Thus, these data enabled the researcher to investigate the utilization of various school
practices as they relate to school security, crime prevention, disciplinary action, the
frequency of particular crimes or infractions, and the frequency of incidents reported to
law enforcement (NCES, 2012). Therefore, an empirical analysis of relevant variables
permitted the researcher to identify whether there was an increased use of neoliberal
social controls (e.g., enhanced surveillance, increased security, expulsion and suspension
without continued educational services, more referrals to law enforcement for infractions,
and the like) in schools over time. Additionally, the researcher was able to determine if
these neoliberal social controls adversely affected marginal populations within schools
over time.
Eight variables were used from the relevant waves of data. The percent minority
student enrollment variable and crime where students live variable measured
sociodemographic characteristics of the schools in the sample, and they were used to
statistically test for racial and economic disparities. Four variables measure social control
efforts that increase police presence and surveillance technologies in schools. These
school security variables include: access controlled/monitored doors, students pass
through metal detectors, security cameras monitor the school, and security used during
school hours. The last two variables served as outcome variables that measured
exclusionary school practices. These outcome variables are total number of disciplinary
actions and total number of removals with no continued school services.

Variables
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Percent Minority Student Enrollment. The racial/ethnic composition of the school
was measured by the percentage of minority students. The four categories include the
following: 1= less than 5 percent, 2= 5 to 20 percent, 3= 20 to 50 percent, and 4= 50
percent or more.
Crime Where Students Live. This ordinal variable measured the levels of crime
reported in the areas where students attending the school live. The four categories
included: 1= high level of crime, 2= moderate level of crime, 3= low level of crime, and
4= students come from areas with very different levels of crime.
Access Controlled Locked/Monitored Doors. This variable is a measure of school
security that documents whether or not access to school buildings are controlled, by being
locked or monitored, during school hours.
Students Pass Through Metal Detectors. This school security variable measured
whether or not students are required to pass through metal detectors upon entering school
each day.
Security Cameras Monitor the School. This school security variable captured
whether schools use one or more security cameras to monitor school buildings and
grounds throughout the day.
Security Used During School Hours. This variable measured whether or not
sworn law enforcement officers, security guards, or security personnel regularly used in
or around the school at any time during school hours.
Total Number of Disciplinary Actions. This continuous variable measured how
many total disciplinary actions were taken overall against students for all varieties of
infractions.
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Total Number of Removals with No Continuing School Services. This continuous
variable measured the total times administrative action was taken to expel or suspend a
student for any infraction without permitting any educational services to be provided. All
of these variables were consistently measured in 2003-04, 2005-06, and 2007-08.
A quantitative analysis of the available variables regarding the various forms of
disciplinary actions taken, with or without continued educational services, in response to
a variety of school-based infractions, was conducted to identify trends that might reflect
the increased punitiveness in the social control of marginal populations within the
education system during the recent neoliberal transition. These hypotheses are as follows:
(H 1 )

Over time, the concern with school security will reflect an increased
number of security measures in schools with a higher percentage of
minority students.

(H 2 )

Over time, disciplinary actions will show an increase in total disciplinary
actions taken by the school administrators for schools with a higher
percentage of minority students.

(H 3 )

Over time, disciplinary removals, with no continued educational services,
will be increasingly applied in schools with a higher percentage of
minority students.

(H 4 )

Over time, students living in areas with higher levels of crime will be
more likely to attend schools with a higher percentage of minority
students.
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(H 5 )

Over time, disciplinary removals, without continued educational services,
will be more likely to be applied in schools that have students living in
areas with higher levels of crime.

These proposed quantitative analyses are exploratory and descriptive in nature. The aim
is to identify the nature of the relationships between the relevant variables and possibly
understand how social controls are being applied in elementary and secondary schools in
the US.
Data Analytic Plan
In order to test the first hypothesis, four one-way ANOVAs, one for each of the
three waves of school data were conducted. To clarify, the independent variable to be
used in each of the four ANOVAs were the percentage of minority students and the four
dependent variables were access controlled, students pass through metal detectors,
security cameras used, and security used during school hours. Thus, a total of 12
ANOVAS were run for hypothesis number one; four for each wave of data.
For the second hypothesis, 3 one-way ANOVAs (i.e., one for each wave of data)
were conducted, where the independent variable is the percentage of minority students
and the dependent variable is the total number of disciplinary actions. The third
hypothesis also required 3 one-way ANOVAS, where the independent variable remained
as the percentage of minority students, but the dependent variable was the total number of
removals with no continuing school services.
Testing the fourth hypothesis required chi-square analyses (i.e., one for each wave
of data) that used percentage of minority students and crime where students live as the
variables of interests. The fifth hypothesis required 3 one-way ANOVAs (i.e., one for
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each wave of data) to be conducted, where the independent variable was crime where
students live and the dependent variable was the total number of removals with no
continuing school services.
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) and chi-square analyses were conducted using
SPSS statistical software. Statistical significance was set at the .05 level. For the
ANOVAs, Tukey and Games-Howell post-hoc tests were used to identify where the
significant differences between groups are. Additionally, a test of homogeneity of
variances was conducted for each ANOVA to assess the assumption that variances are
homogenous. The Welch statistic was calculated to determine whether significant
differences between groups are robust. Phi or Cramer’s V statistics were calculated for
chi-square analyses to evaluate effect size of significant relationships. Also, Bonferroni
adjustments were used in the crosstabulations to compare column proportions and
subsequently adjust p values to identify the statistically significant relationships from the
chi-square analyses. Finally, the means for all ANOVA calculations were plotted and
graphed to visually depict any patterns or changes over time.
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CHAPTER FIVE
QUALITATIVE RESULTS

The qualitative data set, which consisted of 75 court decisions that met the
relevant search criteria, was subjected to two levels of qualitative textual analysis, via the
case law method, and a third overall thematic analysis. The dates of the court decisions
ranged between the years of 1969 to 2012. There were forty-one U.S. District Court (DC)
cases, fifteen U.S. Court of Appeals (CA) cases, twelve State Supreme Court (SSC)
cases, and seven U.S. Supreme Court (SC) cases in the final sample. Appendix B
includes a brief synopsis of all the court cases.
The first level of textual analysis identified terms, phrases, and passages that
reflect the plain meaning from which the court’s jurisprudential intent can be unpacked
(Arrigo et al., 2011). In other words, the text segments extracted from the judicial
decisions, as guided by the research questions, reflect the factors that influence the
attitudes, motivations, and rationales informing the courts’ decision making in zero
tolerance cases where students have alleged that their constitutional rights have been
violated. Tables 1.1A through 1.1O display key text segments and passages as derived
from the plain meaning findings, which represent the responses to the eight research
questions through which these legal decisions were filtered 4. Explained differently, court

4

Data is available upon request.
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cases that contained reference to specific elements mentioned in the research questions
were acknowledged as either supporting or failing to support the appropriate research
question. For instance, if a court decision reflected language that found the control of
potential threats and disruptions deserved more weight when balanced against the
potential intrusion into the individual rights of students, then that passage, or text
segment, was categorized as support for research question number one.
Consistent with confirmability, any passages in the plain meaning results tables
that are underlined represent text segments that fail to support the corresponding research
question. Conversely, text segments, which are not underlined, represent support for the
applicable research question. When qualitative data could not be ascertained for a
research question, “No data” was listed in the table under the appropriate case. Data were
presented in fifteen tables with five cases to a table in the order they appeared in the
criterion-based sample search produced by LexisNexis.
Abbreviations (e.g., DC, CA, SSA, and SC) signifying court level of each case are
also included in Tables 1.1A through 1.1O, as well as Tables 1.3A through 1.3E. For
instance, the columns in these tables provide the name of the case followed by the
decision date and court level in parentheses just like the following example: Stafford v.
Redding (2009, SC). Thus, the column heading in this example means that the Stafford
case was a U.S. Supreme Court case decided in 2009.
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Table 1.1A. Level I Analysis: Plain Meaning Results for Jurisprudential Intent
Stafford v.
Redding (2009,
SC)

K.M. v. Sch.
Bd. (2005, CA)

RQ1
Threat vs.
Individual
Rights

Because there
was no reasons
to suspect the
drugs presented
a danger or were
concealed in her
underwear, we
hold that the
search did
violate the
Constitution (p.
368).

No data

RQ2
Intent vs.
Balance of
Intent vs.
Safety

No data

RQ3
Immune
from
Liability

The official who
ordered the
unconstitutional
search is entitled
to qualified
immunity (p.
368).
No data

RQ4
Prefer
Security

S.G. v.
Sayreville Bd.
of Educ.
(2003, CA)
A school need
not tolerate
student speech
that is
inconsistent
with its basic
educational
mission, even
though the
government
could not
censor similar
speech outside
the school (p.
422).

Cuesta v. Sch.
Bd. (2002, CA)

Ratner v.
Loudoun (2001,
CA)

…it requires a
balancing of the
need for the
particular search
against the
invasion of
personal
rights…officers
had reasonable
suspicion to
search based
upon the violent
and threatening
language…(p.
968-969).

No data

No data

No data

No data

In any event,
defendants are
entitled to
qualified
immunity (p.
423).

No data

No data

…the school
board cannot be
held liable for
any
constitutional
deprivation…(p.
968).
No data

Ratner’s
complaint
asserted that his
suspension…
amounted to
violations of
Ratner’s
Fourteenth
Amendment
rights… Having
heard oral
argument…we
find no
reversible error,
and we
affirm…(p. 142).
…Ratner acted
in what he saw
as the girl’s best
interest and that
at no time did
Ratner pose a
threat to harm
anyone with the
knife…
Nonetheless,
Ratner was then
suspended…(pp.
141-142).
No data
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No data

Table 1.1A Continued
RQ5
No data
No
Imminent
Threat

No data

No data

No data

…the
determination
or what manner
of speech is
inappropriate
properly rests
with the school
officials (p.
423).

Because we hold
that the school
board’s policy
was not the
moving force
behind the arrest,
there is no need
for us to address
whether § 836.11
was “grossly and
flagrantly
unconstitutional”
(p. 967).

No data

No data

However harsh
the result in this
case, the federal
courts are not
properly called
upon to judge
the wisdom of a
zero tolerance
policy of the sort
alleged to be in
place…or of its
application to
Ratner (p. 142).
The district court
also concluded,
correctly, that
the school
officials gave
Ratner
constitutionally
sufficient, even
if imperfect,
process in the
various
notices… and
we agree (p.
142).
No data

It was not
unreasonable
for the
principal to
seek to avoid
conduct which
has the
capacity to
interfere with
the orderly
conduct of the
school (p. 425).

No data

No data

RQ6
Deemed
Not
Binding on
the Courts

Standards of
conduct are for
school
administrators to
determine
without secondguessing by the
courts lacking
the experience
to appreciate
what may be
needed (p. 356).

RQ7
Rejection
of
Alternative
Sanctions

No data

…the denial of
his records
could not be
pursuant to a
custom of
delaying
complete
copies of
records…that
circumstance
does not
establish a
custom (p.
959).
No data

RQ8
Preemptive
Prevent
Future
Disruption

No data

No data
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Table 1.1B. Level I Analysis: Plain Meaning Results for Jurisprudential Intent

RQ1
Threat vs.
Individual
Rights

Seal v. Morgan
(2000, CA)

West v. Derby
Unified Sch.
(2000, CA)

…what process
is due depends
on appropriate
accommodation
of the
competing
interests
involved. In the
context of
disciplining
public school
students, the
student’s
interest is to
avoid unfair or
mistaken
exclusion…
Schools, of
course, haven an
unquestionably
powerful
interest in
maintaining the
safety of their
campuses…That
said, suspending
or expelling a
student for
weapon
possession even
if the student
did not
knowingly
possess any
weapon, would
not be rationally
related to any
legitimate state
interest (p. 574575).

…where school
authorities
reasonably
believe that a
student’s
uncontrolled
exercise of
expression
might
substantially
interfere with
the work of the
school or
impinge upon
the rights of
other students,
they may forbid
such expression
(p. 1366).

PiekoszMurphy v. Bd.
of Educ. (2012,
DC)
No data
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Ottaviano v.
Kings Park
(2010, DC)

Evans v. Bd. of
Educ. (2010,
DC)

It is reasonable
to conclude
that the
regulations
require
suspension for
any drug use…
while
permitting
suspension for
drug use off
school
premises.
Whatever may
be the judge’s
personal view
as to the
wisdom of its
decision, the
board acted on
rational and
specific
grounds
relevant to the
education and
welfare of the
school
children... (pp.
32-33).

No data

Table 1.1B continued
RQ2
We believe,
Intent vs.
however, that
Balance of the board’s zero
tolerance policy
Intent vs.
would surely be
Safety
irrational if it
subjects to
punishment
students who
did not
knowingly or
consciously
possess a
weapon (p.
578).

RQ3
Immune
from
Liability

Because we
have concluded
that
Superintendent
Morgan was
entitled to
summary
judgment on the
basis of
qualified
immunity, we
need not and do
not address the
question… of
whether he had
the authority…
(p. 581).

…rejecting any
notion that the
Constitution
requires a
finding of an
intent to harass
or intimidate
before the Derby
School District
may apply its
Racial
Harassment and
Intimidation
policy… (p.
1363).

No data

N.M.
nevertheless
argues that the
school’s
disciplinary
policy is
arbitrary…
because it does
not require a
scienter…Under
these
circumstances,
the school’s
discipline of
N.M. does not
shock the
conscience (pp.
960-961).
No data

114

No data

No data

No data

…he failed to
address the
situation or take
any remedial
measures, and
that he then
retaliated
against L.E. by
suspending her
when she was
subject to forced
sexual conduct.
Therefore,
Smathers is not
entitled to
qualified
immunity… (pp.
32-33).

Table 1.1B Continued
RQ4
No data
Prefer
Security

RQ5
No
Imminent
Threat

No data

School officials
in Derby had
evidence from
which they
could reasonably
conclude that
possession and
display of
Confederate flag
images, when
unconnected
with any
legitimate
educational
purpose, would
likely lead to a
material and
substantial
disruption of
school discipline
(pp. 1361-1362).

It is not the role
of the federal
courts to set
aside decisions
of school
administrators
which the court
may view as
lacking a basis
in wisdom or
compassion (p.
961).

No data

No data
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The system of
public
education that
had
evolved…relies
necessarily
upon the
discretion and
judgment of
school
administrators
and school
board members
and section
1983 was not
intended to be
a vehicle for
federal court
correction of
errors in the
exercise of that
discretion… (p.
25).
…the plaintiff
argues that
there is no
rational basis
for her
excessive
punishment in
light of her
relatively
minor alcohol
related
infraction…
contrary to the
plaintiff’s
argument, the
severity of the
alcohol related
transgression is
not the
underlying
basis for the
difference in
punishment.
Rather it is the
perceived
danger posed…
(pp. 32-33).

No data

No data

Table 1.1B Continued
RQ6
The fact that we
Deemed
must defer to
Not
the Board’s
Binding on rational
Courts
decisions in
school
discipline cases
does not mean
that we must, or
should
rationalize away
its irrational
decisions (p.
579).

RQ7
Rejection
of
Alternative
Sanctions

No data

T.W.’s argument
is meritless…To
impose in
countless
disciplinary
suspensions a
requirement that
the suspect
student possess a
mens rea akin to
criminal intent
might well
require trial-like
procedures and
proof which
could
overwhelm
administrative
facilities… (p.
1364).

It is not the role
of the federal
courts to set
aside decisions
of school
administrators
which the court
may view as
lacking a basis
in wisdom or
compassion…It
seems that the
professionals in
this sad train of
events exercised
questionable
judgment…But
we can’t say
what the
defendant’s did
violated the due
process
clauses... (p.
961).

No data

No data
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…the Supreme
Court has
stated that
federal courts
are not
authorized to
construe school
regulations…
the court is
sadly mindful
of the
collegiate
opportunities
that Nina may
miss out on as
a result of this
situation.
However…
viewing it in
the light most
favorable to
Nina, the court
cannot
conclude that
she is likely to
succeed… (pp.
25-26 & pp.
32-34).
No data

Section 1983
does not extend
the right to
relitigate in
federal court
evidentiary
questions
arising in school
disciplinary
proceedings or
the proper
construction of
school
regulations. The
system of public
education that
has evolved in
this nation relies
necessarily upon
the discretion
and judgment of
school
administrators…
(p. 16).

No data

Table 1.1B Continued
RQ8
No data
Preemptive
Prevention
of Future
Disruption

The history of
racial tensions in
the district made
administrators’
and parents’
concerns about
future
substantial
disruptions from
possession of
Confederate flag
symbols at
school
reasonable…The
district had the
power to act to
prevent
problems before
they occurred; it
was not limited
to prohibiting
and punishing
conduct only
after it caused a
disturbance (pp.
1366-1367).

No data

No data

No data

Table 1.1C. Level I Analysis: Plain Meaning Results for Jurisprudential Intent

RQ1
Threat vs.
Individual
Rights

Cuff v. Valley
Cent. Sch. Dist.
(2010, DC)

Lee v. Lenape
Valley Reg’l
(2009, DC)

Hardie v.
Churchill (2009,
DC)

Doran v.
Contoocook
(2009, DC)

Brett N. v.
Cmty. Unit
Sch. Dist.
(2009, DC)

…Not only are
school officials
free to act before
the actual
disruption occurs,
they are not
required to
predict disruption
with absolute
certainty to
satisfy the
Tinkers
standard…the
risk of substantial
disruption is not
only reasonable,
but clear (pp.
468-469).

Defendants
cannot shield
themselves
from liability
by enacting
antidiscrimination
policies if
they do not
follow
them…There
is also a
question of
fact as to
whether
defendants
were willfully
indifferent to

…the court finds
that the process
used for Hardie’s
expulsion
proceedings
struck the proper
balance between
administrative
efficiency and
protecting
Hardie’s interest
in attending
school. The
benefit of an
additional hearing
to ensure
Hardie’s
punishment was

Reasonableness
is the touchstone
in any
assessment of
the
constitutionality
of a search or
seizure, and
while, in most
cases,
reasonableness
demands a
warrant and a
showing of
probable cause,
such is not
necessarily the
case in the

The parties
agree that the
zero tolerance
policy does not
create a suspect
class…the
policy aims to
minimize
violence by
deterring
students from
escalating
fights, even if
merely in selfdefense…
Here, Section
7:190 is not
impermissibly
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Table 1.1C Continued

RQ2
Intent vs.
Balance
of Intent
vs. Safety

Under Tinker, it
is the objective
reasonableness of
the school
administrators’
response, rather
than the student’s
private intentions,
that are
relevant…Finally
, whether or not
B.C. had the
capacity to blow
up the school, or
was at all likely
to do so, is not
dispositive, and
indeed has only
minimal
relevance(p. 469).

harassment of
E.L. (p. 21).

just was
outweighed by
the cost imposed
on the limited
resources of the
school board (pp.
19-20).

public school
context…
searches and
seizures in
public schools
can be
conducted
without warrant
or probable
cause (p. 191).
Plaintiffs argue
that the New
Hampshire
Constitution is
more
protective…wit
h respect to
searches and
seizures…
plaintiffs
deserve a full
and fair hearing
on this issue,
and because the
state court is
better equipped
to interpret…the
case shall be
remanded (pp.
194-195).

vague because
the disciplinary
code is
publically
available and
all students are
put on notice
that if they
fight, even in
self-defense,
they are subject
to punishment.
(pp.8-12).

No data

Hardie admitted
to bring the knife
onto the bus,
albeit by accident.
His intent did not
matter, however,
because the
disciplinary
policy followed
by his high school
treats possession
of a weapon as a
strict liability
offense that
results in either a
mandatory
suspension or
expulsion (p. 17).

No data

No data
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Table 1.1C Continued
RQ3
School
Immune
administrators
from
must be permitted
Liability
to react quickly
and decisively to
address a threat
of physical
violence against
their students,
without worrying
that they will
have to face years
of litigation
second-guessing
their judgment as
to whether the
threat posed a
real risk of
substantial
disturbance (p.
470).

RQ4
Prefer
Security

Under this
standard,
defendants need
not prove that
school
administrators’
initially-stated
justifications for
punishment fully
incorporate all the
objective facts
that could support
a likelihood of
substantial
disruption, and
they need not
demonstrate that
substantial
disruption was
inevitable… (p.
468).

Whether Mr.
deMarrais
qualifies for
immunity is a
triable issue
because there
exists
questions of
fact as to
whether Mr.
deMarrais’
failure to
comply with
board policy
rises to the
level of a
knowing
violation of a
right… (pp.
27-28).

Plaintiff argues
that the
municipality
should be liable
for the board’s
violation of
Hardie’s due
process right due
to failure to train
or adequately
supervise school
district
personnel…the
court dismisses
this claim (p. 20).

No data

Public officials
may have
qualified
immunity if
their conduct
does not violate
clearly
established
statutory or
constitutional
rights of which
a reasonable
person would
have known…
Here, the
individual
defendants are
entitled to
qualified
immunity… (p.
13).

No data

While there is a
colorable
argument that this
constituted a
departure from
the applicable
administrative
regulations, the
failure to follow
state or local
regulations does
not ordinarily
establish a
procedural due
process
violation…While
Hardie received a
severe
punishment for
what may have
been an innocent

…Plaintiffs
complain that
Dell’s orders
instructing the
students to leave
their personal
belongings
inside the
building resulted
in an improper
seizure. I am
unpersuaded by
plaintiff’s
argument.
Again, the
school setting is
crucial to the
analysis.
Students are
often restricted
in what items

The court notes
that while it is
within the
power board to
devise and
implement a
policy to check
violence in
schools, the
results of
enforcement of
Section 7:190
can be
draconian when
applied to the
student who
unwittingly
finds himself
under attack by
a schoolyard
bully…If the

119

Table 1.1C Continued
mistake, CCHS
school
administrators
likely adopted
their zero
tolerance policy
as a result of a
rising tide of
violence in our
public schools (p.
14 & pp. 19-20).

they can bring to
school and
where they can
leave those
items.
Accordingly I
reject plaintiff’s
contention… (p.
194).

RQ5
No
Imminent
Threat

No data

No data

No data

No data

RQ6
Deemed
Not
Binding
on Courts

Although
plaintiffs seek to
second-guess
with hindsight the
judgment of
school
administrators,
that is not the role
of the courts…It
is not the role of
the federal courts
to set aside
decisions of
school
administrators
which the court
may view as
lacking a basis in
wisdom or
compassion (pp.
469-470).

No data

…a school
administrator
involved with
initiating charges
may participate in
the deliberations,
reasoning that
due process
requires an
impartial
decisionmaker
but not a full
adversarial
process…grantin
g Hardie another
opportunity to
address the board
would do nothing
to mitigate the
risk of an
erroneous
deprivation…
(pp. 14-15 & p.
18).

The traditional
understanding of
what constitutes
a seizure-that a
reasonable
person would
have believed
that he was not
free to leave-is
analytically
inapplicable to
the school
setting, because
students are
generally not at
liberty to leave
the school
building when
they wish…
Unemancipated
minors lack
some of the
most
fundamental
rights of selfdeterminationincluding the
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student-victim
cannot flee, his
choice is either
be pummeled,
or to fight back
and face certain
suspension.
Despite this
observation, it
is not the role
of the court to
second-guess
the board’s
policy, however
misguided it
may be, so long
as it is
rationally
related to the
interests sought
to be protected
(p. 11).
No data

The Seventh
Circuit has held
that the right to
self-defense is
not a
fundamental
right within the
Due Process
Clause of the
Fourteenth
Amendment…i
t is not the role
of the court to
second-guess
the board’s
policy, however
misguided it
may be, so long
as it is
rationally
related to the
interests sought
to be protected
(pp. 8-11).

Table 1.1C Continued

RQ7
Rejection
of
Alternative
Sanctions

No data

No data

No data

right to come
and go at will…
(p. 193).
No data

RQ8
Preemptive
Prevention of
Future
Disruption

defendants need
not prove that
school
administrators’
initially-stated
justifications for
punishment fully
incorporate all the
objective facts
that could support
a likelihood of
substantial
disruption, and
they need not
demonstrate that
substantial
disruption was
inevitable… Such
a rule is not
required by
Tinker, and
would be
disastrous public
policy: requiring
school officials to
wait until
disruption
actually occurred
before
investigating
would cripple the
officials’ ability
to maintain order
(pp. 468-469).

No data

No data

No data

No data

…the ultimate
purpose of the
board’s zerotolerance policy
is to maintain a
peaceful and
orderly
environment in
the schools.
Specifically,
the policy aims
to minimize
violence by
deterring
students from
escalating
fights, even if
merely in selfdefense…
Consequently,
the court finds
that Section
7:190 is
rationally
related to a
legitimate
government
interest (pp. 1011).

Table 1.1D. Level I Analysis: Plain Meaning Results for Jurisprudential Intent
Barnett v.
Tipton County
(2009, DC)

Griffin v.
Crossett Sch.
(2008, DC)

Hill v. Sharber
(2008, DC)
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Simonian v.
Fowler
Unified (2008,
DC)

Morgan v.
Snider High
(2007, DC)

Table 1.1D Continued
RQ1
…the court
Threat vs.
cannot find that
Individual
plaintiffs’
Rights
websites are
protected as
parodies under
the First
Amendment…in
school discipline
cases a
substantive due
process claim
will succeed
only in the rare
case when there
is no rational
relationship
between the
punishment and
the offense…the
court finds the
disciplinary
proceedings did
not violate the
plaintiffs’
substantive due
process rights (p.
985).

RQ2
Intent vs.
Balance of
Intent vs.
Safety

No data

No data

The Supreme
Court has held
that the
substantial need
of teachers and
administrators
for freedom to
maintain order in
the schools does
not require strict
adherence to the
requirement that
searches be
based on
probable
cause…The
Sixth Circuit has
also noted that,
in the case of
searches in the
school context,
individualized
suspicion is not
necessarily
required (pp.
676-677).

No data

No data

Although the
Sixth Circuit has
warned schools
against applying
zero-tolerance
policies blindly
where a student
has no
knowledge that
he possesses
contraband, such
was not the case
here, as Hill
acknowledged

No data
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The
accommodation
of the privacy
interests of
school children
with the
substantial need
of teachers and
administrators
for freedom to
maintain order
in the schools
does not require
strict adherence
to the
requirement that
searches be
based on
probable cause
(p. 15)…In the
context of
school rules,
flexibility or
breadth should
not necessarily
be confused for
vagueness…
Given the
peculiar issues
facing school
administrators, a
school’s
disciplinary
rules need not
be drafted as
narrowly or with
the same
precision as
criminal statutes
(p. 21).
The thrust of
Kevin’s
argument at the
hearing was that
by the time he
realized “A” had
marijuana, he
was on a busy
street, close to
school, and he
did not have a
reasonable
opportunity to
eject “A” from

Table 1.1D Continued
that the alcohol
contained in the
car was his (p.
682).

RQ3
Immune
from
Liability

Under the
TGTLA, all
government
entities are
immune from
suit for any
injury which
stems from the
exercise of
governmental
functions, except
as specifically
provided by the
act (p. 986).

No data

…there is no
need to address
the defendants’
arguments that
the claims
against Deputy
Booker and Ryan
are barred under
the qualified
immunity
doctrine, and that
the official
capacity claims
against all four
defendants fail
because Hill has
not established
governmental
entity liability
under Section
1983 (p. 681).

No data

RQ4
Prefer
Security

No data

No data

No data

No data
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the car until they
were on school
grounds and
safely out of
traffic…he
believed he was
doing the right
thing…Platz
rendered her
determination…
that Kevin
knowingly
drove a student
that was in
possession of
marijuana onto
school property
(pp. 7-8).
Simmons and
Bailey are not
liable for any
purported
constitutional
violations
arising from the
vehicle searches
(pp. 1415)…even if the
court somehow
found a
constitutional
violation, the
case law
probably
reassured the
defendants that
they were on
solid legal
footing, and thus
they are entitled
to qualified
immunity (p.
28).
In the context of
school rules,
flexibility or
breadth should
not necessarily
be confused for
vagueness…
Given the
peculiar issues
facing school
administrators, a

Table 1.1D Continued

RQ5
No
Imminent
Threat

No data

No data

No data

No data

RQ6
Deemed
Not
Binding on
Courts

District courts of
Tennessee
frequently have
held they do not
have jurisdiction
over claims
under the
TGTLA…Thus,
because the
court declines to
exercise
jurisdiction over
these claims and
because
plaintiffs have
not put forth any
evidence to
support them,
plaintiffs’ claims
under the
TGTLA are
dismissed (p.
986).

Here, the
school district’s
discipline of
both Willie and
Jacob was
controlled by
the decisions of
their respective
504
committees.
Willie’s
committee
found that his
behavior was
not a
manifestation
of his
disability…
Jacob’s 504
committee,
however, found
that his
behavior was a
manifestation
of his behavior.
There exists a
rational basis
for the district’s
dissimilar
treatment of
these two
students…they
have presented
no evidence
showing that
the decision of
either
committee was
affected by
racial

…the Sixth
Circuit has held
that law
enforcement
officers may
sweep a parking
lot with drug
dogs without
implicating the
Fourth
Amendment, as
individuals do
not have a
reasonable
expectation of
privacy in a
parking lot that is
accessible to the
public…although
the search was
not conducted by
school officials,
there does not
appear to be any
basis for Hill’s
assertion that the
school is
prevented from
taking
disciplinary
action simply
because the
misconduct was
discovered by
law enforcement
in the process of
conducting a
legal search (pp.
679-681).

Plaintiff’s
contention that
he was the
only pupil at
Fowler High
School who
was expelled
for the mere
suspicion of
possessing
marijuana has
no evidentiary
support other
than plaintiff’s
conclusory
declaration…
Even if
plaintiff could
prove
plaintiff’s
assignment to
alternate
education was
unsupported,
there is no
evidence
plaintiff was
treated
differently
from any other
student with
possession of
marijuana (pp.
45-46).
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school’s
disciplinary
rules need not
be drafted as
narrowly or with
the same
precision as
criminal statutes
(p.21).
No data

It is not the role
of federal courts
to set aside the
decisions of
school
administrators
which the court
may view as
lacking a basis
in wisdom or
compassion.
The Seventh
Circuit of
Appeals also has
stressed that
federal courts
ought to refrain
from secondguessing the
disciplinary
decisions made
by school
administrators
(p. 13)…
The role of the
courts is not to
second-guess
the decisions of
school
administrators
(pp. 23-24).

Table 1.1D Continued

RQ7
Rejection
of
Alternative
Sanctions

No data

discriminatory
intent…mere
allegation is not
enough (pp. 1415).
No data

RQ8
Preemptive
Prevention
of Future
Disruption

No data

No data

No data

No data

No data

No data

No data

No data

Table 1.1E. Level I Analysis: Plain Meaning Results for Jurisprudential Intent

RQ1
Threat vs.
Individual
Rights

Roy v. Fulton
County Sch.
(2007, DC)

Bogle-Assegai
v. Bloomfield
(2006, DC)

…plaintiffs
claim that
defendants
violated Mark’s
constitutional
right to equal
protection by: 1)
treating Mark,
who is black,
differently from
a white student
who was also
allegedly
involved in the
MP3 theft; and
2) applying the
zero tolerance
policy to black
students but not
to white
students…These
allegations are
sufficient to state
a claim for
violation of
Mark’s right to
equal protection
of the law…the

Plaintiffs were
provided
notice of the
expulsion
hearing, given
the opportunity
to be
represented by
counsel (which
they were) and
given a fullblown hearing
(p. 243)...
Presentation of
summaries of
student witness
statements at
hearing where
witnesses were
not present and
plaintiff thus
had no
opportunity to
cross-examine
them did not
undermine
sufficiency of
process

Langley v.
Monroe
County (2006,
DC)
No data
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Vann v. Stewart
(2006, DC)

McKinley v. Lott
(2005, DC)

The court cannot
conclude that
the punishment
imposed by
school officials
in this case bore
no rational
relationship to
plaintiff’s
offense. Stat
authorities have
expressed a
legitimate
interest in
maintaining safe
and secure
learning
environments…
officials adopted
a zero tolerance
policy that
includes a one
year suspension
for violations.
Plaintiff admits
that he
possessed a
pocket knife in

When society
requires large
groups of
students, too
young to be
considered
capable of
mature restraint
in their use of
illegal
substances or
dangerous
instrumentalities,
it assumes a duty
to protect them
from dangers
pose by
antisocial
activities…and
to provide them
with an
environment in
which education
is possible… To
fulfill that duty,
teachers and
school
administrators

Table 1.1E Continued
motion to
dismiss
plaintiffs’ equal
protection claim
is denied (p.
1323).
…however, the
process that is
due when a
student is
suspended for
less than ten
days is
extremely
limited… (p.
1323).
RQ2
Intent vs.
Balance of
Intent vs.
Safety

No data

afforded…
Including
reading or
reciting
statements
made by
teachers in
response to his
inquiries, was
not violative of
due process (p.
243).

No data

…there is no
requirement in
the school
handbook that
a student must
knowingly
possess alcohol
to be subject to
the penalties
therein (p.
10)…
In light of the
fact that the
plaintiffs have
presented
evidence to
indicate that
the principal
and viceprincipal did
not believe that
Laura knew the
beer can was in
the vehicle,
and the fact
that the MCSD
has not
produced a
policy
outlining the
time period
that a student
should be sent
to alternative
school, this
court finds that
there is a
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violation…even
considering
plaintiff’s
contention that
the school
officials’ action
might have been
harsh or unwise
in view of the
circumstances,
the decision was
not so flawed
that it bore no
rational
relationship to
plaintiff’s
offense (p. 890).
No data

must have broad
supervisory and
disciplinary
powers (pp. 1314).

Mr. McKinley
became confused
about the
question that Dr.
Lott asked him.
He responded
yes to a question
of whether he
had been
smoking.
However, he
believed that Dr.
Lott was asking
him whether he
had ever smoked
marijuana in the
past and not
whether he had
smoked
marijuana that
morning before
school. Dr. Lott
and Officer
Suttles both
understood Mr.
McKinley to
acknowledge and
admit that he had
smoked
marijuana…Mr.
McKinly was
then informed he
was being
arrested… (pp.
3-5).

Table 1.1E Continued

RQ3
Immune
from
Liability

sufficient jury
question as to
whether
Laura's penalty
was rationally
related to the
school boards
interests (pp.
11-12).
No data

No data

However, a
municipality
may not be held
liable under
Section 1983
under a theory of
respondent
superior (pp. 910).

The gist of the
plaintiffs’
allegations is
that school
officials
breached various
express policies
designed to
protect students’
constitutional
rights. Assuming
that is true, the
school district is
not liable for its
employee’s
breach of
admittedly
constitutional
express policies
(p. 1321).
No data

In light of the
court’s
dismissal of
plaintiffs’
claims for the
reasons
detailed above,
the court need
not reach
defendants’’
arguments
concerning
qualified
immunity (p.
244).

No data

No data

No data

No data

RQ5 No
Imminent
Threat

No data

No data

No data

No data

No data

RQ6
Deemed
Not
Binding on
Courts

No data

No data

… in a
situation where
the attorneys
moderated the
hearing, ruled
on objections
and procedural
matters, and
retired with the
Board of
Trustees to
deliberate,
there are no
grounds for
complaint
unless it can be
shown in fact

Assuming,
arguendo, the
DHA and school
board applied
the improper
standard when
considering
plaintiff’s case,
the court cannot
conclude that
such a failure
was so
significant or
substantial that
it could result in
unfair or
mistaken

Federal courts
have determined
that a violation
of the Fifth
Amendment
privilege against
selfincrimination
only occurs
when an
incriminatory
statement that is
obtained
unlawfully is
introduced at
trial…he never
faced a criminal

RQ4
Prefer
Security
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RQ7
Rejection
of
Alternative
Sanctions

No data

No data

that the
attorney did
corrupt or
otherwise
destroy the
impartiality of
the process.
While this
court is
concerned
about the
method in
which the
board
deliberations
occurred, the
plaintiffs have
made no
showing of
actual
corruption (pp.
8-10).
…there is
enough
evidence to
present a jury
question as to
mental anxiety
and stress
suffered by
Laura (p. 13).
No data

RQ8
Preemptive
Prevention
of Future
Disruption

No data

No data

No data

findings or
misconduct or
an arbitrary
exclusion from
school (p.
889)…the right
to attend public
school, however,
is not a
fundamental
right or liberty
interest…it is
not the role of
the courts to set
aside decisions
of school
administrators
which the court
may view as
lacking a basis
in wisdom or
compassion (p.
890).

proceeding…For
this reason, the
court will
dismiss Mr.
McKinley’s Fifth
Amendment
claim (pp. 2325).

No data

No data

No data

No data

Table 1.1F. Level I Analysis: Plain Meaning Results for Jurisprudential Intent
Posthumus v.
Bd. of Educ.
(2005, DC)

Collins v.
Prince
William
County (2004,
DC)

Sypniewski v.
Warren Hills
(2001, DC)
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Anderson v.
Milbank Sch.
(2000, DC)

D.G. v.
Independent
(2000, DC)

Table 1.1F Continued
RQ1
The right to
Threat vs.
attend public
Individual
school is not a
Rights
fundamental
right for the
purposes of due
process
analysis. When
a fundamental
right is not at
issue, the
government’s
action must be
upheld if it is
rationally
related to a
legitimate state
interest (p.
899)…because
the
constitutional
rights of
students in
public school
are not
automatically
coextensive
with the rights
of adults in
other settings,
school officials
may limit
speech in
schools in ways
that the
government
could not do
outside the
school context
(p. 900).

A school
board’s ability
to discipline
students for
offenses
occurring off
school grounds
has been
upheld by the
vast majority
of courts as a
reasonable
exercise of the
board’s general
authority over
the conduct of
its students and
duty to ensure
the safety of its
schools,
provided that
the offense has
a material
effect on the
operation or
general welfare
of the school
(pp. 21-22)…
they may
subject pupils
to punishment
for acts
committed
away from
school
property and
outside of
school hours
which are
detrimental to
the interests of
the school or
adversely
affect school
discipline (pp.
23-24).

Regardless of
whether, in the
abstract, the
Foxworthy Tshirt may be
banned, moving
plaintiffs have
established a
reasonable
probability of
success as to the
constitutionality
inappropriate
overbreadth and
vagueness of the
specific
provisions of the
dress code and
racial harassment
or intimidation
policy…Schools,
however, must
consider the
sensibilities of
other students,
and the freedom
to express
unpopular
opinions must be
balanced against
the interest in
teaching students
the limitations of
socially
appropriate
behavior…the
rights of public
school students
are also not
necessarily as
expansive as the
rights of adults
in society…the
school bears the
responsibility for
determining the
manner of
speech
appropriate in a
school (pp. 5259).
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The student was
talking to
herself in an
office setting
with only one
other person
present. The
better course of
valor may well
have been for
the secretary to
have strongly
reminded the
student of the
rule…the
conduct was
certainly not
disruptive…the
violation was
perhaps too
much to do
about relatively
little. Having
said all of this,
however, the
rule was
clear…the
student, without
dispute, violated
the rule…the
rule was a zero
tolerance rule…
constitutional
rights of public
school students
are not
automatically
coextensive with
the rights of
adults…a school
need not tolerate
speech that is
inconsistent
with its
pedagogical
mission, even
though the
government
could not
suppress that
speech outside
of the
schoolhouse…
schools must

It is impossible
to have a “no
tolerance”
policy against
“threats” if the
threats involve
speech. A
student cannot
be penalized for
what they are
thinking. If
those thoughts
are then
expressed in
speech, the
ability of the
school to censor
or punish the
speech will be
determined by
whether it was
(1) a “true” or
“genuine”
threat, or (2)
disruptive of
the normal
operation of the
school. Neither
of those
circumstances
exist in the case
before the
court. In sum,
the court finds
that any
commotion
caused by the
poem did not
rise to the level
of a substantial
disruption
required to
justify a
suspension of
the plaintiff (pp.
15-16).

Table 1.1F Continued

RQ2
Intent vs.
Balance of
Intent vs.
Safety

No data

The facts
indicated that
Collins was not
replicating a
chemistry
experiment and
knew, or
should have
known, that by
teaching fellow
PWCPS
students how
to explode
bottle
bombs…his
conduct was
likely to cause
a disruption so
significant that
it would
impact the
school division
(p. 34).

The court need
not and does not
decide the
specific role of
student
motivation and
intent in cases of
the regulation of
speech (p. 76).
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teach by
example the
shared values of
a civilized social
order…These
shared values
include
discipline,
courtesy, and
respect for
authority…
civility is a
legitimate
pedagogical
concern…so,
too, is
compliance with
school rules (p.
686).
No data

As far as her
intent is
concerned, the
defendants
admit that
student did not
write the poem
as a genuine
threat, nor was
it written with
the intent of
putting teacher
or any other
teacher in fear.
In addition, the
psychologist
who examined
student does not
believe student
intended the
poem as a
genuine threat,
but rather only
as a way to
express her
frustration and
anger with
teacher (pp. 1314).

Table 1.1F Continued
RQ3
The court finds
Immune
it unnecessary
from
to address all of
Liability
defendants’
arguments
because it
concludes that
Posthumus’
claims fail at the
preliminary
stage of the
qualified
immunity
analysis…the
court finds no
valid
claim…the
court need not
reach the issue
of qualified
immunity (p.
897).

RQ4
Prefer
Security

In examining a
school’s interest
in prohibiting
lewd or vulgar
speech, the
court noted that
while students
have an interest
in expressing
unpopular and
controversial
views, schools
have a
countervailing
interest in
teaching
students the
boundaries of
socially
appropriate
behavior (p.
900)…
Posthumus’
argument
cannot be
sustained
because his
statement was

The school
officials had
qualified
immunity as it
was not clearly
established that
they could not
recommend
expulsion for a
student’s
unlawful
activity
occurring off
school grounds
(p. 1). The
school board
cannot be held
liable for the
decision to
expel
Collins…
protected by
the qualified
immunity
doctrine (pp.
34-37).
No data

No data

No data

No data

While ensuring
that
reasonableness is
honored, a court
should generally
defer to the
limitations of
vulgarity defined
by the local
school board (pp.
70-71).

No data

No data
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Table 1.1F Continued
insubordinate
speech… (p.
901).
RQ5 No
No data
Imminent
Threat
RQ6
Deemed
Not
Binding on
Courts

RQ7
Rejection
of
Alternative
Sanctions
RQ8
Preemptive
Prevention
of Future
Disruption

No data

No data

No data

No data

Fraser teaches
that judgments
regarding what
speech is
appropriate in
school matters
should be left to
the schools
rather than the
courts. A school
is entitled to
make the point
to pupils that
vulgar speech
and lewd
conduct is
wholly
inconsistent
with the
fundamental
values of public
school
education (p.
901)… School
disciplinary
rules need not
be as detailed as
a criminal code
(p. 903).
No data

No data

No data

Finally, the
education of the
nation’s youth is
primarily the
responsibility of
parents,
teachers, and
state and local
school officials,
and not of
federal
judges…This
case, although it
presents matters
of some concern
to the court, as
already
expressed, is an
appropriate case
for summary
judgment (p.
689).

No data

No data

No data

No data

No data

No data

No data

While these
restrictions
impose real
constraints on a
school’s ability
to regulate
student speech, a
school is not
completely
without the
means to ensure
the existence of a

However,
school officials
may restrict
even individual
student
expression that
materially and
substantially
interferes with
the requirements
of appropriate
discipline in the

No data

132

Table 1.1F Continued
safe and
productive
learning
environment,
even under the
Tinker
substantial
disruption test.
In fact, a school
may prohibit or
punish student
speech based on
a specific fear of
disruption (p.
63).

operation of the
school, or that
would
substantially
interfere with
the work of the
school or
impinge upon
the rights of
other students
(p. 687).

Table 1.1G. Level I Analysis: Plain Meaning Results for Jurisprudential Intent
Hammock v.
Keys (2000, DC)

RQ1
Threat
vs.
Individual
Rights

The purpose in
this case,
ensuring that
schools are drugfree, is certainly
a legitimate
purpose. In fact,
the Alabama
legislature finds
that this purpose
is “a compelling
public interest”…
suspension and
expulsion of a
student found to
be in possession
of a drug, even if
“possession” is
interpreted by
school officials
to mean being
found in a
vehicle or locker,
is rationally
related to that
purpose. While
such an
interpretation
may be severe, it

Colvin v.
Lowndes
County (2000,
DC)
These zerotolerance
policies provide
for immediate
suspension or
expulsion of
students that
possess weapons
or drugs on
school grounds.
In general, a
student found
carrying a
weapon, such as
a gun or knife,
on school
property is given
no second
chance, no
appeal, and no
guarantee of
alternative
school programs
or education…
School boards of
this and other
states and of
their aim to
create a school
environment

James P. v.
Lemahieu
(2000, DC)

Fuller v.
Decatur Pub.
(2000, DC)

Doe v. Bd. of
Educ. (1995,
DC)

Unlike the right
to public
education and
liberty of
reputation,
however, a
student has no
constitutional
right to
participate in
school athletic
or social
activities…
Therefore, if
Robert P. was
punished under
the authority of
the athletic
department’s
rules, it is very
unlikely that
plaintiffs will
prevail on the
merits of their
claim (p.
1119)… the
purposes of Act
90 is to keep
alcohol and its
use out of the

If the school
board had failed
to take action
against these
students or
otherwise
ignored their
conduct at the
game, the
students who
were not
involved in the
fight, as well as
the citizens of
Decatur, might
be led to believe
that the school
board was
unable to
control conduct
in schools. It is
also important
to recognize that
the Seventh
Circuit Court of
Appeals
recently noted
that the
Supreme Court
has repeatedly

It is not disputed
that Doe
received both
notice and a
formal hearing
as to the
disciplinary
action being
considered
against him. At
that hearing,
which lasted five
hours, Doe was
represented by
counsel and had
both the
opportunity to
present and
cross-examine
witnesses. As a
matter of law,
therefore, OPRF
argues that Doe
was afforded all
the protections
which due
process requires
(pp. 11-12)…
The board’s
failure to make
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Table 1.1G Continued
is not
unconstitutionall
y arbitrary or
unreasonable…
Given a school’s
need to be able to
impose
disciplinary
sanction for a
wide range of
unanticipated
conduct
disruptive of the
educational
process, school
disciplinary rules
need not be as
detailed as a
criminal code
which imposes
criminal
sanctions (pp.
1230-1232)

RQ2
Intent
vs.
Balance
of
Intent
vs.
Safety

No data

conducive to
learning, by
eliminating fear
of crime and
violence, such
efforts must be
balanced with
the
constitutional
guarantees
afforded to the
children (p.
506)… To be
sure, the court is
not offended by
the school
board’s decision
to overrule the
hearing officer’s
recommendation
, clearly it had
the authority to
do so. The court
is, however,
offended by the
manner in which
it blindly meted
out the student’s
punishment…
The district’s
zero-tolerance
policy requires
that the board
impose the same
penalty
regardless of
circumstances…
(p. 513).

No data

schools by
suspending
students who
possess alcohol
while attending
school. Since
this is not a
suspect class,
there is no other
evidence that
any other
classification
was used to
punish Robert
(p. 1121)…
since it would
be
fundamentally
unfair to punish
someone for
some
wrongdoing that
he did not
commit, a
disciplinary
body must have
evidence of a
statutory
violation by an
individual
before it may
punish that
individual…
Robert did not
possess
intoxicating
liquor…while
attending school
even if he did
drink liquor
prior to the
school event ( p.
1120).
No data
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emphasized the
need for
affirming the
comprehensive
authority of the
states and of
school officials,
consistent with
fundamental
constitutional
safeguards, to
prescribe and
control conduct
in the schools
(p. 815)… The
court first
concludes that
each student
received notice
of a hearing
before an
independent
hearing officer
and before the
school
board…each
student received
a separate
hearing before a
hearing
officer…
accordingly,
this court
concludes that
the students’
procedural due
process rights
were not
violated (p.
815).

specific findings
as to any
possible
mitigating
circumstances in
Doe’s case
likewise does not
violate the
plaintiff’s
rights…Althoug
h such a
punishment
might appear to
be harsh under
the given
circumstances,
the decision
properly
remained within
the province of
the board (pp.
13-14).

No data

No data

Table 1.1G Continued
RQ3
No data
Immune
from
Liability
RQ4
Indeed, courts
Prefer
staunchly resist
Security the suggestion
that school
discipline
hearings should
emulate criminal
trials (p. 1229)…
the court notes
that the system of
public
education…
relies necessarily
upon the
discretion of
school
administrators
and school board
members…
Vesting a school
official with the
discretion to
determine which
situations warrant
expulsion is not
only necessary in
order to maintain
discipline and
good order, it is
desirable (pp.
1232-1233).
RQ5
No data
No
Imminent
Threat

No data

No data

No data

No data

While the court
is fully aware
that school
disciplinary
matters are best
resolved in the
local community
and within the
institutional
framework of
the school
system, the court
is of the opinion
that the board
employed an
erroneous
standard in
considering
Jonathan’s case
(p. 513).

No data

No data

No data

No data

First, there is a
legitimate
possibility of
irreparable harm
that could result
from not
rescinding
disciplinary
action prior to
the end of the
litigation. For
example, Robert
P.’s college
applications will
be tarnished
since the actions
taken by the
school will be
on his record,

No data

No data
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RQ6
Deemed
Not
Binding
on the
Courts

It is not the role
of the federal
courts to set aside
decisions of
school
administrators
which the court
may view as
lacking a basis in
wisdom or
compassion (p.
1224)…In the
school context, it
is both
impossible and
undesirable for
administrators
involved in
incidents of
misbehavior
always to be
precluded from
acting as decision
makers (p.
1229)… Even if
the discipline
imposed could be
construed as
harsh or drastic,
the United States
Supreme Court
position on this is
clear: § 1983 was
not intended to
be a vehicle for
federal-court
corrections of

No data

his grades will
suffer if he is
not able to make
up his work and
he will not be
able to compete
in athletic
events. It is also
very possible
that his inability
to
participate…wil
l negatively
affect his ability
to obtain an
athletic
scholarship (p.
1122).
No data
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At the outset, it
is important to
note that a
federal court’s
role in school
disciplinary
matters is very
limited. School
discipline is an
area which the
courts are
reluctant to
enter (p.
821)…It is not
the role of the
federal courts to
set aside
decisions of
school
administrators
which the court
may view as
lacking a basis
in wisdom or
compassion…
Moreover, the
right to an
education is not
guaranteed,
either explicitly
or implicitly, by
the
Constitution,
and therefore
could not
constitute a
fundamental

It is not the role
of the federal
courts to set
aside decisions
of school
administrators
which the court
may view as
lacking a basis in
wisdom or
compassion (p.
10)…The area of
school discipline
is a realm in
which the courts
enter with great
hesitation and
reluctance.
Generally, the
decision of
whether or not to
expel a student
for gross
disobedience or
misconduct is
best left to the
discretion of the
school board (pp.
13-14).

Table 1.1G Continued
errors by school
administrators in
the exercise of
discretion… (p.
1234).

RQ7
Rejection of
Alternative
Sanctions

No data

No data

No data

right (pp. 821822)…This
court ordered
Arndt to review
school records
and, by any
means available,
to determine the
race of each
expelled
student…the
summary
indicated that
82% of students
expelled from
the beginning of
the 1996-1997
school year
through
December 1999,
were African
American…Thi
s court notes the
statistics…
However, this
court cannot
make its
decision solely
upon statistical
speculation (p.
824).
No data

RQ8
Preemp
-tive
Prevention of
Future
Disruption

No data

No data

No data

No data
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No data

No data

Table 1.1H. Level I Analysis: Plain Meaning Results for Jurisprudential Intent

RQ1
Threat vs.
Individual
Rights

Edwards v. O’
Fallon Twp.
(1999, CA)
No data

Northwestern
Sch. v. Linke
(2002, SSC)
After weighing
the students’
privacy
interests and
the character of
the search
against the
nature and
immediacy of
the
governmental
concern at
issue, we
conclude that
the drug-testing
program here is
constitutional
(p. 974)…The
United States
Supreme Court
has taken the
view that while
public schools
are state actors
subject to
constitutional
oversight, the
nature of a
school’s role is
custodial and
tutelary,
permitting a
degree of
supervision and
control that
could not be
exercised over
free adults (p.
979)…We find
that students
are entitled to
less privacy at
school than
adults would
enjoy in
comparable
situations. In
any realistic
sense, students
within the

In re L.A.
(2001, SSC)
…a school
security officer
is not required to
give a student
Miranda
warnings (p.
879)…a
schoolchild’s
interest in
privacy must be
set against the
substantial
interest of
teachers and
administrators in
maintaining
discipline in the
classroom and
on school
grounds. The
court noted that
maintaining
order in the
classroom has
never been easy,
but in recent
years, school
disorder has
often taken
particularly ugly
forms…the
court pointed
out that it
previously had
recognized that
maintaining
security and
order in the
schools requires
a certain degree
of flexibility in
school
disciplinary
procedures and
had respected
the value of
preserving the
informality of
the studentteacher
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Commonwealth
v. Lawrence L.
(2003, SSC)
…the typical
requirements of
warrant and
probable cause
are relaxed
when a school
official conducts
a search of a
student. The
relaxation of the
warrant and
probable cause
requirements of
the Fourth
Amendment are
only applicable
to school
officials who are
not acting in
conjunction with
or at the behest
of law
enforcement
agencies…the
Supreme Court
recognized the
particular
interests of
school officials
in maintaining a
safe learning
environment and
taking swift
disciplinary
action (pp. 880822).

Covington
County v. G.W.
(2000, SSC)
…school
officials need
not obtain a
warrant before
searching a
student who is
under their
authority…the
warrant
requirement, in
particular, is
unsuited to the
school
environment:
requiring a
teacher to obtain
a warrant before
searching a child
suspected of an
infraction of
school rules (or
of the criminal
law) would
unduly interfere
with the
maintenance of
the swift and
informal
disciplinary
procedures
needed in
schools (p.
193)…While it
is important to
note that
students have a
reasonable
expectation of
privacy in their
school lockers,
we must also
emphasize that
high school
students fall into
a different and
generally less
suspect class…
the realities of
the school
setting require

Table 1.1H Continued
school
environment
have a lesser
expectation of
privacy than
members of the
population
generally (pp.
979-980).

RQ2
Intent vs.
Balance of
Intent vs.
Safety

No data

No data

relationship (p.
884)…It is
evident that the
school setting
requires some
easing of the
restrictions to
which searchers
by public
authorities are
ordinarily
subject…School
officials need
not obtain a
warrant…the
substantial
interest of
teachers and
administrators in
maintaining
order in the
schools does not
require strict
adherence to the
requirement that
searches be
based on
probable cause
(p. 885).
No data

RQ3
Immune
from
Liability

No data

No data

No data
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that teachers and
other school
personnel have
the power to
make an
immediate,
limited search
for contraband,
weapons, or
other prohibited
objects or
substances…
society places a
high value on
education, which
requires an
orderly
atmosphere
which is free
from danger and
disruption (pp.
193-194).

No data

No data

Because Ridley
was not acting
as an agent of
the police, he
was exempt
from obtaining a
search warrant,
and must only
demonstrate that
the search was
reasonable in all
of the
circumstances
(p. 822).

No data

Table 1.1H Continued
RQ4
We are
Prefer
consistently
Security
reluctant to
intrude upon
the disciplinary
decisions of
school districts.
If the
opportunity to
earn college
financial
assistance were
to elevate
participation in
interscholastic
athletics into a
protected
property right,
school districts
would have to
afford
procedural due
process in
practically all
disciplinary
actions…we
cannot accept a
notion that
would invite a
due process
claim by every
student
engaged in
interscholastic
athletics and
extracurricular
activities.
Judicial
intervention in
school
discipline
would become
the rule rather
than the
exception
unless school
districts
provided due
process hearing
in all such
disciplinary
actions (p.
1078).

That NSC has
the
responsibility
of supervising
its students and
enforcing
desirable
behavior in
carrying out
school
purposes is not
questioned…
Therefore,
school
corporation
personnel have
the right,
subject to this
chapter, to take
any
disciplinary
action
necessary to
promote
student conduct
that conforms
with an orderly
and effective
educational
system.
Students must
follow
responsible
directions of
school
personnel in all
educational
settings and
refrain from
disruptive
behavior that
interferes with
the education
environment
(p. 983).

No data
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No data

No data
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RQ5
No data
No
Imminent
Threat
RQ6
Deemed
Not
Binding of
Courts

A player’s
hope, no matter
how justified,
cannot elevate
his high school
playing
privileges to a
protectable
property
interest at any
stage where
disciplinary
action would be
taken against
those
privileges.
Jordan did not
possess the
right to
participate in
interscholastic
athletics. Nor
did his
scholarship
opportunities
confer such a
right.
Therefore, a
protectable
property
interest was not
at stake when
the school
imposed
discipline, and
a due process
hearing was not
required… we
are consistently
reluctant to
intrude upon
the disciplinary
decisions of
school districts
(p. 1078).

No data

No data

No data

No data

No data

No data

No data

This school
district has
imposed a zero
tolerance policy,
which absent a
violation of
G.W.’s due
process rights, it
has the
discretion to
enforce. We find
that no such due
process violation
occurred (p.
192).
G.W. contends
that he was
denied a fair and
impartial hearing
before the school
board because
the board
considered
hearsay
testimony…This
court rejects this
argument and
finds it to be
without merit…
Furthermore,
hearsay
testimony from
school
employees is
apparently
treated
differently, and
admitting this
type of hearsay
does not deprive
a student of due
process… (p.
194).
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Table 1.1H Continued
RQ7
No data
Rejection
of
Alternative
Sanctions

RQ8
Preemptive
Prevention
of Future
Disruption

No data

No data

No data

No data

No data

No data

No data

While it is true
that there are
many
punishments that
would seem less
harsh or more
appropriate in
this case, we
must recognize
that the law
commits this
entire matter to
the discretion of
the school board
(p. 192).
No data

Table 1.1I. Level I Analysis: Plain Meaning Results for Jurisprudential Intent

RQ1
Threat vs.
Individual
Rights

Hinds County v.
R. B. (2007,
SSC)
No data

State v. Best
(2010, SSC)

In re K.K.
(2011, CA)

A school
administer
need only
satisfy the
lessor
reasonable
grounds
standard rather
than the
probable cause
standard to
search a
student’s
vehicle parked
on school
property (p.
102)
…The need for
school officials
to maintain
safety, order,
and discipline
is necessary
whether school
officials are

We join the
majority of
courts that have
examined this
issue in
concluding that
the
accommodation
of the privacy
interests of
schoolchildren
with the
substantial need
of teachers and
administrators
for freedom to
maintain order
in the schools
does not require
strict adherence
to the
requirement
that searches by
based on
probable cause
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In the Interest
of F.B. (1999,
SSC)
A student’s
privacy right in
personal items
was limited and
the means of
search did not
have to be the
least intrusive
and most
efficient
possible…the
interest in
keeping
weapons out of
public schools
was so obvious
that failure to
develop a record
as to why the
search was held
was superfluous
and the trial
court had taken
judicial notice
of the increased

In re
Hinterlong
(2003, CA)
Having
determined that
the crime
stoppers
privilege
restricts
Hinterlong’s
cognizable
common law
claims, we next
determine
whether the
abrogation of
those claims is
arbitrary and
unreasonable
when balanced
against the
legislature’s
actual
purpose…His
inability to
obtain
discovery
concerning how

Table 1.1I Continued
addressing
concerns inside
the school
building or
outside on the
school parking
lot. It is the
school
environment
and the need
for safety,
order, and
discipline that
is the
underpinning
for the school
official…We
have
repeatedly
declared that
the school
setting calls for
protections
geared toward
the safety of
students (pp.
109-113).

to believe that
the subject of
the search has
violated or is
violating the
law (p.
653)…There is
nothing in the
developing case
law that
indicates school
officials must
conduct an
independent
investigation as
to the tip or its
reliability (p.
654).
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rate of violence
in schools (p.
663)…Although
students possess
a legitimate
expectation of
privacy
concerning their
person and
personal
belongings, that
privacy right is
limited. The
need to protect
all students, to
ensure school
discipline, and
protect school
property, limits
the student’s
expectation of
privacy while in
the school
environment (p.
669)…

the tipster
obtained the
information
provided to
Clements
severely
impedes
Hinterlong’s
prosecution of
his common law
causes of action
against these
parties (p.
630)…The
purpose of the
crime stoppers
statute is to
promote
legitimate
reports of
criminal
activities, not to
shield a student
who for
personal gain or
retaliatory
motives makes
a set up tip to
achieve
expulsion of a
rival (pp. 631632)…We
understand
AMHS’s
unfortunate
need for a zero
tolerance
policy. We also
understand the
usefulness of a
crime stoppers
program…and
the need for
tipster
anonymity…the
Thomas in
camera review
procedure
would satisfy
the
government’s
interest in
protecting its
witnesses while

Table 1.1I Continued

RQ2
Intent vs.
Balance of
Intent vs.
Safety

No data

No data

No data

No data

RQ3
Immune
from
Liability

No data

No data

No data

No data

RQ4
Prefer
Security

No data

The court
recognized that
the school
setting requires
some easing of
the restrictions
to which
searches by
public
authorities are
ordinarily
subject…In
weighing the
student’s
expectations of
privacy on the
one hand and
the school’s
interest in
maintaining
discipline and

There is
nothing in the
developing case
law that
indicates school
officials must
conduct an
independent
investigation as
to the tip or its
reliability (p.
654)…We
conclude that it
was because of
the zero
tolerance policy
in the school’s
code of conduct
and it was the
policy to act on
all tips

The interest in
keeping
weapons out of
public schools is
a matter so
obvious that the
need to develop
a record on this
point is
superfluous
(p.672)…The
myriad of
interests at issue
include the
physical safety
of the school
students,
teachers,
administrators
and other
employees, the
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satisfying the
defendant’s
Sixth
Amendment
rights…(p.633).
No data

Absent both
pleading and
proof of
immunity,
Clements can be
held liable
under
Hinterlong’s
claims (p.
627)…
Clements is also
not cloaked
with immunity
from personal
liability where
her actions are
not incident to
or within the
scope of her
professional
duties…(p.
628).
No data

Table 1.1I Continued

RQ5
No
Imminent
Threat

No data

RQ6
Deemed
Not
Binding on
Courts

The court finds
that the school
board’s decision
was arbitrary and
capricious and
not supported by
substantial
evidence. The
school board
relied solely on
the report from
the appeals
committee and
the faxed
photocopy of an
item purporting
to be the “knife”
found on R.B.
The findings of
the appeals
committee are
themselves
deficient, as the
appeals
committee chose
to rely on the
written reports
characterizing
the device as a
pocket knife
without
examining the
device
themselves…Had
the school board

order on the
other, the court
decided that
the public
interest is best
served by a
Fourth
Amendment
standard of
reasonableness
that stops short
of probable
cause (pp. 109110).
No data

regardless of
the source (p.
654).

public concern
of eliminating
violence in the
community in
general and in
the schools in
specific, and the
need to maintain
schools as
centers of
learning free of
fear for personal
safety (p. 672).

No data

No data

No data

No data

No data

Thus, although
we acknowledge
that a search of
a student
involves the
greater intrusion
of the student’s
privacy interest
than a search of
a school locker,
where the
character of the
intrusion is noninvasive such as
here, the
intrusion
remains
minimal (pp.
669-670)…a
search will not
be barred
because less
intrusive means
exist than those
actually utilized
if the means, as
employed, are
not so expansive
as to be
disproportionate
to the purpose
of the search (p.
670).

Accordingly,
we hold that the
trial court did
not abuse its
discretion in
determining that
the student
informant made
the tip to an
appropriate
school official,
invoking
section
414.008’s crime
stopper
privilege (p.
624)…We have
addressed each
of Hinterlong’s
arguments
claiming that
the crime
stopper
privilege is not
applicable to the
present facts;
therefore, we
overrule his first
issue (p. 625).
…because the
identity of the
tipster and
information
provided by the
tipster may be
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Table 1.1I Continued
conducted even a
cursory
examination of
the actual device,
it would have
realized that the
appeals
committee’s
recommendation
…did not
constitute
substantial
evidence upon
which to
discipline R.B.
for possession of
a weapon (pp.
501-502).

RQ7
Rejection
of
Alternative
Sanctions

No data

No data

No data

No data

RQ8
Preemptive
Prevention
of Future
Disruption

No data

No data

No data

The schools are
simply not
required to wait
for a tragedy to
occur within
their walls to
demonstrate that
the need is
immediate (p.
673).

crucial to
Hinterlong’s
tort claims…the
extent of the
abrogation of
Hinterlong’s
right to redress
is almost total.
He cannot
prosecute his
common law
causes against
either Clements,
the tipster, or
the person or
persons who
planted the
Ozarka water
bottle for injury
done him, in
his…person or
reputation
without learning
the tipster’s
identity (p.
630).
No data

No data

Table 1.1J. Level I Analysis: Plain Meaning Results for Jurisprudential Intent
E.M. v. Briggs
(1996, SSC)
RQ1
Threat vs.
Individual
Rights

No data

Cathe A. v.
Doddridge (1997,
SSC)
The court found
that a child could
be constitutionally
removed from a

J.M. v. Webster
County Bd.
(2000, SSC)
Because the
state has a
compelling
interest in
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Goss v. Lopez
(1975, SC)
Those young
people do not
shed their
constitutional

Tinker v. Des
Moines Sch.
(1969, SC)
…prohibiting
students from
thus wearing
the armbands

Table 1.1J Continued
classroom when
he engaged in
disruptive conduct
(p.
521)…Because
the state has a
compelling
interest in
providing a safe
and secure
environment to
the school
children of this
state pursuant to
W. Va. Const. art.
XII, section 1, and
because expulsion
from school for as
much as twelve
months…is
reasonably
necessary and
narrowly tailored
method to further
that interest, the
mandatory
suspension period
of the Act is not
facially
unconstitutional...
another legitimate
concern is the
need to effectively
deter other
children from
engaging in
prohibited
conduct (p.524)
Where the state is
able to safely
provide
reasonable basic
educational
opportunities and
services to a child
who has been
removed from
regular school
under the
provisions…there
is no compelling
state interest in a
policy of
providing the

providing a safe
and secure
environment to
the school
children of this
state pursuant to
W. Va. Const.
art. XII,
section1, and
because
expulsion from
school for as
much as twelve
months…is
reasonably
necessary and
narrowly
tailored method
to further that
interest, the
mandatory
suspension
period of the
Act is not
facially
unconstitutional
(p. 498)…In
Cathe A., supra,
we were asked
whether or not
the requirement
of a one-year
expulsion for
violating the
statute could
pass
constitutional
muster; we
answered that
question in the
affirmative
because the
state has a
compelling
interest in
providing a safe
and secure
environment…
(pp. 501-502).
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rights at the
schoolhouse
door…Among
other things,
the state is
constrained to
recognize a
student’s
legitimate
entitlement to a
public
education as a
property
interest which
is protected by
the Due
Process Clause
and which may
not be taken
away for
misconduct
without
adherence to
the minimum
procedures
required by that
clause (p.
574)… But it
would be a
strange
disciplinary
system in an
educational
institution if no
communication
was sought by
the
disciplinarian
with the student
in an effort to
inform him of
his dereliction
and to let him
tell his side of
the story in
order to make
sure that an
injustice is not
done (p.581)…
We stop short
of construing
the Due
Process Clause
to require,

violated the
students’ rights
of free speech
under the First
Amendment,
where there was
no evidence
that the
authorities had
reason to
anticipate that
the wearing of
the armbands
would
substantially
interfere with
the work of the
school
(p.503)… It can
hardly be
argued that
either students
or teachers shed
their
constitutional
rights to
freedom of
speech or
expression at
the schoolhouse
gate (p. 506)…
Certainly where
there is no
finding and no
showing that
engaging in the
forbidden
conduct would
materially and
substantially
interfere with
the
requirements of
appropriate
discipline in the
operation of the
school, the
prohibition
cannot be
sustained…
School officials
do not possess
absolute
authority over

Table 1.1J Continued
opportunities and
services only if
the child’s parents
are able and
willing to
reimburse the
state for the cost
(p.524)…Well
before the passage
of the Safe
Schools Act, this
court recognized
that a child may
be constitutionally
removed from the
classroom
environment
when he or she
engages in
disruptive
conduct…the
pupils were not
entitled to
reinstatement
because the
pupils’ behavior
involved
substantial
disorder…(p.528).

RQ2
Intent vs.
Balance of
Intent vs.
Safety

No data

No data

The coach
found the
particular
expletive
chosen by
J.M.’s father to
be quite
objectionable,
and feared that
the argument
might escalate
into a physical
altercation, so
he asked J.M.’s
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countrywide,
that hearings in
connection
with short
suspensions
must afford the
student the
opportunity to
secure counsel,
to confront and
cross-examine
witnesses
supporting the
charge, or to
call his own
witnesses to
verify his
version of the
incident. Brief
disciplinary
suspensions are
almost
countless. To
impose in each
case even
truncated trialtype procedures
might well
overwhelm
administrative
facilities in
many places,
and by
diverting
resources, cost
more than it
would save in
educational
effectiveness
(p. 583).
Requiring that
there be at least
an informal
give-and-take
between
student and
disciplinarian,
preferably prior
to the
suspension,
will add little to
the factfinding
function where
the

their students
(pp. 507-511)…
But conduct by
that student, in
class or out of
it, which for
any reason—
whether it
stems from
time, place, or
type of
behaviormaterially
disrupts
classwork or
involves
substantial
disorder or
invasion of the
rights of others
is, of course,
not immunized
by the
constitutional
guarantee of
freedom of
speech (p. 513).

No data

Table 1.1J Continued
father to go
outside and
calm
down…After
his father left
the room, J.M.
took out the
loaded gun and
fifty-six
additional
rounds of
ammunition,
and surrendered
them to the
coach, asking
the coach to
“take care of
them,” and
adding that he
thought his
father “was
going to kill
him” (p. 500)…
There is no
question that
J.M. had a
firearm on his
person while on
school grounds.
However, J.M.
argues that he
had not
intended to be
upon school
grounds and
was transported
to the school by
his father and
against his will.
Thus he argues
that the lack of
a mental
element or
mens rea of
“intent” makes
it impossible for
him to be guilty
of possession
(pp. 502-503)…
the fact finder
determined that
J.M.’s actions
in having a gun
tucked into his
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disciplinarian
himself has
witnessed the
conduct
forming the
basis for the
charge. But
things are not
always as they
seem to be, and
the student will
at least have
the opportunity
to characterize
his conduct and
put it in what
he deems the
proper context
(p.584).

Table 1.1J Continued

RQ3
Immune
from
Liability

No data

No data

pants on school
property
constituted a
violation of the
statute…even if
the initial taking
of the gun were
defensible
(which we
question) J.M.
had several
opportunities to
discard the gun
or the bullets.
While J.M.’s
actions might
be excusable to
some, they were
not to the
principal, the
board, nor the
superintendent
(p.507).
No data

RQ4
Prefer
Security

…the board
did not act
arbitrarily and
capriciously in
violation of the
students’
constitutional
rights when it
expelled them
for the
remainder of
the year with
homebound
services. The
school’s drug
and alcohol
policy and its
handbook both
stated that
expulsion was
an appropriate
discipline for
students
possessing
illegal drugs on
school property

Indeed, a school
system that did
not take rigorous
steps to eliminate
violence and
weapons could
find itself in
serious liability
problems if a
child or teacher
were injured by
the presence of
conditions that the
school could have
detected and
prevented. We
conclude that the
Safe Schools
Act’s twelvemonth expulsion
period sends a
strong message
that we think the
legislature was
entitled to believe
needs to be sent to

It may be that
some of the
school officials
misunderstand
their duty under
the statute. I
may also be
significant that
J.M.’s incident,
of May 12,
1999, came just
three weeks
after the April
20, 1999
massacre at
Columbine
High school in
Colorado,
where two
students
murdered many
of their
classmates.
However, we
do not feel it
appropriate to
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No data

No data

No data

No data

Table 1.1J Continued
(p. 757).

RQ5
No
Imminent
Threat

No data

RQ6
Deemed
Not
Binding on
Courts

It should be
here noted that
the
management,
supervision
and
determinations
of policy are
the prerogative
and

further a
compelling state
interest (p. 529)…
In applying the
mandate…
articulating a
policy that a child
who is removed
from the
classroom
setting…is not
entitled to any
form of statefunded instruction
during the
pendency of their
expulsion. We are
not unmindful of
the enormous
demands upon our
state’s educational
system…
Recognizing that
our decision today
will do nothing to
reduce those
demands, we must
nevertheless
conclude that the
broad and
sweeping policy
set forth…is
incompatible with
the place of
education as a
fundamental,
constitutional
right of this state
(p. 531).
No data

undermine the
authority of
school officials,
by rejecting the
factual findings
of those closest
to the events in
this case (p.
507).

No data

No data

No data

No data

No data

Among other
things, the state
is constrained
to recognize a
student’s
legitimate
entitlement to a
public
education as a
property

No data
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Table 1.1J Continued
responsibility
of the school
officials; and
that the courts
should be
reluctant to
enter
therein…It is
the policy of
the law not to
favor
limitations on
the powers of
boards of
education, but
rather to give
them a free
hand to
function within
the sphere of
their
responsibilities
(p. 757)…
Section 1983
does not
extend the
right to
relitigate in
federal court
evidentiary
questions
arising in
school
disciplinary
proceedings or
the proper
construction of
school
regulations.
The system of
public
education that
has evolved in
this nation
relies
necessarily
upon the
discretion and
judgment of
school
administrators
and school
board
members, and

interest which
is protected by
the Due
Process Clause
and which may
not be taken
away for
misconduct
without
adherence to
the minimum
procedures
required by that
clause (p. 574).
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Table 1.1J Continued
§ 1983 was not
intended to be
a vehicle for
federal court
correction of
errors in the
exercise of that
discretion (p.
757).
RQ7
No data
Rejection
of
Alternative
Sanctions

RQ8
Preemptive
Prevention
of Future
Disruption

No data

The twelve-month
expulsion period...
may seem to be a
severe penalty.
But the legislature
is entitled to
believe that only
such a penalty
would serve as an
effective deterrent
to further the
important goal of
a strict weaponsfree environment
in our schools…
(p.529).
No data

No data

No data

No data

No data

No data

The district
court concluded
that the action
of the school
authorities was
reasonable
because it was
based upon
their fear of a
disturbance
from the
wearing of the
armbands. But,
in our system,
undifferentiated
fear or
apprehension of
disturbance is
not enough to
overcome the
right to freedom
of expression
(pp. 508-509).
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Table 1.1K. Level I Analysis: Plain Meaning Results for Jurisprudential Intent

RQ1
Threat vs.
Individual
Rights

Hazelwood v.
Kuhlmeier
(1988, SC)
…the control
that educators
are entitled to
exercise over
schoolsponsored
publications,
theatrical
productions,
and other
expressive
activities that
might
reasonably be
perceived to
bear the
imprimatur of
the school is
greater than the
control,
governed by the
standard
articulated in
Tinker…A
school need not
tolerate student
speech that is
inconsistent
with its basic
educational
mission, even
though the
government
could not
censor similar
speech outside
the school (p.
261)… we have
nonetheless
recognized that
the First
Amendment
rights of
students in the
public schools
are not
automatically
coextensive
with the rights
of adults in

New Jersey v.
T.L.0. (1985,
SC)
…greater
emphasis should
be placed on the
special
characteristics of
elementary and
secondary
schools that
make it
unnecessary to
afford students
the same
constitutional
protections
granted adults
and juveniles in
a non-school
setting…the
special need for
an immediate
response to
behavior that
threatens either
the safety of
school children
and teachers or
the educational
process itself
justifies the
court in
[exempting]
school searches
from the warrant
and probable
cause
requirements,
and in applying
a standard
determined by
balancing the
relevant interests
(p. 325)… But
striking a
balance between
schoolchildren’s
legitimate
expectations of
privacy and the
school’s equally
legitimate need

Bethel Sch.
Dist. v. Fraser
(1986, SC)
…the
determination
of what manner
of speech in the
classroom or
school assembly
is inappropriate
properly rests
with the school
board…Given a
school’s need to
be able to
impose
disciplinary
sanctions for a
wide range of
unanticipated
conduct
disruptive of the
educational
process, school
disciplinary
rules need not
be as detailed as
a criminal code
which imposes
criminal
sanctions (p.
676)…The
undoubted
freedom to
advocate
unpopular and
controversial
views in
schools and
classrooms
must be
balanced
against the
society’s
countervailing
interest in
teaching
students the
boundaries of
socially
appropriate
behavior (p.
681)…the
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Vernonia Sch.
Dist. v. Acton
(1995, SC)
Students were
not entitled to
full Fourth
Amendment
protections
where the
state’s interest
in preventing
drug addiction
among students
was compelling
and student
athletes had a
decreased
expectation of
privacy (p.
646)…The state
may exercise a
degree of
supervision and
control greater
than it could
exercise over
free adults (p.
647)…
balancing the
intrusion on the
individual’s
Fourth
Amendment
interests against
its promotion of
legitimate
governmental
interests (p.
653)…We have
found such
“special needs”
to exist in the
public school
context. There,
the warrant
requirement
would unduly
interfere with
the maintenance
of the swift and
informal
disciplinary
procedures that

Binder v. Cold
Spring Harbor
(2010, DC)
…it is wellestablished that
the school
setting requires
some easing of
the restrictions
to which
searches by
public
authorities are
ordinarily
subject (p.
14)…Under the
more flexible
approach
afforded to
school
administrators
in conducting
searches, and
especially in
light of the
seriousness of
bringing
marijuana to a
school, Browne
had sufficient
cause to
conduct the
search as a
matter of law
(p.17).

Table 1.1K Continued
other settings,
and must be
applied in light
of the special
characteristics
of the school
environment
(pp. 266-267).

to maintain an
environment in
which learning
can take place
requires some
easing of the
restrictions to
which searches
by public
authorities are
ordinarily
subject
(p.326)…Where
a careful
balancing of
governmental
and private
interests suggest
that the public
interest is best
served by a
Fourth
Amendment
standard of
reasonableness
that stops short
of probable
cause, we have
not hesitated to
adopt such a
standard (pp.
340-341).

RQ2
Intent vs.
Balance of
Intent vs.
Safety

No data

No data

constitutional
rights of
students in
public school
are not
automatically
coextensive
with the rights
of adults in
other settings
(p. 682)…
maintaining
security and
order in the
schools requires
a certain degree
of flexibility in
school
disciplinary
procedures…
Given the
school’s need to
be able to
impose
disciplinary
sanctions for a
wide range of
unanticipated
conduct
disruptive of the
educational
process, the
school
disciplinary
rules need not
be as detailed as
a criminal code
(p. 686).
No data

RQ3
Immune
from
Liability

No data

No data

No data

No data

No data

RQ4
Prefer
Security

No data

No data

I wish
therefore…to
disclaim any
purpose…to
hold that the

No data

No data
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are needed, and
strict adherence
to the
requirement
that searches be
based on
probable cause
would undercut
the substantial
need of teachers
and
administrators
for freedom to
maintain order
in the schools
(p. 653).

No data

No data
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RQ5
No
Imminent
Threat

No data

RQ6
Deemed
Not
Binding on
Courts

We thus
recognized that
the
determination
of what manner
of speech in the
classroom or in
the school
assembly is
inappropriate
properly rest
with the school
board, rather
than with the
federal courts
(p. 267).

…the Eighth
Amendment’s
prohibition of
cruel and
unusual
punishment
applies only to
punishments
imposed after
criminal
convictions and
hence does not
apply to the
punishment of
school children
by public school
officials (p.334).
Absent any
suggestion that
the rule violates
some substantive
constitutional
guarantee, the
courts should, as
a general matter,
defer to that
judgment and
refrain from
attempting to
distinguish
between rules
that are
important to the
preservation of
order in the
schools and rules
that are not
(p.342).

Federal
Constitution
compels the
teachers,
parents, and
elected school
officials to
surrender
control of the
American
public school
system to public
school students
(p. 686).
No data

The
determination
of what manner
of speech in the
classroom or in
school assembly
is inappropriate
properly rests
with the school
board (p.
683)…
maintaining
security and
order in the
schools requires
a certain degree
of flexibility in
school
disciplinary
procedures…
Given the
school’s need to
be able to
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No data

No data

Accordingly,
we reach the
same
conclusion as in
Skinner: that the
invasion of
privacy was not
significant (p.
660).

The Supreme
Court has long
held that § 1983
does not extend
the right to
relitigate in
federal court
evidentiary
questions
arising in school
disciplinary
proceedings…
The system of
public
education that
has evolved in
this nation relies
necessarily
upon the
discretion and
judgment of
school
administrators

Table 1.1K Continued

RQ7
Rejection
of
Alternative
Sanctions

No data

No data

impose
disciplinary
sanctions for a
wide range of
unanticipated
conduct
disruptive of the
educational
process, the
school
disciplinary
rules need not
be as detailed as
a criminal code
(p. 686).
No data

RQ8
Preemptive
Prevention
of Future
Disruption

No data

No data

No data

and school
board members
and § 1983 was
not intended to
be a vehicle for
federal court
correction of
errors in the
exercise of that
discretion (p.
10).

No data

No data

No data

No data

Table 1.1L. Level I Analysis: Plain Meaning Results for Jurisprudential Intent

RQ1
Threat
vs.
Individual
Rights

C.H. v. Folks
(2010, DC)

Beard v.
Whitmore Lake
(2005, CA)

No data

…the character of
the intrusion was
far more invasive
than the character
of the urinalysis
in Vernonia,
where students
remained fully
clothed…the boys
were required to
lift their shirts and
to remove both
their pants and
underwear
(p.605)…The
highly intrusive
nature of the
searches, the fact

Sims v.
Bracken
County Sch.
(2010, DC)
However,
students
typically have a
lesser
expectation of
privacy than
members of the
public
generally.
While students’
constitutional
rights do not
evaporate at the
public school’s
doors, the
essence of those
rights is
balanced
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Lausin v. Bishko
(2010, DC)

Pendleton v.
Fassett (2009,
DC)

…it is clear that in
a school setting
the standard for a
Fourth
Amendment
analysis does not
require probable
cause (p. 629).

Generally, in
order to conduct
a search, an
officer must
have probable
cause to believe
an individual is
engaged in
illegal activity
and that
evidence
bearing on that
offense will be
found in the
place to be
searched. In the
school setting,
however, the

Table 1.1L Continued
that the searches
were undertaken
to find missing
money, the fact
that the searches
were performed
on a substantial
number of
students, the fact
that the searches
were performed in
the absences of
individualized
suspicion, and the
lack of consent,
taken together,
demonstrate that
the searches were
not reasonable.
Accordingly,
under T.L.O. and
Vernonia, the
searches violated
the Fourth
Amendment (p.
605)…At the time
of the search at
issue, the prior
law involving
strip searches of
students did not
clearly establish
that the
defendants’
actions in this
case were
unconstitutional…
Given the lack of
a factual context
similar to that of
this case, T.L.O.
and Vernonia
could not have
truly compelled
the defendants to
realize that they
were acting
illegally when
they participated
in the searches of
the students in
this case…
Because the
searches in this

against the need
for teachers and
administrators
to have the
freedom to
maintain order
in school…the
Supreme court
held that the
Fourth
Amendment
applies to
searches
conducted by
school officials,
but rejected the
adherence to a
probable cause
requirement
(pp. 18-19)…
Reasonable
suspicion
demands a less
exacting
standard of
constitutional
scrutiny than
does probable
cause (p. 22)…
To determine
the
constitutionality
of a
seizure…courts
will look to the
school official’s
actions
balanced
against the
special needs
dictated in the
public school
setting where
the state is
responsible for
maintaining
discipline,
health, and
safety (p. 30).
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level of
suspicion
required to
justify a search
is less than
probable
cause…the
accommodation
of the privacy
interests of
schoolchildren
with the
substantial need
of teachers and
administrators
for freedom to
maintain order
in the schools
does not require
strict adherence
to the
requirement that
searches be
based on
probable cause
(pp. 15-16)…In
a school setting,
it is not always
necessary that
the reasonable
suspicion be
individualized;
that is, school
officials my
conduct
searches of
multiple
students without
a suspicion that
a particular
student has
committed an
infraction (p.
18)… Here, the
governmental
interest was
maintaining
order…The
general
governmental
interest in safe
and disciplined
schools in order
to promote and

Table 1.1L Continued
case did not
violate clearly
established law,
the defendants are
entitled to
qualified
immunity (pp.
607-608).

RQ2
Intent
vs.
Balance
of Intent
vs.
Safety

No data

No data

No data

No data

ensure a
productive
learning
environment is
more weighty
here…(p. 21).
However, the
complete lack of
any reasonable
belief that
Pendleton—or
any other
student on her
bus- possessed
contraband
detracts from
the generally
compelling
nature of the
government
interest…
without any
individualized
suspicion, the
intrusive search
of each
individual is that
much less likely
to be
successful…she
suffered a
violation of her
Fourth
Amendment
rights (pp. 2224).
No data

RQ3
Immune
from
Liability

Defendants
violated a
clearly
established
constitutional
right when the
custodian
peered into the
restroom stall.
If plaintiff’s

However, the
teachers and
officer were
entitled to
qualified
immunity because
the law at the time
the searches were
conducted did not
clearly establish

Defendant Ray
is entitled to
qualified
immunity
relative to her
search of the
jacket (p. 23)…
Defendant Ray
is entitled to
qualified

...a political
subdivision is not
liable in damages
in a civil action
for injury, death,
or loss to person
or property
allegedly caused
by any act or
omission of the

The available
case law
therefore did not
give the instant
officials fair
warning that
their conduct
was
unconstitutional.
Accordingly,
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Table 1.1L Continued
allegations are
proven to be
true, Principal
Perez and Vice
Principal Gray
would not be
entitled to
qualified
immunity with
regard to the
search of the
restroom stall
… Plaintiff
fails, however,
to tie the
search of his
pockets in any
manner to any
action or
inaction of
Perez and
Gray.
Therefore, at
this point,
plaintiff fails
to allege
sufficient facts
to implicate
their
supervisory
liability for the
pocket search
(pp. 25-26)…
The district
retains its
governmental
immunity
(p.28).
RQ4
No data
Prefer
Security

that the searches
were
unreasonable
under the
particular
circumstances
present in the case
(p. 598)…
Because the
searches in this
case did not
violate clearly
established law,
the defendants are
entitled to
qualified
immunity (p.
608).

immunity for
authorizing the
search of K.S.’
s person (p.
26)…
Defendant Ray
is also entitled
to qualified
immunity
relative to this
seizure (pp. 3334).

political
subdivision or an
employee of the
political
subdivision in
connection with a
governmental or
proprietary
function…
Richmond
Heights Board of
Education is a
political
subdivision, and
as such, it had
immunity (p.
631)…the
individual school
board defendants,
Mr. Bishko, Dr.
Wallace, and Dr.
Calinger, are
entitled to
immunity (p.
631).

Fisher, Welch,
Fassett, and
Riggs are
protected from a
civil damages
suit for their
allegedly
unconstitutional
conduct by the
doctrine of
qualified
immunity (p.
32).

No data

No data

No data

No data

RQ5
No
Imminent
Threat

No data

No data

No data

No data

No data

RQ6
Deemed
Not
Binding
on the
Courts

The court
agrees. Texas
law does not
recognize a
cause of action
in tort for

The actions of the
defendants were
unconstitutional.
However, at the
time the searches
occurred, the law

In essence,
plaintiffs allege
municipal
liability based
on the Board’s
alleged practice

The fact that
plaintiffs did not
have counsel at
the suspension
hearing or that
Gina was not

Whether or not
the conduct rises
to the level of
outrageous is a
question of law.
The court
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money
damages for a
violation of
the Texas
Constitution…
Accordingly,
plaintiff’s
claims under
the Texas
Constitution
are dismissed
(p. 32).

regarding the
reasonableness of
a strip search
under these
circumstances
was not clearly
established. The
denial of
summary
judgment is
therefore reversed
(p.601).

of tacitly
approving its
employees’
unconstitutional
conduct. A
municipality,
however, only
violates § 1983
where its
official policy
or custom
actually serves
to deprive an
individual of his
or her
constitutional
rights…because
the individual
defendants did
not violate the
plaintiff’s
constitutional
rights, plaintiff
cannot rely on
their conduct to
establish a
claim of
municipal
liability
(p.39)… When
all federal
claims are
dismissed
before trial, the
balance of
considerations
usually will
point to
dismissing the
state law claims
(pp. 42-43).
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permitted to
consult with her
mother prior to
the hearing does
not offend due
process (pp. 626627)
The Supreme
Court has held
that the right to
attend public
school is not a
fundamental right
for the purposes
of substantive due
process analysis
…it is not the role
of the federal
courts to set aside
decisions of
school
administrators
which the court
may view as
lacking a basis in
wisdom or
compassion (pp.
627-628)… While
the police officers
admit
misrepresenting
certain facts to
Gina, such as their
claim that they
had handwriting
analysis finding
that Gina had
written the
threat…these
misrepresentations
did not rise to the
level of coercive
police activity…
the suppression of
Gina’s confession
in the juvenile
proceedings does
not have
preclusive effect
on this court…
(pp. 635-636).

concludes that
the conduct the
plaintiff
complains of is
not so
outrageous and
extreme so as to
support this
claim.
Accordingly, it
will grant the
defendants
summary
judgment as to
this claim (pp.
52-53).

Table 1.1L Continued
RQ7
No data
Rejection of
Alternative
Sanction
RQ8
Preemptive Prevention
of
Future
Disruption

No data

No data

No data

No data

No data

No data

No data

No data

No data

Table 1.1M. Level I Analysis: Plain Meaning Results for Jurisprudential Intent

RQ1
Threat vs.
Individual
Rights

Wooleyhan v.
Cape
Henlopen
(2011, DC)
In establishing
these minimum
procedural
guidelines, the
court balanced
the school’s
need to
maintain order
free from the
burden of
elaborate
hearing
requirements
against the
general interest
of arriving at
the truth
inherent in the
concept of due
process and
giving a
student in
jeopardy of
serious loss
notice of the
case against
him and
opportunity to
meet it (pp. 40-

Porter v.
Ascension
(2004, CA)

Demers v.
Leominster
Sch. (2003, DC)

Bundick v. Bay
City Indep. Sch.
(2001, DC)

Butler v. Rio
Rancho Pub.
(2003, CA)

Because the
search of the
younger son was
reasonable at
inception, and
conducted in a
reasonable
manner when
balanced against
the school’s
interest in its
students’ safety
and welfare, the
younger son’s
Fourth
Amendment
claim failed (p.
608)…A school
need not tolerate
student speech
that is
inconsistent with
its basic
educational
mission, even
though the
government
could not censor
similar speech

While the
supreme court
has made it
clear that public
school students
do not shed
their
constitutional
rights as the
schoolhouse
gate, it has also
established that
a student’s First
Amendment
rights are not
coextensive
with the rights
of adults in
other settings
(p. 200). In
order to
suppress speech
that is not
constitutionally
protected, the
court must
justify its
decision by
showing facts

However, given
the relaxed
standard
applicable to
searches and
seizures o school
properties,
Bundick’s claim
fails. In striking
the balance of
students’
legitimate
expectations of
privacy and
schools’ equally
legitimate need
to maintain the
proper
educational
environment, the
United States
Supreme Court
eased the
restrictions to
which searches
by public
authorities are
ordinarily
subject; the

There is no
doubt the
school has a
legitimate
interest in
providing a
safe
environment
for students
and staff. It is
not
unreasonable
for the school
to conclude
that student
possession of
weapons on
school property
threatens this
interest. In
order to protect
against this
threat and
further the
school’s
interest in
safety, we
believe there is
a rational basis
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Table 1.1M Continued
41).

outside the
school…While
certain forms of
expressive
conduct and
speech are
sheltered under
the First
Amendment,
constitutional
protection is not
absolute,
especially in the
public school
setting.
Educators have
an essential role
in regulating
school affairs
and establishing
appropriate
standards of
conduct (p. 615).
Because Adam’s
drawing was
composed offcampus,
displayed only to
members of his
own household,
stored offcampus, and not
purposefully
taken by him to
EAHS or
publicized in a
way certain to
result in its
appearance at
EAHS, we have
found that the
drawing is
protected by the
First
Amendment.
Furthermore, we
have found that it
is neither speech
directed at the
campus nor a
purposefully
communicated
true threat (p.
620)

which might
reasonably have
led school
authorities to
forecast
substantial
disruption of or
material
interference
with school
activities (p.
202)…
Michael’s
suspension and
subsequent
expulsion were
rationally
related to the
school’s interest
in maintaining a
safe school
environment,
particularly in
light of the
apprehensive
climate that
existed at the
time due to
highly
publicized
incidents of
school violence
around the
country. In the
wake of other
episodes of
school violence,
many of which
occurred close
in time to the
events in this
case, student
safety had to be
considered by
the school
officials in
Leominster
when faced with
a potentially
dangerous
situation (p.
206).
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Court rejected
the requirements
of a warrant or
probable cause
in favor of a
simple
reasonableness
under the
circumstances
standard (p.
738).

for the school
to suspend Mr.
Butler, even for
one year, when
he should have
known he
brought a
weapon onto
school
property. The
school’s
decision was
not arbitrary,
nor does it
shock the
conscience.
Accordingly,
the decision did
not violate Mr.
Butler’s
substantive due
process rights,
if any (p.
1201).

Table 1.1M Continued

RQ2
Intent vs.
Balance of
Intent vs.
Safety

No data

…However, a
reasonable
school official
facing this
question for the
first time would
find not preexisting body of
law from which
he could draw
clear guidance…
a reasonable
school official
would encounter
a body of case
law sending
inconsistent
signals as to how
far school
authority to
regulate student
speech reaches
beyond the
confines of the
campus (p. 620).
Inter alia, the
instant court
found that the
older son did not
intentionally or
knowingly
communicate his
drawing in a way
sufficient to
remove it from
First Amendment
protection. The
drawing’s
introduction to
the school was
wholly
accidental and
unconnected
with an earlier
display of the
drawing to
household
members. Thus,
the state had no
authority to issue
sanctions for the
message it
contained(p.608).

The appropriate
focus is on what
the defendant
reasonably
should have
foreseen. Under
this standard,
there is no
requirement that
the speaker had
the ability or
actually
intended to
carry out the
threat. Michael
should have
concluded that
his drawing and
note would be
considered a
threat to the
school and to
himself (p.
202).
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Bundick relies
heavily upon a
recent split
decision from
the Sixth
Circuit, Seal v.
Morgan…which
held that a
school board
may not expel a
student without
first determining
that the student
intentionally
committed the
acts for which
his expulsion is
sought. The
court must admit
that this
argument has a
virtuous appeal,
however, with
all due respect to
the Seal
majority, it
seems Judge
Surheinrich, in
dissent, has a

…the school
board later
concluded Mr.
Butler should
have known, as
the driver of
the vehicle,
that he was in
possession of
and
transporting a
weapon onto
school
grounds…Mr.
Butler knew, or
should have
known that he
was
responsible for
the vehicle he
brought onto
school property
and the
contents
thereof…As a
result of the
board’s
decision, we
need not decide

Table 1.1M Continued

RQ3
Immune
from
Liability

Accordingly,
the court
concludes that
a reasonable
official would
not know that
such conduct
violated
procedural due
process, and
Yor, Mrazeck,
and Maull are
entitled to
qualified
immunity on
the procedural
due process
claim

Even if we find
that the right was
clearly
established at the
time of the
alleged violation,
however, a
defendant will
still be entitled to
qualified
immunity if the
defendant’s
conduct was
objectively
reasonable in
light of clearly
established law
at the time of the

Even if the law
is clearly
established, an
official is
entitled to
qualified
immunity if at
the time of the
challenged
actions, such
official’s belief
that his or her
actions were
lawful is
objectively
legally
reasonable…A
reasonable,
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better
understanding of
the law in this
area. Scienter is
not a
requirement of
the school
district’s policy
and that policy is
entitled to
deference.
Moreover,
scienter can be
imputed from
the fact of
possession.
Bundick carried
the machete in
his truck when
he worked and
he had worked
the day before it
was found.
While clear
findings of fact
from the
superintendent
may have been
helpful, it was
not irrational to
find Bundick
knew, even if he
had forgotten, of
the machete’s
presence (p.
740).
No data

whether
suspending a
high school
student for
unknowingly
bringing a
weapon onto
school property
violates the
student’s
substantive due
process rights
(p. 1201).

Since the
Butlers failed
to state a
substantive due
process
violation, we
conclude the
school is
entitled to
qualified
immunity on
the Butlers'
substantive due
process claims
(p. 1201).
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(p.80)…Jester
is not entitled
to qualified
immunity for
Wooleyhan’s
only remaining
federal law
claim against
her- unlawful
detention. The
right to be free
from false
arrest is a
clearly
established
right, which
necessarily
includes the
right to be free
from false
accusations in
obtaining the
authority to
arrest…No
state actor
could
reasonably
believe that
making a false
accusation to
procure a
student’s arrest
is lawful under
the
circumstances
of this case.
Accordingly,
Jester is not
entitled to
qualified
immunity (pp.
80-81).
RQ4
No data
Prefer
Security

violation. The
reasonableness
of an official’s
actions must be
assessed in light
of the facts
available to him
at the time of his
actions and the
law that was
clearly
established at the
time of the
alleged acts (p.
614)…While we
cannot agree
with its finding
that there was no
violation of the
First
Amendment, we
affirm its
judgment on its
alternative
ground that
Principal Braud
is entitled to
qualified
immunity (p.
625).

though
mistaken
conclusion
about the
lawfulness of
one’s conduct
does not subject
a governmental
official to
personal
liability (p.
207)…there is
limited case law
on this issue of
school violence
in this Circuit,
which lends
further credence
to conclude that
this area of the
law is unsettled.
Therefore, the
individual
defendants are
entitled to
qualified
immunity (p.
208).

No data

On these facts, a
reasonable
interpretation of
the law would
allow a school
official to
prevent
potential
disorder or
disruption to
school safety,
particularly in
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…given the
relaxed standard
applicable to
searches and
seizures on
school
properties,
Bundick’s claim
fails…The need
to obtain either a
warrant or
Bundick’s

There is no
doubt the
school has a
legitimate
interest in
providing a
safe
environment
for students
and staff. It is
not
unreasonable

Table 1.1M Continued
the wake of
increased
school violence
across the
country. We
review,
however, with
deference,
schools’
decisions in
connection with
the safety of
their students
even when
freedom of
expression is
involved. At the
time when
school officials
made their
determination to
emergency
expel him, they
had facts which
might
reasonably have
led them to
forecast a
substantial
disruption of or
material
interference
with school
activities…
Michael’s
suspension and
subsequent
expulsion were
rationally
related to the
school’s interest
in maintaining a
safe school
environment,
particularly I
light of the
apprehensive
climate that
existed at the
time due to
highly
publicized
incidents of
school violence
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consent was,
therefore,
vitiated and it
was legally
permissible to
begin a search
(p.738).

for the school
to conclude
that student
possession of
weapons on
school property
threatens this
interest. In
order to protect
against this
threat and
further the
school’s
interest in
safety, we
believe there is
a rational basis
for the school
to suspend Mr.
Butler, even for
one year, when
he should have
known he
brought a
weapon onto
school
property. The
school’s
decision was
not arbitrary,
nor does it
shock the
conscience.
Accordingly,
the decision did
not violate Mr.
Butler’s
substantive due
process rights,
if any (p.
1201).
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RQ5
No
Imminent
Threat

No data

No data

RQ6
Deemed
Not
Binding on
the Courts

The alleged
conduct reveals
poor judgment,
insults,
indignities, or
annoyances,
but did not
create atrocious
or intolerable
conditions (p.
65)…Further,
there is no
reputation
interest or
injury resulting
from
dissemination
of criminal acts
(p. 67)…
Wooleyhan
obviously feels
strongly, and
his feeling are
not irrational.
Having been
arrested and
prosecuted, and
acquitted,
Wooleyhan, as
any similarly
situated
individual, has
a right to seek
damages if
defendants
acted
wrongfully (p.
86).
No data

No data

No data

RQ7
Rejection
of
Alternative
Sanctions

around the
country
(pp.203-206).
No data

No data

No data

Public school
officials have
been granted
substantial
deference as to
what speech is
appropriate. The
daily
administration
of public
education is
committed to
school officials.
The
determination
of what manner
of speech in the
classroom or in
school assembly
is inappropriate
properly rests
with the school
board, rather
than with the
federal courts
(p. 202).

Because federal
courts are
extremely, and
quite properly,
hesitant to
become involved
in the public
schools’
disciplinary
decisions, only
rudimentary
precautions are
commanded of
the
Constitution…
Without
question,
expulsion is a
harsh
punishment, but
it is not the
business of a
federal court to
set aside
decisions of
school
administrators
which the court
may view as
lacking in a
basis in wisdom
or compassion
(pp. 740-741).

Although we
questioned in
Tonkovich
whether the
“shock the
conscience”
standard
applies to all
due process
violations, we
need not decide
the issue in this
case because
we conclude
the school’s
conduct does
not violate the
due process
clause under
any of the
standards (p.
1201).

No data

No data

No data
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RQ8
No data
Preemptive
Prevention
of Future
Disruption

No data

However, the
potential for
disruption or
disorder to the
students of the
Northwest
School was
greater than
merely the
school’s
negative
reaction to an
unpopular
political
viewpoint…On
these facts, a
reasonable
interpretation of
the law would
allow a school
official to
prevent
potential
disorder or
disruption to
school safety,
particularly in
the wake of
increased
school violence
across the
country. We
review,
however, with
deference,
schools’
decisions in
connection with
the safety of
their students
even when
freedom of
expression is
involved. At the
time when
school officials
made their
determination to
emergency
expel him, they
had facts which
might
reasonably have
led them to
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No data

No data

Table 1.1M Continued
forecast a
substantial
disruption of or
material
interference
with school
activities (p.
203).

Table 1.1N. Level I Analysis: Plain Meaning Results for Jurisprudential Intent

RQ1
Threat vs.
Individual
Rights

Defabio v. E.
Hampton Union
(2009, DC)

Tun v. Fort
Wayne Cmty.
(2004, DC)

Given that there
were threats to
plaintiff’s safety
on the day the
comment was
first attributed to
plaintiff and in
the following
weeks, the court
held that it was
reasonable for
defendants to
conclude that
plaintiff’s
presence at
school posed a
threat to his
safety and the
safety of others
because of the
possibility that
violence might
have erupted in
the school due to
plaintiff’s
presence or
speech (p.
461)…student
expression may
be restricted
where it would
substantially
interfere with
the work of the
school, or would
cause material
and substantial

…the court must
weigh the value
of providing Tun
with
Constantine’s
statement and
the opportunity
to cross-examine
him against the
burden that such
a practice would
place on the
school
administration.
As this court
recently noted,
in light of the
increasing
challenges
schools face in
maintaining
order and
discipline,
requiring them to
permit the
confrontation of
student
witnesses or
even to disclose
their identities in
expulsion
hearings is
overly
burdensome and
unrealistic. This
is particularly
true given that

T.T. v.
Bellevue Sch.
Dist. (2009,
DC)
…prior to
T.T.’s
emergency
expulsion, the
school district
provided
sufficient
rudimentary
precautions to
comport with
due process. As
a general rule,
notice and
hearing should
precede
removal of that
student from
school.
However, a
student whose
presence poses
an ongoing
threat of
disrupting the
academic
process may be
immediately
removed from
school, and the
necessary
notice and
rudimentary
hearing should
follow as soon
as practicable
(pp. 1516)..The school
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S.H. v.
Rowland
Unified Sch.
(2005, CA)
Due to the
nature of the
violation and
seriousness of
possession of a
weapon, the
District Review
Panel finds that
other means of
correction are
not feasible or
have repeatedly
failed to bring
about proper
conduct. The
presence of
appellant would
cause a
continuing
danger to the
physical safety
of the pupil or
others (p.
15)…although
appellant
presents a good
school record,
zero tolerance
for dangerous
weapons does
not allow for
different
treatment for
certain students
who bring
dangerous
weapons to

Jones v. Long
County Sch.
(2012, DC)
In order for a
suspension to
constitute a
deprivation of a
property
interest in
public
education, the
suspension
must constitute
a total
exclusion from
the education
process (p. 14).

Table 1.1N Continued
interference with
schoolwork or
discipline (p.
473)…Although
students do not
shed their
constitutional
rights to
freedom of
speech or
expression at the
schoolhouse
gate, their
constitutional
rights are not
automatically
coextensive with
the rights of
adults in other
settings (p. 474).
In this context, it
is well settled
that school
officials do not
have to wait for
actual disruption
from the speech
before they act;
instead, school
officials have an
affirmative duty
to not only
ameliorate the
harmful effects
of disruptions,
but to prevent
them from
happening in the
first place…Not
only are school
officials free to
act before the
actual disruption
occurs, they are
not required to
predict
disruption with
absolute
certainty to
satisfy the
Tinker standard
(pp. 480-481)…
Moreover,
forecasting

the purpose
behind the
administrative
expulsion
process is to
avoid the
formalistic
trappings,
complexity and
cost of
adversarial
litigation…Thus,
in balancing all
the factors, the
defendants’
interests in
avoiding the
administrative
burdens of
formalized
expulsion
proceeding and
protecting
student
witnesses greatly
outweighs the
minimal value
derived from
providing Tun
with
Constantine’s
written statement
and the
opportunity to
cross-examine
him (pp. 943944)…Indeed,
no one could
possibly
conclude that
merely allowing
one’s photo to be
taken in the
shower equates
with something
sexual. This is
particularly true
here because, as
the photos
reveal, Tun is
not so much
posing as trying
to cover his
nudity…

district
undeniably has
a legitimate
interest in
preventing
drug use near
school and
preventing
disruption of
the educational
process (p. 26).
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school (p. 47).

Table 1.1N Continued
disruption is
unmistakably
difficult to do.
Thus, rather than
requiring
certainty of
disruption,
Tinker allows
school officials
to act and
prevent the
speech where
they might
reasonably
portend
disruption form
the student
expression at
issue…Because
of the special
circumstances of
the school
environment, the
level of
disturbance
required to
justify official
intervention is
lower inside a
public school
than it is outside
the school (p.
481).
RQ2
No data
Intent vs.
Balance of
Intent vs.
Safety

Accordingly, this
is one of those
rare school
discipline cases
where there is no
rational
relationship
between the
punishment and
the offense (p.
949)…In short,
as there was no
evidence to
support either
Whitticker’s
charge or Platz’s
finding that Tun
engaged in some
form of
inappropriate
sexual conduct,
their acts,
shocking to the
conscience, and
a violation of
Tun’s
substantive due
process rights as
a matter of law
(p. 950).

No data

No data
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Bryan also
reputedly said
that he believed
appellant had no
intention of
doing anything
to Mr. Pollock’s
car until the
event actually
occurred and
was sorry about
what had
happened.
Bryan further
allegedly stated
he believed that
appellant had no
intention of
bringing the
knife to school.
He apologized

No data

Table 1.1N Continued
for having to
recommend
appellant for
expulsion and
continued to
stress that he
had no say so in
the matter in
light of the
district’s no
tolerance
policy…the
principal
arguments made
against
expulsion were
that appellant’s
possession of a
knife at school
was
unintentional,
appellant was
not a danger to
himself or
anyone else,
appellant
deserved a
second chance,
and that there
were
alternatives to
expulsion
available (pp.
12-14)…But
even if the
evidence in this
regard were
lacking, there is
no question that
appellant
possessed a
knife on
campus (pp. 2425)… Appellant
attempted to
mitigate his
actions by
essentially
testifying that
he put the
binder in his
backpack
unconsciously
when he was in
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RQ3
Immune
from
Liability

Accordingly,
even assuming
arguendo that
there was a First
Amendment
violation as to
Daniel’s
freedom of
speech (which
there was not),
the individual
school officials
are entitled to
summary
judgment under
the doctrine of
qualified
immunity (pp.
483-484).

Consequently,
both Whitticker
and Platz either
knew, or
reasonably
should have
known that there
at least had to be
some evidence
of the Behavior
Code violation
before Tun could
be expelled or
otherwise
disciplined, and
correspondingly,
that to expel him
for a violation
for which there
was no evidence
violated a clearly
established
fundamental
right of due
process. Thus,
neither is entitled
to qualified
immunity as a
matter of
law…The
defendants’
motion for
summary
judgment is
granted as to

No data
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a rush. But there
is no
requirement that
the district
review panel,
who had the
right to believe
or disbelieve
any witness’s
testimony, give
that explanation
credence. Their
rejection of
appellant’s
credibility on
this point does
not constitute
reversible error
(p. 39).
No data

No data
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RQ4
Prefer
Security

…while the
distribution of
his speech at the
school in his
absence would
eliminate any
potential harm
to Daniel at the
school, it would
not eliminate the
potential harm
and disruption to
the school that
could reasonably
result from the
response of
students to his
speech even in
his absence (p.
480)…courts
must keep in
mind that school
officials also are
entitled to rely
upon their
expertise and
experience in
making these
often difficult
judgments in
extraordinary
circumstance…
The First
Amendment
does not deprive
school
administrators of
the ability to
rely upon their
own
considerable

Tun’s claims
against FWCS,
Mohr, and
Rhodes, and also
as to Tun’s
claims against
Whitticker and
Platz to the
extent they are
being sued in
their official
capacities (p.
951).
Finally, the court
must weigh the
value of
providing Tun
with
Constantine’s
statement and
the opportunity
to cross-examine
him against the
burden that such
a practice would
place on the
school
administration.
As this court
recently noted,
in light of the
increasing
challenges
schools face in
maintaining
order and
discipline,
requiring them to
permit the
confrontation of
student
witnesses or
even to disclose
their identities in
expulsion
hearings is
overly
burdensome and
unrealistic. Thus,
in balancing all
the factors, the
defendants’
interests in
avoiding the

No data

175

No data

No data
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experience,
expertise, and
judgment in
recognizing and
diffusing the
potential for
disruption and
violence in
public schools.
Indeed, they are
duty-bound to
do just that. That
duty is
particularly
acute when
threats of
physical
violence have
already been
made and actual
violence could
well erupt if the
hostile situation
is not promptly
and
emphatically
controlled (p.
481).
RQ5
No data
No
Imminent
Threat
RQ6
Deemed
Not
Binding on
Courts

Although
plaintiffs seek to
second-guess
with hindsight
the judgment of
school
administrators,
that is not the
role of the
courts. If the
school’s
decision satisfies
the
constitutional
standard in
Tinker, then it is
irrelevant that a
litigant or court
believes the
situation could
have been

administrative
burdens of
formalized
expulsion
proceeding and
protecting
student
witnesses greatly
outweighs the
minimal value
derived from
providing Tun
with
Constantine’s
written statement
and the
opportunity to
cross-examine
him (pp. 943944)

No data

No data

No data

No data

When it comes
to disciplinary
matters, this
court is to resist
the temptation to
become a superschool board by
substituting its
judgment for that
of school
administrators.
The Supreme
Court cautions
that it is not the
role of the
federal courts to
set aside the
decisions of
school
administrators
which the court

It is not the role
of the federal
courts to set
aside decisions
of school
administrators
which the court
may view as
lacking a basis
in wisdom or
compassion.
Public high
school students
do have
substantive and
procedural
rights while at
school. But §
1983 does not
extend the right
to relitigate in

Perfection is
seldom
achieved in trial
[or
administrative]
proceedings,
and minor or
trivial errors
(e.g., in
procedural
matters or
evidentiary
rulings) are not
uncommon.
Such errors are
usually found to
be insubstantial,
not warranting
reversal on
appeal (pp. 2122)…although

…once school
administrators
tell a student
what they heard
or saw, ask why
they heard or
saw it, and
allow a brief
response, a
student has
received all the
process that the
Fourteenth
Amendment
demands (p.
17)…the right
to attend public
school is not
fundamental (p.
21)…As such,
courts must
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handled better. It
is not the role of
the federal
courts to set
aside decision of
school
administrators
which the court
may view as
lacking a basis
in wisdom or
compassion (p.
481).

RQ7
Rejection
of
Alternative
Sanctions

No data

may view as
lacking a basis in
wisdom or
compassion. The
Seventh Circuit
also has
emphasized that
federal courts
must refrain
from secondguessing the
disciplinary
decisions made
by school
administrators
(p. 938).

federal court
evidentiary
questions
arising in
school
disciplinary
proceedings or
the proper
construction of
school
regulations.
The system of
public
education that
has evolved in
this nation
relies
necessarily
upon the
discretion and
judgment of
school
administrators
and school
board
members, and
§ 1983 was not
intended to be
a vehicle for
federal-court
corrections of
errors in the
exercise of that
discretion… (p.
25).

No data

No data
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administrative
panel erred in
refusing to issue
witness
subpoenas
requested by
student, reversal
would not be
required where
student did not
make offer of
proof
concerning
what those
witnesses would
have said…The
only harm
identified by
appellant is that
Mr. H. was
unable to attack
the witnesses’
credibility…
Thus, we do not
see how
attacking the
credibility of
the witnesses
would have
assisted
appellant…The
error in
restricting Mr.
H.’s questioning
of them was
therefore
harmless (pp.
35-37).
Due to the
nature of the
violation and
seriousness of
possession of a
weapon, the
District Review
Panel finds that
other means of
correction are
not feasible or
have repeatedly
failed to bring
about proper
conduct. The
presence of

bear in mind
that schools are
unlike the adult
workplace and
that children
may regularly
interact in a
manner that
would be
unacceptable
among adults
(p. 27)…The
undisputed
facts show that
the cafeteria
incident did not
constitute
harassment and
even if it did,
Peek was not
indifferent. As
noted
previously,
conduct that
would be
deeply
offensive, and
actionable
harassment, in
an adult
workplace may
be part of the
ordinarily
unpleasantness
that is a middle
school cafeteria
(p. 29).
No data
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RQ8
Preemptive
Prevention
of Future
Disruption

…student
expression may
be restricted
where it would
substantially
interfere with
the work of the
school, or would
cause material
and substantial
interference with
schoolwork or
discipline (p.
473)…Given
those fact, it was
reasonable for
the school to
conclude that
Daniel’s
presence at the
school- even if
to engage in
some type of
speech to
proclaim his
innocenceposed a threat to
his personal
safety and the
safety of other
students because
of the real
possibility that
violence could
erupt in the
school due to his
presence and/or
speech, and no
rational jury
could find
otherwise (p.
479).
In this context, it
is well settled
that school
officials do not
have to wait for

No data

No data
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appellant would
cause a
continuing
danger to the
physical safety
of the pupil or
others (p. 15).
No data

No data
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actual disruption
from the speech
before they act;
instead, school
officials have an
affirmative duty
to not only
ameliorate the
harmful effects
of disruptions,
but to prevent
them from
happening in the
first place…Not
only are school
officials free to
act before the
actual disruption
occurs, they are
not required to
predict
disruption with
absolute
certainty to
satisfy the
Tinker standard
(pp. 480-481)

Table 1.1O. Level I Analysis: Plain Meaning Results for Jurisprudential Intent

RQ1
Threat vs.
Individual
Rights

J.S. v. Blue Mt.
Sch. Dist.
(2011, CA)
Because J.S.
was suspended
from school for
speech that
indisputably
caused no
substantial
disruption in
school and that
could not
reasonably have
led school
officials to
forecast
substantial
disruption in
school, the
school district’s
action violated

Boim v. Fulton
County Sch.
(2006, DC)
…the court
concludes that
the content of
Rachel’s story
was sufficiently
disturbing to
cause school
officials to
reasonably fear
substantial
disruption of
school
activities.
Therefore, the
disciplinary
action taken by
defendants was
justified under
the Supreme

Commonwealth
v. Smith (2008,
CA)
The Supreme
Judicial Court
has
acknowledged
that
notwithstanding
the legitimate
goal of school
administrators
to maintain a
safe learning
environment,
students
continue to
have a
legitimate
expectation of
privacy in their
persons and in
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J.S. v.
Bethlehem
(2002, SSC)
The court
concluded that
courts have
permitted school
officials to
discipline
students for
conduct
occurring off
school premises
where the
conduct
materially and
substantially
interferes with
the educational
process. The
court pointed to
the damaging

R.M. v.
Washakie
(2004, SSC)
The school
district asserted
that it had a
compelling
interest in
providing for
the safety and
welfare of its
students and that
is was that
interest that the
expulsions
protected. The
Court agreed…
the fundamental
right to an
opportunity for
an education did
not guarantee
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J.S.’s First
Amendment
free speech
rights. We will
accordingly
reverse and
remand that
aspect of the
District Court’s
judgment (p.
920)…The
exercise of First
Amendment
rights in school,
however, has to
be applied in
light of the
special
characteristics
of the school
environment,
and thus the
constitutional
rights of
students in
public schools
are not
automatically
coextensive
with the rights
of adults in
other settings.
Since Tinker,
courts have
struggled to
strike a balance
between
safeguarding
students’ First
Amendment
rights and
protecting the
authority of
school
administrators
to maintain an
appropriate
learning
environment (p.
926)…We
recognize that
vulgar and
offensive speech
such as that

Court decision
in Tinker, and
did not violate
Rachel’s First
Amendment
rights. Given
this conclusion,
the Court finds
it unnecessary
to address the
parties’ other
arguments (p.
10)…Tinker
does not
require school
officials to wait
until disruption
actually occurs.
In fact, they
have a duty to
prevent the
occurrence of
disturbances.
While
predicting
disruption is
unmistakably
difficult, Tinker
does not
require
certainty that
disruption will
occur, but
rather the
existence of
facts which
might
reasonably lead
school officials
to forecast
substantial
disruption (pp.
10-11)…The
court concludes
that Rachel’s
story alone,
when read in
light of the
recent history
of school
shootings, was
sufficient to
lead school
officials

the items they
bring to
school… In
order to achieve
a balance
between these
two equally
legitimate needs
and
expectations it
is evident that
the school
setting requires
some easing of
the restrictions
to which
searches by
public
authorities are
ordinarily
subject. The
warrant
requirement, in
particular is
unsuited to the
school
environment:
requiring a
teacher to
obtain a warrant
before
searching a
child suspected
of an infraction
of school rules
(or of the
criminal law)
would unduly
interfere with
the maintenance
of the swift and
informal
disciplinary
procedures
needed in the
schools…Not
only did the
United States
Supreme Court
conclude in
T.L.O. that
obtaining a
warrant was
impractical in a
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effects on Mrs.
Fulmer, Mr.
Kartsotis and the
school
community and
concluded that
the school
district did not
violate J.S.’s
First
Amendment
rights.
Moreover, the
majority noted
that in this day
and age where
school violence
is becoming
more
commonplace,
school officials
are justified in
taking threats
against faculty
and students
seriously (p.
648)…the
United States
Supreme Court
has recognized
that the
unbridled free
expression of
speech is not
permissible in
every setting…
One of these
settings is in the
unique
environment of
our nation’s
schools (p. 650).
In various
situations, the
high courts of
both the United
States and
Pennsylvania
have performed
the delicate
balance and
concluded that
the
constitutional

that a student
could not
temporarily
forfeit
educational
services through
his own conduct
(p. 1)…implicit
within the
constitutional
guarantee of a
thorough and
efficient system
of free schools
is the need for a
safe and secure
school
environment. A
school cannot
fulfill its basic
purpose of
providing an
education
without such an
environment (p.
16). A student’s
right to an
education may
be
constitutionally
denied when
outweighed by
the school’s
interest in
protecting other
students,
teachers, and
school property,
and in
preventing the
disruption of the
educational
system (p. 19)…
It is reasonably
may be argued
that a
requirement that
a student who is
expelled for
misconduct, no
matter how
egregious, be
provided with
alternate
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employed in this
case-even made
in jest- could
damage the
careers of
teachers and
administrators
and we
conclude only
that the punitive
action taken by
the school
district violated
the First
Amendment
free speech
rights of J.S. (p.
930)… This
standard,
however, is
relaxed in the
school
environment:
Given the
school’s need to
be able to
impose
disciplinary
sanctions for a
wide range of
unanticipated
conduct
disruptive of the
educational
process, the
school
disciplinary
rules need not
be as detailed as
a criminal code
(pp. 935-936).

RQ2 Intent
vs.
Balance of
Intent vs.
Safety

J.S. did not even
intend for the
speech to reach
the school- in
fact, she took
specific steps to
make the profile
private so that
only her friends
could access it

reasonably to
forecast
substantial
disruption of or
material
interference
with school
activitiesspecifically,
that Rachel
might attempt
to shoot her
math teacher
(p.15).

school setting, it
also determined
that the level of
suspicion
required to
justify a
warrantless
search should
be modified
within the
school context.
Ordinarily, even
a search that
may be
conducted
without a
warrant
nevertheless
would require a
basis of
probable cause
to believe that a
crime had been
committed (pp.
178-179).

Regardless of
whether Rachel
intended the
story to be
read, the fact
that she
brought the
notebook to
school and
passed it to

No data
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interests of the
student, in
certain
circumstances,
must yield to the
school officials’
need to maintain
order and to
discipline when
necessary to
assure a safe
school
environment that
is conducive to
learning (p.
651)…However,
even if not a
“true threat,” the
school district
might not have
violated J.S.’s
constitutional
right to free
speech by
disciplining him
if the speech
was otherwise
protected, but it
in some fashion
disrupted school
work or invaded
the rights of
others. As
discussed in
greater detail
below, this is
because
otherwise
protected speech
nonetheless may
be subject to
restriction in a
school setting
(pp. 652-653).
No data

education by a
public school
system, would
be likely to have
a serious
detrimental
effect on the
ability of school
officials to deter
dangerous
behavior within
a school by
imposing
expulsion as a
sanction (p. 20).
We would note
that just as no
one doubt that
the state had a
compelling
interest in
keeping schools
safe, we are
confident that
no one doubts
that these
policies are
indeed good and
worthwhile
policies (p. 26).

No data
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(p. 930).

RQ3
Immune
from
Liability

No data

another student
was enough to
cause school
officials to be
legitimately
concerned that
the story had
been or might
be read by
others (p. 12).
No data

RQ4
Prefer
Security

No data

No data

No data

No data

No data

No data

In sum, the
website created
disorder and
significantly and
adversely
impacted the
delivery of
instruction.
Indeed, it was
specifically
aimed at this
particular school
district and
seemed designed
to create
precisely this
sort of upheaval.
Based upon
these facts, we
are satisfied that
the school
district has
demonstrated
that J.S.’s
website created
an actual and
substantial
interference with
the work of the
school to a
magnitude that
satisfies the
requirements of
Tinker. Thus, for
the reasons
stated above, we
find that the
school district’s
disciplinary

No data
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RQ5
No
Imminent
Threat

Since Tinker,
the Supreme
Court has
carved out a
number of
narrow
categories of
speech that a
school may
restrict even
without the
threat of
substantial
disruption…The
first exception is
set out in
Fraser, which
we interpreted
to permit school
officials to
regulate lewd,
vulgar, indecent,
and plainly
offensive speech
in school…The
second
exception to
Tinker is
articulated in
Hazelwood
School District
v. Kuhlmeier,
which allows
school officials
to regulate
schoolsponsored
speech (that is,
speech that a
reasonable
observer would
view as the
school’s own
speech) on the
basis of any
legitimate

No data

No data
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action taken
against J.S. did
not violate his
First
Amendment
right to freedom
of speech (pp.
674-675).
No data

No data
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pedagogical
concern (p.
927).
RQ6
Federal courts
Deemed
should not
not
ordinarily
Binding on intervene in the
Courts
resolution of
conflicts which
arise in the daily
operation of
school system
(p. 926)…The
education of the
nation’s youth is
primarily the
responsibility of
parents,
teachers, and
state and local
school officials,
and not of
federal judges
(p. 926).

Plaintiffs argue
that D.F. is
distinguishable
because the
student in that
case actually
read the story
to his
classmates. The
Court does not
find this
distinction
relevant.
Although
speech must be
communicated
in order to
constitute a
“true threat,”
communication
is not a
prerequisite to
suppression on
Tinker grounds.
As previously
noted, Rachel
took the
notebook
containing the
story to school
and passed it to
another
student, thus
creating the
risk, if not the
likelihood, that
it would be
read. This was
sufficient to
qualify the
story as student
speech on
school
premises and to
authorize
school officials
to take
disciplinary
action under
Tinker (pp. 1314).

No data
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We caution that
it is for school
districts to
determine what
is vulgar, lewd
or plainly
offensive, at
least in the first
instance. Great
deference should
be given to their
determination,
as courts must
not become
embroiled in
micromanaging
school officials’
administration
of the
institution’s
daily
affairs…school
board…is in the
best position to
weigh the
strengths and
vulnerabilities of
the town’s 785
students. The
First
Amendment
does not compel
the court into
this arena (p.
672).

Thus, we are
asked to
consider
whether the
provisions of the
Wyoming
constitution
require a school
district to
provide an
education to a
student who has
been lawfully
expelled. We
answer the
reserved
question in the
negative (p.
1)…In an ideal
world it surely
would be
preferable to
provide an
alternative
education to
students who are
expelled; and
even in our own
imperfect world,
it is still a better
idea to do so (at
least in my
opinion).
However, we
are judges, not
legislators; and
unless the
legislation is
determined to be
unconstitutional,
it is really
properly a
legislative
decision as to
what is a good
idea. Thus, the
only proper
inquiry for this
court is whether
our state
constitution
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RQ7
Rejection
of
Alternative
Sanctions

No data

No data

No data
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No data

requires the
provision of
such educational
services. And
the answer to
this question is
quite clearly that
the constitution
does not require
it (p. 26)…We
similarly find
that it does not
violate equal
protection to
provide an
alternate
education to
disabled
students that are
expelled while
not providing
such an
education for
non-disable
student (p. 29).
The court held
that the district’s
actions were the
least onerous
means of
accomplishing
that compelling
interest, and the
court did not
agree that an
alternate
education had to
be provided to
lawfully
expelled
students (p. 1).
In light of these
considerations,
we determine
that a school
district is not
constitutionally
required to
provide an
alternate
education to
lawfully
expelled
students (p. 26).
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RQ8
The facts in this
Preemptive case do not
Prevention support the
conclusion that
of Future
Disruption a forecast of
substantial
disruption was
reasonable (p.
928)…The facts
simply do not
support the
conclusion that
the school
district could
have reasonably
forecasted a
substantial
disruption of or
material
interference
with the school
as a result of
J.S.’s profile.
Under Tinker,
therefore, the
school district
violated J.S.’s
First
Amendment
free speech
rights when it
suspended her
for creating the
profile (p. 931).

In Tinker, the
Supreme Court
held that school
officials may
justify the
suppression of
student speech
by showing
facts which
might
reasonably
have led school
authorities to
forecast
substantial
disruption of or
material
interference
with school
activities.
Tinker does not
require school
officials to wait
until disruption
actually
occurs… While
predicting
disruption is
unmistakably
difficult, Tinker
does not
require
certainty that
disruption will
occur, but
rather the
existence of
facts which
might
reasonably lead
school officials
to forecast
substantial
disruption (pp.
10-11)…In
light of the
recent history
of school
shootings,
school officials
were justified
in perceiving
the story as a
portent of

No data
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In fact, it has
been offered that
school officials,
have a duty to
prevent the
occurrence of
disturbances.
Moreover, due
to the
importance of
the educational
environment and
the state’s
interest therein,
the level of
disturbance
required to
justify action is
relatively lower
in a public
school than it
might be on a
street corner.
Finally, this
ability to
forecast a
substantial
disruption is not
limited to priorrestraint case,
but applies to
punishment after
publication
(p.662).

No data

Table 1.1O Continued
possible future
violence
(p.11)… In this
case, on the
other hand,
school officials
feared that
Rachel’s story
was a possible
plan disguised
as a dream, and
their
disciplinary
action was at
least in part an
attempt to
prevent actual
violence from
occurring on
the school
campus (p. 17).

As depicted in Table 1.2, the first level of textual analysis reveals that a majority
of the court cases provided support rather than failure to support the research questions.
Of course support was found more among certain research questions compared to others.
For example, research questions 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6 appear to have the largest number of
court cases providing support. Thus, the issues made apparent in these 5 research
questions appear to be significant in how the courts decide to rule either for or against the
neoliberal, zero-tolerance social control efforts in schools. On the other hand, while
research questions 5, 7, and 8 did find support among the judicial decisions under
scrutiny, there were far fewer cases providing support for these three research questions.
Some court decisions revealed passages that provided inconclusive findings, whereby
statements made by the jurists provided support followed by other statements that failed
to support a particular research question, or vice versa. Thus, in those instances when a
research question was sometimes supported and sometimes rejected, the evidence was
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treated as a rejection of the research question for the applicable court decisions.
Relatively few cases provided only qualitative evidence rejecting, or failing to support,
the research questions. Regardless, as displayed in Table 1.2, all of the research questions
in the first level of textual analysis found more support than failed support.

Table 1.2. Summary Table of Plain Meaning Results for each Research Question
Cases
Supporting

Cases
Rejecting
1 (1%)

Cases
Supporting &
Rejecting
20 (27%)

Research
Question 1

44 (59%)

Research
Question 2

No
Data
10 (13%)

16 (21%)

7 (9%)

0 (0%)

52 (69%)

Research
Question 3

24 (32%)

3 (4%)

3 (4%)

45 (60%)

Research
Question 4

25 (33%)

1 (1%)

1 (1%)

48 (64%)

Research
Question 5

4 (5%)

1 (1%)

0 (0%)

70 (93%)

Research
Question 6

50 (67%)

2 (3%)

4 (5%)

19 (25%)

Research
Question 7

5 (7%)

0 (0%)

0 (0%)

70 (93%)

Research
Question 8

11 (15%)

2 (3%)

0 (0%)

62 (83%)

In addition to evaluating jurisprudential intent by carefully examining plain
meaning, a second level of textual analysis builds upon the first by identifying underlying
themes that emerge from the plain meaning data and reflect language and concepts
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embodied in the theoretical framework. The second level of analysis is interpretive, but
essential in order to explain and uncover how jurisprudential intent conveys a legal
language that signifies principles representative of the various mechanisms identified in
the theoretical framework detailing how neoliberal court mechanisms support zerotolerance social control initiatives in schools. Thus, the manifest content of legal thought
is made apparent by first discerning jurisprudential intent from the plain meaning of court
decisions and then filtering that intent through the theoretical framework to make explicit
the nature of the political economic philosophy encoded within the law. The text
segments and/or passages, which serve as manifest content, are listed by court case under
the emergent theme they support (see Tables 1.3A through 1.3E). How these themes,
which are represented by repetitious manifest content across cases, relate back to the
neoliberal theoretical framework will be discussed in detail in chapter 7.

Table 1.3A. Level II Analysis: Emergent Themes from the Jurisprudential Intent
Theme 1 Data: Interest Balancing
Cuesta v. Sch. Bd.
(2002, CA)

…it requires a balancing of the need for the particular search against the
invasion of personal rights (pp. 968-969).

Hardie v. Churchill …the court finds that the process used for Hardie’s expulsion proceedings
struck the proper balance between administrative efficiency and protecting
(2009, DC)

Hardie’s interest in attending school. The benefit of an additional hearing to
ensure Hardie’s punishment was just was outweighed by the cost imposed on
the limited resources of the school board (pp. 19-20).

Sypniewski v.
Warren Hills
(2001, DC)

Schools, however, must consider the sensibilities of other students, and the
freedom to express unpopular opinions must be balanced against the interest in
teaching students the limitations of socially appropriate behavior (pp. 52-59).

Colvin v. Lowndes
County (2000, DC)

School boards of this and other states and of their aim to create a school
environment conducive to learning, by eliminating fear of crime and violence,
such efforts must be balanced with the constitutional guarantees afforded to the
children (p. 506).
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In re Hinterlong
(2003, CA)

Having determined that the crime stoppers privilege restricts Hinterlong’s
cognizable common law claims, we next determine whether the abrogation of
those claims is arbitrary and unreasonable when balanced against the
legislature’s actual purpose…His inability to obtain discovery concerning how
the tipster obtained the information provided to Clements severely impedes
Hinterlong’s prosecution of his common law causes of action against these
parties (p. 630).

New Jersey v.
T.L.O. (1985, SC)

…the special need for an immediate response to behavior that threatens either
the safety of school children and teachers or the educational process itself
justifies the court in [exempting] school searches from the warrant and probable
cause requirements, and in applying a standard determined by balancing the
relevant interests (p. 325)… But striking a balance between schoolchildren’s
legitimate expectations of privacy and the school’s equally legitimate need to
maintain an environment in which learning can take place requires some easing
of the restrictions to which searches by public authorities are ordinarily subject
(p.326)…Where a careful balancing of governmental and private interests
suggest that the public interest is best served by a Fourth Amendment standard
of reasonableness that stops short of probable cause, we have not hesitated to
adopt such a standard (pp. 340-341).

Bethel Sch. Dist. v.
Fraser (1986, SC)

The undoubted freedom to advocate unpopular and controversial views in
schools and classrooms must be balanced against the society’s countervailing
interest in teaching students the boundaries of socially appropriate behavior (p.
681).

Vernonia Sch. Dist. … balancing the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests
v. Acton (1995, SC) against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests (p. 653).
Sims v. Bracken
County Sch. (2010,
DC)

However, students typically have a lesser expectation of privacy than members
of the public generally. While students’ constitutional rights do not evaporate at
the public school’s doors, the essence of those rights is balanced against the
need for teachers and administrators to have the freedom to maintain order in
school…the Supreme court held that the Fourth Amendment applies to searches
conducted by school officials, but rejected the adherence to a probable cause
requirement (pp. 18-19) …courts will look to the school official’s actions
balanced against the special needs dictated in the public school setting where the
state is responsible for maintaining discipline, health, and safety (p. 30).

Wooleyhan v. Cape
Henlopen (2011,
DC)

In establishing these minimum procedural guidelines, the court balanced the
school’s need to maintain order free from the burden of elaborate hearing
requirements against the general interest of arriving at the truth inherent in the
concept of due process and giving a student in jeopardy of serious loss notice of
the case against him and opportunity to meet it (pp. 40-41).

Porter v. Ascension
(2004, CA)

Because the search of the younger son was reasonable at inception, and
conducted in a reasonable manner when balanced against the school’s interest in
its students’ safety and welfare, the younger son’s Fourth Amendment claim
failed (p. 608).
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Bundick v. Bay
City Indep. Sch.
(2001, DC)

However, given the relaxed standard applicable to searches and seizures o
school properties, Bundick’s claim fails. In striking the balance of students’
legitimate expectations of privacy and schools’ equally legitimate need to
maintain the proper educational environment, the United States Supreme Court
eased the restrictions to which searches by public authorities are ordinarily
subject; the Court rejected the requirements of a warrant or probable cause in
favor of a simple reasonableness under the circumstances standard (p. 738).

Tun v. Fort Wayne
Cmty. (2004, DC)

Thus, in balancing all the factors, the defendants’ interests in avoiding the
administrative burdens of formalized expulsion proceeding and protecting
student witnesses greatly outweighs the minimal value derived from providing
Tun with Constantine’s written statement and the opportunity to cross-examine
him …the court must weigh the value of providing Tun with Constantine’s
statement and the opportunity to cross-examine him against the burden that such
a practice would place on the school administration (pp. 943-944).

J.S. v. Blue Mt.
Sch. Dist. (2011,
CA)

Since Tinker, courts have struggled to strike a balance between safeguarding
students’ First Amendment rights and protecting the authority of school
administrators to maintain an appropriate learning environment (p. 926).

Commonwealth v.
Smith (2008, CA)

The Supreme Judicial Court has acknowledged that notwithstanding the
legitimate goal of school administrators to maintain a safe learning environment,
students continue to have a legitimate expectation of privacy in their persons
and in the items they bring to school… In order to achieve a balance between
these two equally legitimate needs and expectations it is evident that the school
setting requires some easing of the restrictions to which searches by public
authorities are ordinarily subject (pp. 178-179).

J.S. v. Bethlehem
(2002, SSC)

In various situations, the high courts of both the United States and Pennsylvania
have performed the delicate balance and concluded that the constitutional
interests of the student, in certain circumstances, must yield to the school
officials’ need to maintain order and to discipline when necessary to assure a
safe school environment that is conducive to learning (p. 651)…school
board…is in the best position to weigh the strengths and vulnerabilities of the
town’s 785 students (p. 672).

Northwestern Sch.
v. Linke (2002,
SSC)

After weighing the students’ privacy interests and the character of the search
against the nature and immediacy of the governmental concern at issue, we
conclude that the drug-testing program here is constitutional (p. 974).

State v. Best (2010,
SSC)

In weighing the student’s expectations of privacy on the one hand and the
school’s interest in maintaining discipline and order on the other, the court
decided that the public interest is best served by a Fourth Amendment standard
of reasonableness that stops short of probable cause (pp. 109-110).

Pendleton v.
Fassett (2009, DC)

Here, the governmental interest was maintaining order…The general
governmental interest in safe and disciplined schools in order to promote and
ensure a productive learning environment is more weighty here…(p. 21).

R.M. v. Washakie
(2004, SSC)

A student’s right to an education may be constitutionally denied when
outweighed by the school’s interest in protecting other students, teachers, and
school property, and in preventing the disruption of the educational system (p.
19).

191

Table 1.3B. Level II Analysis: Emergent Themes from the Jurisprudential Intent
Theme 2 Data: Qualified Immunity
Stafford v. Redding
(2009, SC)

The official who ordered the unconstitutional search is entitled to qualified
immunity (p. 368).

S.G. v. Sayreville
Bd. of Educ. (2003,
CA)
Cuesta v. Sch. Bd.
(2002, CA)

In any event, defendants are entitled to qualified immunity (p. 423).

Seal v. Morgan
(2000, CA)

Because we have concluded that Superintendent Morgan was entitled to
summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity, we need not and do not
address the question… of whether he had the authority… (p. 581).

Evans v. Bd. of
Educ. (2010, DC)

…he failed to address the situation or take any remedial measures, and
that he then retaliated against L.E. by suspending her when she was subject to
forced sexual conduct. Therefore, Smathers is not entitled to qualified
immunity… (pp. 32-33).

Cuff v. Valley Cent.
Sch. Dist. (2010,
DC)

School administrators must be permitted to react quickly and decisively to
address a threat of physical violence against their students, without worrying
that they will have to face years of litigation second-guessing their judgment as
to whether the threat posed a real risk of substantial disturbance (p. 470).

Lee v. Lenape
Valley Reg’l (2009,
DC)

Whether Mr. deMarrais qualifies for immunity is a triable issue
because there exists questions of fact as to whether Mr. deMarrais’ failure to
comply with board policy rises to the level of a knowing violation of a right…
(pp. 27-28).

…the school board cannot be held liable for any constitutional deprivation…(p.
968).

Hardie v. Churchill Plaintiff argues that the municipality should be liable for the board’s violation of
Hardie’s due process right due to failure to train or adequately supervise school
(2009, DC)
district personnel…the court dismisses this claim (p. 20).

Brett N. v. Cmty
Unit Sch. Dist.
(2009, DC)

Public officials may have qualified immunity if their conduct does not violate
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known… Here, the individual defendants are entitled to
qualified immunity… (p. 13).

Barnett v. Tipton
County (2009, DC)

Under the TGTLA, all government entities are immune from suit for any injury
which stems from the exercise of governmental functions, except as specifically
provided by the act (p. 986).

Hill v. Sharber
(2008, DC)

…there is no need to address the defendants’ arguments that the claims against
Deputy Booker and Ryan are barred under the qualified immunity doctrine, and
that the official capacity claims against all four defendants fail because Hill has
not established governmental entity liability under Section 1983 (p. 681).
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Morgan v. Snider
High (2007, DC)

Simmons and Bailey are not liable for any purported constitutional violations
arising from the vehicle searches (pp. 14-15)…even if the court somehow found
a constitutional violation, the case law probably reassured the defendants that
they were on solid legal footing, and thus they are entitled to qualified immunity
(p. 28).

Roy v. Fulton
County Sch. (2007,
DC)

The gist of the plaintiffs’ allegations is that school officials breached various
express policies designed to protect students’ constitutional rights. Assuming
that is true, the school district is not liable for its employee’s breach of
admittedly constitutional express policies (p. 1321).

Bogle-Assegai v.
Bloomfield (2006,
DC)

In light of the court’s dismissal of plaintiffs’ claims for the reasons detailed
above, the court need not reach defendants’’ arguments concerning qualified
immunity (p. 244).

McKinley v. Lott
(2005, DC)

However, a municipality may not be held liable under Section 1983 under a
theory of respondent superior (pp. 9-10).

Posthumus v. Bd.
of Educ. (2005,
DC)

The court finds it unnecessary to address all of defendants’ arguments because it
concludes that Posthumus’ claims fail at the preliminary stage of the qualified
immunity analysis…the court finds no valid claim…the court need not reach the
issue of qualified immunity (p. 897).

Collins v. Prince
William County
(2004, DC)

The school officials had qualified immunity as it was not clearly established that
they could not recommend expulsion for a student’s unlawful activity occurring
off school grounds (p. 1). The school board cannot be held liable for the
decision to expel Collins… protected by the qualified immunity doctrine (pp.
34-37).

In re Hinterlong
(2003, CA)

Absent both pleading and proof of immunity, Clements can be held liable under
Hinterlong’s claims (p. 627)… Clements is also not cloaked with immunity
from personal liability where her actions are not incident to or within the scope
of her professional duties…(p. 628).

C.H. v. Folks
(2010, DC)

Plaintiff fails, however, to tie the search of his pockets in any manner to any
action or inaction of Perez and Gray. Therefore, at this point, plaintiff fails to
allege sufficient facts to implicate their supervisory liability for the pocket
search (pp. 25-26)… The district retains its governmental immunity (p.28).

Beard v. Whitmore
Lake (2005, CA)

However, the teachers and officer were entitled to qualified immunity because
the law at the time the searches were conducted did not clearly establish that the
searches were unreasonable under the particular circumstances present in the
case (p. 598)… Because the searches in this case did not violate clearly
established law, the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity (p. 608).

Sims v. Bracken
County Sch. (2010,
DC)

Defendant Ray is entitled to qualified immunity relative to her search of the
jacket (p. 23)… Defendant Ray is entitled to qualified immunity for authorizing
the search of K.S.’ s person (p. 26)… Defendant Ray is also entitled to qualified
immunity relative to this seizure (pp. 33-34).
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Lausin v. Bishko
(2010, DC)

...a political subdivision is not liable in damages in a civil action for injury,
death, or loss to person or property allegedly caused by any act or omission of
the political subdivision or an employee of the political subdivision in
connection with a governmental or proprietary function… Richmond Heights
Board of Education is a political subdivision, and as such, it had immunity (p.
631)…the individual school board defendants, Mr. Bishko, Dr. Wallace, and Dr.
Calinger, are entitled to immunity (p. 631).

Pendleton v.
Fassett (2009, DC)

The available case law therefore did not give the instant officials fair warning
that their conduct was unconstitutional. Accordingly, Fisher, Welch, Fassett,
and Riggs are protected from a civil damages suit for their allegedly
unconstitutional conduct by the doctrine of qualified immunity (p. 32).

Wooleyhan v. Cape
Henlopen (2011,
DC)

Accordingly, the court concludes that a reasonable official would not know that
such con
duct violated procedural due process, and Yor, Mrazeck, and Maull are entitled
to qualified immunity on the procedural due process claim (p.80)…Jester is not
entitled to qualified immunity for Wooleyhan’s only remaining federal law
claim against her- unlawful detention. (pp. 80-81).

Porter v. Ascension
(2004, CA)

Even if we find that the right was clearly established at the time of the alleged
violation, however, a defendant will still be entitled to qualified immunity if the
defendant’s conduct was objectively reasonable in light of clearly established
law at the time of the violation (p. 614)… While we cannot agree with its
finding that there was no violation of the First Amendment, we affirm its
judgment on its alternative ground that Principal Braud is entitled to qualified
immunity (p. 625).

Demers v.
Leominster Sch.
(2003, DC)

Even if the law is clearly established, an official is entitled to qualified
immunity if at the time of the challenged actions, such official’s belief that his
or her actions were lawful is objectively legally reasonable…A reasonable,
though mistaken conclusion about the lawfulness of one’s conduct does not
subject a governmental official to personal liability (p. 207)…there is limited
case law on this issue of school violence in this Circuit, which lends further
credence to conclude that this area of the law is unsettled. Therefore, the
individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity (p. 208).

Butler v. Rio
Rancho Pub.
(2003, DC)

Since the Butlers failed to state a substantive due process violation, we conclude
the school is entitled to qualified immunity on the Butlers' substantive due
process claims (p. 1201).

Defabio v. E.
Hampton Union
(2009, DC)

Accordingly, even assuming arguendo that there was a First Amendment
violation as to Daniel’s freedom of speech (which there was not), the individual
school officials are entitled to summary judgment under the doctrine of qualified
immunity (pp. 483-484).

Tun v. Fort Wayne
Cmty (2004, DC)

Thus, neither is entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law…The
defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted as to Tun’s claims against
FWCS, Mohr, and Rhodes, and also as to Tun’s claims against Whitticker and
Platz to the extent they are being sued in their official capacities (p. 951).
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Table 1.3C. Level II Analysis: Emergent Themes from the Jurisprudential Intent
Theme 3 Data: Disempowered Citizenship
Posthumus v. Bd.
of Educ. (2005,
DC)

…because the constitutional rights of students in public school are not
automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings, school
officials may limit speech in schools in ways that the government could not do
outside the school context (p. 900). School disciplinary rules need not be as
detailed as a criminal code (p. 903).

Anderson v.
Milbank Sch.
(2000, DC)
Hazelwood v.
Kuhlmeier (1988,
SC)

…the rule was a zero tolerance rule… constitutional rights of public school
students are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults (p. 686).

Bethel Sch. Dist. v.
Fraser (1986, SC)

…the constitutional rights of students in public school are not automatically
coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings (p. 682)… maintaining
security and order in the schools requires a certain degree of flexibility in school
disciplinary procedures… Given the school’s need to be able to impose
disciplinary sanctions for a wide range of unanticipated conduct disruptive of
the educational process, the school disciplinary rules need not be as detailed as a
criminal code (p. 686).

Demers v.
Leominster Sch.
(2003, DC)

While the supreme court has made it clear that public school students do not
shed their constitutional rights as the schoolhouse gate, it has also established
that a student’s First Amendment rights are not coextensive with the rights of
adults in other settings (p. 200).

Defabio v. E.
Hampton Union
(2009, DC)

…student expression may be restricted where it would substantially interfere
with the work of the school, or would cause material and substantial interference
with schoolwork or discipline (p. 473)…Although students do not shed their
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate,
their constitutional rights are not automatically coextensive with the rights of
adults in other settings (p. 474).

J.S. v. Blue Mt.
Sch. Dist. (2011,
CA)

The exercise of First Amendment rights in school, however, has to be applied in
light of the special characteristics of the school environment, and thus the
constitutional rights of students in public schools are not automatically
coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings (p. 926)… Given the
school’s need to be able to impose disciplinary sanctions for a wide range of
unanticipated conduct disruptive of the educational process, the school
disciplinary rules need not be as detailed as a criminal code (pp. 935-936).

Morgan v. Snider
High (2007, DC)

The accommodation of the privacy interests of school children with the
substantial need of teachers and administrators for freedom to maintain order in
the schools does not require strict adherence to the requirement that searches be
based on probable cause (p. 15)…In the context of school rules, flexibility or
breadth should not necessarily be confused for vagueness…Given the

A school need not tolerate student speech that is inconsistent with its basic
educational mission, even though the government could not censor similar
speech outside the school (p. 261)… we have nonetheless recognized that the
First Amendment rights of students in the public schools are not automatically
coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings, and must be applied in
light of the special characteristics of the school environment (pp. 266-267).
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Hammock v. Keys
(2000, DC)

peculiar issues facing school administrators, a school’s disciplinary rules need
not be drafted as narrowly or with the same precision as criminal statutes (p.
21).
Given a school’s need to be able to impose disciplinary sanction for a wide
range of unanticipated conduct disruptive of the educational process, school
disciplinary rules need not be as detailed as a criminal code which imposes
criminal sanctions (pp. 1230-1232).

Commonwealth v.
Smith (2008, CA)

The warrant requirement, in particular is unsuited to the school environment:
requiring a teacher to obtain a warrant before searching a child suspected of an
infraction of school rules (or of the criminal law) would unduly interfere with
the maintenance of the swift and informal disciplinary procedures needed in the
schools…Not only did the United States Supreme Court conclude in T.L.O. that
obtaining a warrant was impractical in a school setting, it also determined that
the level of suspicion required to justify a warrantless search should be modified
within the school context. Ordinarily, even a search that may be conducted
without a warrant nevertheless would require a basis of probable cause to
believe that a crime had been committed (pp. 178-179).

Doran v.
Contoocook (2009,
DC)

Reasonableness is the touchstone in any assessment of the constitutionality of a
search or seizure, and while, in most cases, reasonableness demands a warrant
and a showing of probable cause, such is not necessarily the case in the public
school context… searches and seizures in public schools can be conducted
without warrant or probable cause (p. 191). Unemancipated minors lack some of
the most fundamental rights of self-determination-including the right to come
and go at will… (p. 193).

Hill v. Sharber
(2008, DC)

The Supreme Court has held that the substantial need of teachers and
administrators for freedom to maintain order in the schools does not require
strict adherence to the requirement that searches be based on probable
cause…The Sixth Circuit has also noted that, in the case of searches in the
school context, individualized suspicion is not necessarily required (pp. 676677).

In re L.A. (2001,
SSC)

It is evident that the school setting requires some easing of the restrictions to
which searchers by public authorities are ordinarily subject…School officials
need not obtain a warrant…the substantial interest of teachers and
administrators in maintaining order in the schools does not require strict
adherence to the requirement that searches be based on probable cause (p. 885).

Commonwealth v.
Lawrence L. (2003,
SSC)

…the typical requirements of warrant and probable cause are relaxed when a
school official conducts a search of a student. The relaxation of the warrant and
probable cause requirements of the Fourth Amendment are only applicable to
school officials who are not acting in conjunction with or at the behest of law
enforcement agencies…the Supreme Court recognized the particular interests of
school officials in maintaining a safe learning environment and taking swift
disciplinary action (pp. 880-822).

State v. Best (2010,
SSC)

A school administer need only satisfy the lessor reasonable grounds standard
rather than the probable cause standard to search a student’s vehicle parked on
school property (p. 102)… In weighing the student’s expectations of privacy on
the one hand and the school’s interest in maintaining discipline and order on the
other, the court decided that the public interest is best served by a Fourth
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Amendment standard of reasonableness that stops short of probable cause (pp.
109-110).

In re K.K. (2011,
CA)

We join the majority of courts that have examined this issue in concluding that
the accommodation of the privacy interests of schoolchildren with the
substantial need of teachers and administrators for freedom to maintain order in
the schools does not require strict adherence to the requirement that searches by
based on probable cause to believe that the subject of the search has violated or
is violating the law (p. 653)…There is nothing in the developing case law that
indicates school officials must conduct an independent investigation as to the tip
or its reliability (p. 654).

New Jersey v.
T.L.O. (1985, SC)

…greater emphasis should be placed on the special characteristics of elementary
and secondary schools that make it unnecessary to afford students the same
constitutional protections granted adults and juveniles in a non-school
setting…the special need for an immediate response to behavior that threatens
either the safety of school children and teachers or the educational process itself
justifies the court in [exempting] school searches from the warrant and probable
cause requirements (p. 325).
We have found such “special needs” to exist in the public school context.
There, the warrant requirement would unduly interfere with the maintenance of
the swift and informal disciplinary procedures that are needed, and strict
adherence to the requirement that searches be based on probable cause would
undercut the substantial need of teachers and administrators for freedom to
maintain order in the schools (p. 653).

Vernonia Sch. Dist.
v. Acton (1995, SC)

Sims v. Bracken
County Sch. (2010,
DC)

However, students typically have a lesser expectation of privacy than members
of the public generally. (pp. 18-19)…the Supreme court held that the Fourth
Amendment applies to searches conducted by school officials, but rejected the
adherence to a probable cause requirement (pp. 18-19)… Reasonable suspicion
demands a less exacting standard of constitutional scrutiny than does probable
cause (p. 22).

Lausin v. Bishko
(2010, DC)

…it is clear that in a school setting the standard for a Fourth Amendment
analysis does not require probable cause (p. 629).

Pendleton v.
Fassett (2009, DC)

Generally, in order to conduct a search, an officer must have probable cause to
believe an individual is engaged in illegal activity and that evidence bearing on
that offense will be found in the place to be searched. In the school setting,
however, the level of suspicion required to justify a search is less than probable
cause…the accommodation of the privacy interests of schoolchildren with the
substantial need of teachers and administrators for freedom to maintain order in
the schools does not require strict adherence to the requirement that searches be
based on probable cause (pp. 15-16) )…In a school setting, it is not always
necessary that the reasonable suspicion be individualized; that is, school
officials my conduct searches of multiple students without a suspicion that a
particular student has committed an infraction (p. 18).

Bundick v. Bay
City Indep. Sch.
(2001, DC)

In striking the balance of students’ legitimate expectations of privacy and
schools’ equally legitimate need to maintain the proper educational
environment, the United States Supreme Court eased the restrictions to which
searches by public authorities are ordinarily subject; the Court rejected the
requirements of a warrant or probable cause in favor of a simple reasonableness
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under the circumstances standard (p. 738).

Northwestern Sch.
v. Linke (2002,
SSC)

The United States Supreme Court has taken the view that while public schools
are state actors subject to constitutional oversight, the nature of a school’s role is
custodial and tutelary, permitting a degree of supervision and control that could
not be exercised over free adults (p. 979)…We find that students are entitled to
less privacy at school than adults would enjoy in comparable situations. In any
realistic sense, students within the school environment have a lesser expectation
of privacy than members of the population generally (pp. 979-980).

Table 1.3D. Level II Analysis: Emergent Themes from the Jurisprudential Intent
Theme 4 Data: Empowered Discretion of School Authorities
Stafford v. Redding
(2009, SC)

Standards of conduct are for school administrators to determine without secondguessing by the courts lacking the experience to appreciate what may be needed
(p. 356).

S.G. v. Sayreville
Bd. of Educ. (2003,
CA)
Piekosz-Murphy v.
Bd. of Educ. (2012,
DC)

…the determination or what manner of speech is inappropriate properly rests
with the school officials (p. 423).

Ottaviano v. Kings
Park (2010, DC)

…the Supreme Court has stated that federal courts are not authorized to
construe school regulations (pp. 25-26).

Evans v. Bd. of
Educ. (2010, DC)

Section 1983 does not extend the right to relitigate in federal court evidentiary
questions arising in school disciplinary proceedings or the proper construction
of school regulations. The system of public education that has evolved in this
nation relies necessarily upon the discretion and judgment of school
administrators… (p. 16).

Cuff v. Valley Cent.
Sch. Dist. (2010,
DC)

Although plaintiffs seek to second-guess with hindsight the judgment of school
administrators, that is not the role of the courts…It is not the role of the federal
courts to set aside decisions of school administrators which the court may view
as lacking a basis in wisdom or compassion (pp. 469-470).

Brett N. v. Cmty
Unit Sch. Dist.
(2009, DC)

…it is not the role of the court to second-guess the board’s policy, however
misguided it may be, so long as it is rationally related to the interests sought to
be protected (pp. 8-11).

Morgan v. Snider
High (2007, DC)

It is not the role of federal courts to set aside the decisions of school
administrators which the court may view as lacking a basis in wisdom or
compassion. The Seventh Circuit of Appeals also has stressed that federal courts
ought to refrain from second-guessing the disciplinary decisions made by school
administrators (p. 13)…The role of the courts is not to second-guess the

It is not the role of the federal courts to set aside decisions of school
administrators which the court may view as lacking a basis in wisdom or
compassion…It seems that the professionals in this sad train of events exercised
questionable judgment…But we can’t say what the defendant’s did violated the
due process clauses... (p. 961).
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decisions of school administrators (pp. 23-24).

Vann v. Stewart
(2006, DC)

Assuming, arguendo, the DHA and school board applied the improper standard
when considering plaintiff’s case, the court cannot conclude that such a failure
was so significant or substantial that it could result in unfair or mistaken
findings or misconduct or an arbitrary exclusion from school (p. 889)…it is not
the role of the courts to set aside decisions of school administrators which the
court may view as lacking a basis in wisdom or compassion (p. 890).

Posthumus v. Bd.
of Educ. (2005,
DC)
Anderson v.
Milbank Sch.
(2000, DC)

Fraser teaches that judgments regarding what speech is appropriate in school
matters should be left to the schools rather than the courts (p. 901).

Hammock v. Keys
(2000, DC)

the court notes that the system of public education… relies necessarily upon the
discretion of school administrators and school board members… Vesting a
school official with the discretion to determine which situations warrant
expulsion is not only necessary in order to maintain discipline and good order, it
is desirable (pp. 1232-1233). It is not the role of the federal courts to set aside
decisions of school administrators which the court may view as lacking a basis
in wisdom or compassion (p. 1224)… Even if the discipline imposed could be
construed as harsh or drastic, the United States Supreme Court position on this
is clear: § 1983 was not intended to be a vehicle for federal-court corrections of
errors by school administrators in the exercise of discretion… (p. 1234).

Fuller v. Decatur
Pub. (2000, DC)

At the outset, it is important to note that a federal court’s role in school
disciplinary matters is very limited. School discipline is an area which the courts
are reluctant to enter (p. 821)…It is not the role of the federal courts to set aside
decisions of school administrators which the court may view as lacking a basis
in wisdom or compassion (pp. 821-822).

Doe v. Bd. of Educ.
(1995, DC)

It is not the role of the federal courts to set aside decisions of school
administrators which the court may view as lacking a basis in wisdom or
compassion (p. 10)…The area of school discipline is a realm in which the courts
enter with great hesitation and reluctance. Generally, the decision of whether or
not to expel a student for gross disobedience or misconduct is best left to the
discretion of the school board (pp. 13-14).

Edwards v.
O’Fallon Twp.
(1999, CA)
E.M. v. Briggs
(1996, SSC)

…we are consistently reluctant to intrude upon the disciplinary decisions of
school districts (p. 1078).

Finally, the education of the nation’s youth is primarily the responsibility of
parents, teachers, and state and local school officials, and not of federal
judges…This case, although it presents matters of some concern to the court, as
already expressed, is an appropriate case for summary judgment (p. 689).

It should be here noted that the management, supervision and determinations of
policy are the prerogative and responsibility of the school officials; and that the
courts should be reluctant to enter therein…It is the policy of the law not to
favor limitations on the powers of boards of education, but rather to give them a
free hand to function within the sphere of their responsibilities (p. 757)…
Section 1983 does not extend the right to relitigate in federal court evidentiary
questions arising in school disciplinary proceedings or the proper construction
of school regulations. The system of public education that has evolved in this
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nation relies necessarily upon the discretion and judgment of school
administrators and school board members, and § 1983 was not intended to be a
vehicle for federal court correction of errors in the exercise of that discretion (p.
757).

J.M. v. Webster
County Bd. (2000,
SSC)

However, we do not feel it appropriate to undermine the authority of school
officials, by rejecting the factual findings of those closest to the events in this
case (p. 507).

Hazelwood v.
Kuhlmeier (1988,
SC)

We thus recognized that the determination of what manner of speech in the
classroom or in the school assembly is inappropriate properly rest with the
school board, rather than with the federal courts (p. 267).

New Jersey v.
T.L.O. (1985, SC)

Absent any suggestion that the rule violates some substantive constitutional
guarantee, the courts should, as a general matter, defer to that judgment and
refrain from attempting to distinguish between rules that are important to the
preservation of order in the schools and rules that are not (p.342).

Bethel Sch. Dist. v.
Fraser (1986, SC)

The determination of what manner of speech in the classroom or in school
assembly is inappropriate properly rests with the school board (p. 683).

Binder v. Cold
Spring Harbor
(2010, DC)

The Supreme Court has long held that § 1983 does not extend the right to
relitigate in federal court evidentiary questions arising in school disciplinary
proceedings… The system of public education that has evolved in this nation
relies necessarily upon the discretion and judgment of school administrators and
school board members and § 1983 was not intended to be a vehicle for federal
court correction of errors in the exercise of that discretion (p. 10).

Lausin v. Bishko
(2010, DC)

The Supreme Court has held that the right to attend public school is not a
fundamental right for the purposes of substantive due process analysis …it is
not the role of the federal courts to set aside decisions of school administrators
which the court may view as lacking a basis in wisdom or compassion (pp. 627628).

Demers v.
Leominster Sch.
(2003, DC)

Public school officials have been granted substantial deference as to what
speech is appropriate. The daily administration of public education is committed
to school officials. The determination of what manner of speech in the
classroom or in school assembly is inappropriate properly rests with the school
board, rather than with the federal courts (p.202).

Bundick v. Bay
City Indep. Sch.
(2001, DC)

Because federal courts are extremely, and quite properly, hesitant to become
involved in the public schools’ disciplinary decisions, only rudimentary
precautions are commanded of the Constitution… Without question, expulsion
is a harsh punishment, but it is not the business of a federal court to set aside
decisions of school administrators which the court may view as lacking in a
basis in wisdom or compassion (pp. 740-741).
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Defabio v. E.
Hampton Union
(2009, DC)

Although plaintiffs seek to second-guess with hindsight the judgment of school
administrators, that is not the role of the courts…It is not the role of the federal
courts to set aside decision of school administrators which the court may view
as lacking a basis in wisdom or compassion (p. 481).

Tun v. Fort Wayne
Cmty (2004, DC)

When it comes to disciplinary matters, this court is to resist the temptation to
become a super-school board by substituting its judgment for that of school
administrators. The Supreme Court cautions that it is not the role of the federal
courts to set aside the decisions of school administrators which the court may
view as lacking a basis in wisdom or compassion. The Seventh Circuit also has
emphasized that federal courts must refrain from second-guessing the
disciplinary decisions made by school administrators (p. 938).

T.T. v. Bellevue
Sch. Dist. (2009,
DC)

It is not the role of the federal courts to set aside decisions of school
administrators which the court may view as lacking a basis in wisdom or
compassion…The system of public education that has evolved in this nation
relies necessarily upon the discretion and judgment of school administrators and
school board members, and § 1983 was not intended to be a vehicle for federalcourt corrections of errors in the exercise of that discretion… (p. 25).

J.S. v. Blue Mt.
Sch. Dist. (2011,
CA)

Federal courts should not ordinarily intervene in the resolution of conflicts
which arise in the daily operation of school system (p. 926)…The education of
the nation’s youth is primarily the responsibility of parents, teachers, and state
and local school officials, and not of federal judges (p. 926).

J.S. v. Bethlehem
(2002, SSC)

Great deference should be given to their determination, as courts must not
become embroiled in micromanaging school officials’ administration of the
institution’s daily affairs…school board…is in the best position to weigh the
strengths and vulnerabilities of the town’s 785 students. The First Amendment
does not compel the court into this arena (p. 672).

Table 1.3E. Level II Analysis: Emergent Themes from the Jurisprudential Intent
Theme 5 Data: Preemptive Exclusion
Demers v.
Leominster Sch.
(2003, DC)

On these facts, a reasonable interpretation of the law would allow a school
official to prevent potential disorder or disruption to school safety, particularly
in the wake of increased school violence across the country…At the time when
school officials made their determination to emergency expel him, they had
facts which might reasonably have led them to forecast a substantial disruption
of or material interference with school activities… Michael’s suspension and
subsequent expulsion were rationally related to the school’s interest in
maintaining a safe school environment, particularly in light of the apprehensive
climate that existed at the time due to highly publicized incidents of school
violence around the country (pp.203-206).

Defabio v. E.
Hampton Union
(2009, DC)

In this context, it is well settled that school officials do not have to wait for
actual disruption from the speech before they act; instead, school officials have
an affirmative duty to not only ameliorate the harmful effects of disruptions, but
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to prevent them from happening in the first place…Not only are school officials
free to act before the actual disruption occurs, they are not required to predict
disruption with absolute certainty to satisfy the Tinker standard (pp. 480-481)…
Moreover, forecasting disruption is unmistakably difficult to do. Thus, rather
than requiring certainty of disruption, Tinker allows school officials to act and
prevent the speech where they might reasonably portend disruption form the
student expression at issue…Because of the special circumstances of the school
environment, the level of disturbance required to justify official intervention is
lower inside a public school than it is outside the school (p. 481). The First
Amendment does not deprive school administrators of the ability to rely upon
their own considerable experience, expertise, and judgment in recognizing and
diffusing the potential for disruption and violence in public schools. Indeed,
they are duty-bound to do just that. That duty is particularly acute when threats
of physical violence have already been made and actual violence could well
erupt if the hostile situation is not promptly and emphatically controlled (p.
481).

Boim v. Fulton
County Sch. (2006,
DC)

Tinker does not require school officials to wait until disruption actually occurs.
In fact, they have a duty to prevent the occurrence of disturbances. While
predicting disruption is unmistakably difficult, Tinker does not require certainty
that disruption will occur, but rather the existence of facts which might
reasonably lead school officials to forecast substantial disruption (pp. 1011)…The court concludes that Rachel’s story alone, when read in light of the
recent history of school shootings, was sufficient to lead school officials
reasonably to forecast substantial disruption of or material interference with
school activities-specifically, that Rachel might attempt to shoot her math
teacher (p.15).

J.S. v. Bethlehem
(2002, SSC)

In fact, it has been offered that school officials, have a duty to prevent the
occurrence of disturbances. Moreover, due to the importance of the educational
environment and the state’s interest therein, the level of disturbance required to
justify action is relatively lower in a public school than it might be on a street
corner. Finally, this ability to forecast a substantial disruption is not limited to
prior-restraint case…(p.662). The court concluded that courts have permitted
school officials to discipline students for conduct occurring off school premises
where the conduct materially and substantially interferes with the educational
process. The court pointed to the damaging effects on Mrs. Fulmer, Mr.
Kartsotis and the school community and concluded that the school district did
not violate J.S.’s First Amendment rights. Moreover, the majority noted that in
this day and age where school violence is becoming more commonplace, school
officials are justified in taking threats against faculty and students seriously (p.
648)…the United States Supreme Court has recognized that the unbridled free
expression of speech is not permissible in every setting… One of these settings
is in the unique environment of our nation’s schools (p. 650).

Cuff v. Valley Cent.
Sch. Dist. (2010,
DC)

defendants need not prove that school administrators’ initially-stated
justifications for punishment fully incorporate all the objective facts that could
support a likelihood of substantial disruption, and they need not demonstrate
that substantial disruption was inevitable… Such a rule is not required by
Tinker, and would be disastrous public policy: requiring school officials to wait
until disruption actually occurred before investigating would cripple the
officials’ ability to maintain order (pp. 468-469). School administrators must be
permitted to react quickly and decisively to address a threat of physical violence
against their students, without worrying that they will have to face years of
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litigation second-guessing their judgment as to whether the threat posed a real
risk of substantial disturbance (p. 470).

In the Interest of
F.B. (1999, SSC)

The schools are simply not required to wait for a tragedy to occur within their
walls to demonstrate that the need is immediate (p. 673).

Anderson v.
Milbank Sch.
(2000, DC)

…a school need not tolerate speech that is inconsistent with its pedagogical
mission, even though the government could not suppress that speech outside of
the schoolhouse… schools must teach by example the shared values of a
civilized social order…These shared values include discipline, courtesy, and
respect for authority… civility is a legitimate pedagogical concern…so, too, is
compliance with school rules (p. 686).

S.G. v. Sayreville
Bd. of Educ. (2003,
CA)

A school need not tolerate student speech that is inconsistent with its basic
educational mission, even though the government could not censor similar
speech outside the school (p. 422).

Hazelwood v.
Kuhlmeier (1988,
SC)

A school need not tolerate student speech that is inconsistent with its basic
educational mission, even though the government could not censor similar
speech outside the school (p. 261)… we have nonetheless recognized that the
First Amendment rights of students in the public schools are not automatically
coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings, and must be applied in
light of the special characteristics of the school environment (pp. 266-267).

Porter v. Ascension
(2004, CA)

A school need not tolerate student speech that is inconsistent with its basic
educational mission, even though the government could not censor similar
speech outside the school…While certain forms of expressive conduct and
speech are sheltered under the First Amendment, constitutional protection is not
absolute, especially in the public school setting. Educators have an essential role
in regulating school affairs and establishing appropriate standards of conduct (p.
615).

T.T. v. Bellevue
Sch. Dist. (2009,
DC)

As a general rule, notice and hearing should precede removal of that student
from school. However, a student whose presence poses an ongoing threat of
disrupting the academic process may be immediately removed from school, and
the necessary notice and rudimentary hearing should follow as soon as
practicable (pp. 15-16).

Finally, a thematic investigation was conducted intratextually, within relevant
court decisions, and intertextually, across relevant court decisions. Sixty (80%) of the
Seventy-five court cases in the sample provided manifest content. The intratextual (see
Table 1.4) analysis allows the researcher to look within the 60 court decisions that have
yielded manifest content applicable to emergent themes and determine how many of
these themes are evident within the legal language used in the court decisions. Table 1.5
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reveals that 46.7% (n = 28) of the court cases provided evidence supporting at least one
emergent theme. Twenty-three percent (n = 14) yielded evidence supporting two
emergent themes within each case. Twenty-seven percent (n = 16) produced evidence
supporting three emergent themes within each case. Lastly, only 3.33% (n = 2) of court
decisions generated manifest content supporting four emergent themes. None of the court
decisions provided manifest content across all five themes. Table 1.5 also displays the
breakdown of the intratextual patterns for single references, paired references, and three
or more references to emergent themes.
Table 1.4. Level III Intratextual Analysis of Emergent Themes Across Cases
Emergent Themes

Stafford v.
Redding
S.G. v.
Sayreville
Cuesta v. Sch.
Bd.
Seal v. Morgan

Interest
Qualified Disempowered Empowered Preemptive
Balancing Immunity
Citizenship
Discretion
Expulsion T
X
X
2
X
X

X

X

3

X

2

X

1
X

1

X

1

X

X

2

Cuff v. Valley
Cent. Sch. Dist.

X

X

Lee v. Lenape
Valley Reg’l

X

PiekoszMurphy v. Bd.
of Educ.
Ottaviano v.
Kings Park
Evans v. Bd. of
Educ.

X

3
1
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X
Hardie v.
Churchill
Doran v.
Contoocook
Brett N. v.
Cmty Unit Sch.
Dist.
Barnett v.
Tipton County
Hill v. Sharber

X

2
X

X

X

2

X

1

X

X

Morgan v.
Snider High
Roy v. Fulton
County Sch.
Bogle-Assegai
v. Bloomfield
Vann v.
Stewart
McKinley v.
Lott
Posthumus v.
Bd. of Educ.

X

X

Collins v.
Prince William
County
Sypniewski v.
Warren Hills
Anderson v.
Milbank Sch.

X

Hammock v.
Keys
Colvin v.
Lowndes
County
Fuller v.
Decatur Pub.
Doe v. Bd. of
Educ.
Edwards v.
O’Fallon Twp.

1

2
X

3

X

1

X

1
X

1

X

1

X

X

X

3
1

X

1
X

X

X

X

X

X

3
2
1
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X

1

X

1

X

1

Table 1.4 Continued
X
Northwestern
Sch. v. Linke
In re L.A.
Commonwealth
v. Lawrence L.
State v. Best

X

In re K.K.
In the Interest
of F.B.
In re
Hinterlong
E.M. v. Briggs
J.M. v. Webster
County Bd.
Hazelwood v.
Kuhlmeier
New Jersey v.
T.L.O.
Bethel Sch.
Dist. v. Fraser
Vernonia Sch.
Dist. v. Acton
Binder v. Cold
Spring Harbor
C.H. v. Folks
Beard v.
Whitmore Lake
Sims v.
Bracken
County Sch.
Lausin v.
Bishko
Pendleton v.
Fassett
Wooleyhan v.
Cape Henlopen
Porter v.
Ascension

X

2

X

1

X

1

X

2

X

1
X

X

X

1
2

X

1

X

1

X

X

X

X

X

X

3

X

X

X

3

X

X

2
X

X

3

1

X

1

X

1

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

3

X

3

X

3
2
X
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Demers v.
Leominster
Sch.
Bundick v. Bay
City Indep.
Sch.
Butler v. Rio
Rancho Pub.
Defabio v. E.
Hampton
Union
Tun v. Fort
Wayne Cmty.
T.T. v. Bellevue
Sch. Dist.
J.S. v. Blue Mt.
Sch. Dist.
Boim v. Fulton
County Sch.
Commonwealth
v. Smith
J.S. v.
Bethlehem
R.M. v.
Washakie

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

3

X

1

X

X

4

X

X

X

X

X
X

X

X

3
X

X

X

X

2
3

X
X

4

1
2

X

X

X

3
1

The intertextual (see Table 1.6) analysis permits the researcher to look across the
60 court cases to determine how many court decisions provided support for the 5
emergent themes individually. Such an analysis enables the researcher to identify the
theoretical mechanisms, which are predominantly applied to legitimate neoliberal judicial
support for zero tolerance social control efforts in schools. As depicted in Table 1.6,
33.3% (n = 20) of court decisions evidenced interest balancing, 48.3% (n = 29) of the
cases evidenced qualified immunity, 38.3% (n = 23) of the cases evidenced disempowered
citizenship, 48.3% (n = 29) of the cases evidenced empowered discretion of school
authorities, and 18.3% (n = 11) of the cases evidenced preemptive exclusion. With
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Table 1.5. Patterns in the Level III Intratextual Thematic Analysis

Pattern Types
Single References
1 only
2 only
3 only
4 only
5 only

Number of Cases
3
10
4
9
2

Total
Paired References
1 and 2
1 and 3
1 and 4
1 and 5
2 and 3
2 and 4
2 and 5
3 and 4
3 and 5
4 and 5

28

Total

14

4
4
0
0
1
3
0
1
0
1

Three or More

18

Total

60

just below half of the relevant court cases yielding support for qualified immunity and
empowered discretion of school authorities, the researcher can conclude that these are the
two primary, neoliberal theoretical mechanisms utilized by courts to rule in support of
zero tolerance social control efforts in schools. However, interest balancing and
disempowered citizenship, while employed by courts roughly 35 to 40% of the time, are
still theoretical mechanisms that are very pertinent to the process in which court decision
making reflects support for neoliberal social controls in schools. While preemptive
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exclusion is the least applied theoretical mechanism, it is still used in approximately 2 out
of 10 cases to rationalized neoliberal social controls in schools.

Table 1.6. Level III Intertextual Analysis of Emergent Themes Across Cases
Theme

Number of Instances in which Thematic
Data Emerged
20

Interest Balancing
Qualified Immunity

29

Disempowered Citizenship

23

Empowered Discretion

29

Preemptive Exclusion

11

Total

112

In summary, the first level of textual analysis predominately found plain meaning
qualitative data in support of the eight research questions. The majority of support was
found for research questions 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6. Conversely, very few cases yielded support
for research questions 5, 7, and 8. Regardless, the textual support for the research
questions outweighed the instances where textual evidence rejected the research
questions. The text segments and passages identified as evidence for or against the 8
research questions represents the jurisprudential intent as it relates to these queries. Thus,
the plain meaning rationales elicited from the court cases by way of the 8 research
questions posed to them, serve as the courts’ jurisprudential intent for why decisions were
made as they were in these 75 cases.
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The second level of textual analysis identified 5 themes, which emerged from
repetitive language, attitudes, and rationales used by the courts in conveying their
jurisprudential intent on the matters of zero tolerance policies in schools. The courts’
jurisprudential intent conveys a legal language that denotes principles representative of
the various mechanisms identified in the theoretical framework detailing how neoliberal
court mechanisms support zero-tolerance social control initiatives in schools. Thus, the
manifest content of legal thought is made apparent by first discerning jurisprudential
intent from the plain meaning of court decisions and then filtering that intent through the
theoretical framework to make explicit the nature of the political economic philosophy
encoded within the law. The 5 themes include the following: (1) Interest Balancing, (2)
Qualified Immunity, (3) Disempowered Citizenship, (4) Empowered Discretion of School
Authorities, and (5) Preemptive Exclusion. How these themes translate back to the
neoliberal theoretical framework is described in chapter 7.
The final thematic analysis revealed that 80% (n = 60) of the court cases in the
sample evidenced manifest content pertinent to the identification of 5 emergent themes
from the jurisprudential intent. The remaining 15 court cases did not yield the repetitive
legal language necessary to be considered representative of manifest content signifying
one or more of the emergent themes. The intratextual analysis found that 28 ( 46.7%)
court cases provided content referencing a single theme, 14 (23.3%) court cases
evidenced some pattern of paired reference to two themes, and 18 (30%) court cases
referencing 3 or more themes. The intertextual analysis found that just below half of the
relevant court cases yielded support for qualified immunity (48.3%) and empowered
discretion of school authorities (48.3%); therefore, the researcher can conclude that these
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are the two primary, neoliberal theoretical mechanisms utilized by courts to rule in
support of zero tolerance social control efforts in schools. In addition, interest balancing
and disempowered citizenship were employed by the courts roughly 35 to 40% of the
time, which means these theoretical mechanisms are quite important to the process in
which court decision making reflects support for neoliberal social controls in schools.
Lastly, preemptive exclusion was the least applied theoretical mechanism; however, it
was still used in approximately 20% of the cases to rationalize neoliberal social controls
in schools.
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CHAPTER SIX
QUANTITATIVE RESULTS

Three one-way ANOVAs were conducted to examine whether the American
schools with less than 5%, 5 to 20%, 20-50%, and greater than 50% of minorities differ
in their average usage of metal detectors for social control measures (see Table 2.1). The
Levene’s F test revealed that the homogeneity of variance assumption was not met (p <
.001) for all three ANOVAs. Therefore, the Welch’s F test was used except for the 20052006 wave of data in which the F-statistic was reported because one of the minority
category groups did not have enough variance. The ANOVAs revealed a statistically
significant effect: Welch’s F 03-04 (3, 1480) = 14.67, p < .001, η2 = .03; F 05-06 (3, 2644) =
35.54, p < .001, η2 = .04; Welch’s F 07-08 (3, 1056) = 19.42, p < .001, η2 = .03.
Post hoc comparisons, using the Games-Howell post hoc procedure, were
conducted to determine which pairs of the four percentage minority category means
differed significantly. The results for the 2003-2004 data revealed that schools with
greater than 50% minority students (M = 1.94, SD = 0.24) had a significantly lower
average usage of metal detectors compared to schools with less than 5% minority
students (M = 1.99, SD = 0.07), 5 to 20% minority students (M = 1.99, SD = 0.08), and
20 to 50% minority students (M = 2.00, SD = 0.67). The effect size was weak for this
relationship (η2 = .03). Similarly, the results for the 2005-2006 data revealed that schools
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with greater than 50% minority students (M = 1.94, SD = 0.24) had a significantly lower
average usage of metal detectors compared to schools with less than 5% minority
students (M = 2.00, SD = 0.00), 5 to 20% minority students (M = 2.00, SD = 0.00), and
20 to 50% minority students (M = 2.00, SD = 0.06). The effect size was also weak for this
relationship (η2 = .04). Likewise, the results for the 2007-2008 data revealed that schools
with greater than 50% minority students (M = 1.93, SD = 0.24) had a significantly lower
average usage of metal detectors compared to schools with less than 5% minority
students (M = 1.99, SD = 0.08), 5 to 20% minority students (M = 2.00, SD = 0.04), and
20 to 50% minority students (M = 1.99, SD = 0.10). This relationship was weak too (η2 =
.03).

Table 2.1. One-Way ANOVAs for Metal Detector Usage Across Minority Categories in
Three Waves of Data
Percent Minority Makeup Categories
>5%
Variable

5 - 20%

20 – 50%

> 50%

ANOVA

M

SD

M

SD

M

SD

M

SD

F

Ƞ2

Metal
Detectors

03-04

1.99

0.07

1.99

0.08

2.00

0.67

1.94

0.24

14.67***

0.03

Metal
Detectors

05-06

2.00

0.00

2.00

0.00

2.00

0.06

1.94

0.24

35.54***

0.04

Metal
Detectors

07-08

1.99

0.08

2.00

0.04

1.99

0.10

1.93

0.25

19.42***

0.03

Note. η2 = effect size; *p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001
The means for all three waves of data were plotted to visually depict trends of
metal detector usage at schools with differing minority makeup (see Figure 1). The line
graph suggests very little differentiation in metal detector deployment across the three
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waves of data collection. These findings also fail to support hypothesis one, which
expected schools with greater than 50% minority makeup would use metal detectors as
security mechanisms significantly more than the other categories.

Mean Levels of Metal
Detectors Used at Schools

Figure 1. Plotted Means for Metal Detector Usage Across
Percentage Minority Makeup Categories
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Three one-way ANOVAs were conducted to examine whether the American
schools with less than 5%, 5 to 20%, 20-50%, and greater than 50% of minorities differ
in their average usage of access control, via locked or monitored doors, for social control
measures (see Table 2.2). The Levene’s F test revealed that the homogeneity of variance
assumption was not met (p < .001) for the ANOVAs conducted on the 2005-2006 and
2007-2008 data waves. Therefore, the Welch’s F test was used except for the 2003-2004
wave of data in which the F-statistic was reported because the Levene’s F test was not
statistically significant (p > .05). Only the ANOVA for 2005-2006 revealed a statistically
significant effect: Welch’s F 05-06 (3, 1340) = 4.12, p < .001, η2 = .004. The ANOVAs for
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the other two waves of data did not reveal any significant differences in the average
usage of access controls in schools across the minority makeup categories.
Post hoc comparisons, using the Games-Howell post hoc procedure, were
conducted to determine which pairs of the four percentage minority category means
differed significantly. The results for the 2005-2006 data revealed that schools with
greater than 50% minority students (M = 1.13, SD = 0.34) had a significantly lower
average deployment of access controls compared to schools with 5 to 20% minority
students (M = 1.18, SD = 0.39) and 20 to 50% minority students (M = 1.18, SD = 0.39).
There was no significant difference between the less than 5% and greater than 50%
category. The effect size was weak for this relationship (η2 = .004).

Table 2.2. One-Way ANOVAs for Access Controls Used in Schools Across Minority
Categories in Three Waves of Data
Percent Minority Makeup Categories
>5%
Variable

5 - 20%

20 – 50%

> 50%

ANOVA

M

SD

M

SD

M

SD

M

SD

F

Ƞ2

0.64

0.01

Access
Control

03-04

1.16

0.36

1.18

0.38

1.18

0.39

1.17

0.38

Access
Control

05-06

1.18

0.39

1.18

0.39

1.18

0.39

1.13

0.34

Access
Control

07-08

1.13

0.34

1.11

0.31

1.13

0.34

1.11

0.31

4.12** 0.004
0.94

0.001

Note. η2 = effect size; *p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001
The means for all three waves of data were plotted to visually depict trends of
access controls utilized at schools with differing minority makeup (see Figure 2). The line
graph suggests inconsistent and shifting trends in the deployment of access controls
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across the three waves of data collection. Although only the 2005-2006 wave produced
statistically significant results, these findings also fail to support hypothesis one, which
expected schools with greater than 50% minority makeup would use access controls as
security mechanisms significantly more than the other categories. Additionally, Figure 2
reveals a declining trend in the use of access controls in schools between the 2005-2006
and 2007-2008 waves of school data.

Mean Levels of Access
Controls Used at Schools

Figure 2. Plotted Means for School Access Controls Across
Percentage Minority Makeup Categories
1.2
1.18
1.16
1.14
1.12
1.1
1.08
1.06
Less than
5%

5 to 20 %

20 to 50%

More than
50%

Percentage Minority Makeup
2003-2004

2005-2006

2007-2008

Three one-way ANOVAs were conducted to examine whether the American
schools with less than 5%, 5 to 20%, 20-50%, and greater than 50% of minorities differ
in their average usage of security cameras for social control measures (see Table 2.3).
The Levene’s F test revealed that the homogeneity of variance assumption was not met (p
< .001) for the ANOVAs conducted on the 2003-2004 and 2007-2008 data waves.
Therefore, the Welch’s F test was used except for the 2005-2006 wave of data in which
the F-statistic was reported because the Levene’s F test was not statistically significant (p
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> .05). Only the ANOVA for 2007-2008 revealed a statistically significant effect:
Welch’s F 07-08 (3, 1190) = 4.10, p = .007, η2 = .005. The ANOVAs for the other two
waves of data did not reveal any significant differences in the average usage of security
cameras in schools across the minority makeup categories.
Post hoc comparisons, using the Games-Howell post hoc procedure, were
conducted to determine which pairs of the four percentage minority category means
differed significantly. The results for the 2007-2008 data revealed that schools with
greater than 50% minority students (M = 1.37, SD = 0.34) had a significantly higher
average usage of security cameras compared to schools with less than 5% minority
students (M = 1.30, SD = 0.46) and 5 to 20% minority students (M = 1.30, SD = 0.46).
There was no significant difference between the 20 to 50% and greater than 50%
category. The effect size was weak for this relationship (η2 = .005).
The means for all three waves of data were plotted to visually depict trends of
security camera usage at schools with differing minority makeup (see Figure 3). The line
graph suggests consistent trends in the deployment of security cameras across the three
waves of data collection, which suggests schools with the largest percentage of minorities
deployed a higher average usage of security cameras. Although only the 2007-2008 wave
produced statistically significant results, these findings somewhat support hypothesis one,
which expected schools with greater than 50% minority makeup would use security
cameras as security mechanisms significantly more than the other categories. Of course
this support is limited to the trend line for 2007-2008. However, Figure 3 reveals a
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Table 2.3. One-Way ANOVAs for Security Camera Usage Across Minority Categories in
Three Waves of Data
Percent Minority Makeup Categories
>5%
Variable

5 - 20%

20 – 50%

> 50%

ANOVA

M

SD

M

SD

M

SD

M

SD

F

Ƞ2

Security
Cameras

03-04

1.53

0.50

1.51

0.50

1.56

0.50

1.56

0.50

1.68

0.001

Security
Cameras

05-06

1.46

0.50

1.45

0.50

1.44

0.50

1.47

0.50

0.34

0.0004

Security
Cameras

07-08

1.30

0.46

1.30

0.46

1.34

0.47

1.37

0.48

4.10**

0.005

Note. η2 = effect size; *p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001
declining trend in the overall use of security cameras in schools from 2003-2004 to 20052006 and 2005-2006 to 2007-2008, consecutively.
Three one-way ANOVAs were conducted to examine whether the American
schools with less than 5%, 5 to 20%, 20-50%, and greater than 50% of minorities differ
in their average deployment of sworn law enforcement officers or other security
personnel as social control agents during school hours (see Table 2.4). The Levene’s F
test revealed that the homogeneity of variance assumption was not met (p < .001) for all
three ANOVAs. Therefore, the Welch’s F test was used for all three waves of data. The
ANOVAs revealed a statistically significant effect: Welch’s F 03-04 (3, 783) = 4.70, p =
.003, η2 = .01; Welch’s F 05-06 (3, 653) = 2.62, p < .05, η2 = .006; Welch’s F 07-08 (3, 1154)
= 18.06, p < .001, η2 = .02.
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Mean Levels of Security
Cameras Used at Schools

Figure 3. Plotted Means for Security Camera Usage Across
Percentage Minority Makeup Categories
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Post hoc comparisons, using the Games-Howell post hoc procedure, were
conducted to determine which pairs of the four percentage minority category means
differed significantly. The results for the 2003-2004 data revealed that schools with
greater than 50% minority students (M = 1.04, SD = 0.19) had a significantly lower
average usage of security personnel compared to schools with less than 5% minority
students (M = 1.11, SD = 0.32). The effect size was weak for this relationship (η2 = .01).
Correspondingly, the results for the 2005-2006 data revealed that schools with greater
than 50% minority students (M = 1.04, SD = 0.20) had a significantly lower average
usage of security personnel compared to schools with less than 5% minority students (M
= 1.09, SD = 0.28). The effect size was also weak for this relationship (η2 = .006).
Conversely, the results for the 2007-2008 data revealed that schools with greater than
50% minority students (M = 0.52, SD = 0.91) had a significantly higher average usage of
security personnel compared to schools with less than 5% minority students (M = 0.07,
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SD = 1.01), 5 to 20% minority students (M = 0.30, SD = 1.00), and 20 to 50% minority
students (M = 0.38, SD = 0.98). This relationship was weak too (η2 = .02).

Table 2.4. One-Way ANOVAs for Security Used During School Hours Across Minority
Categories in Three Waves of Data
Percent Minority Makeup Categories
>5%

5 - 20%

20 – 50%

> 50%

ANOVA

Variable

M

SD

M

SD

M

SD

M

SD

F

Ƞ2

Security
Used 03-04

1.11

0.32

1.06

0.24

1.06

0.24

1.04

0.19

4.70**

0.01

Security
Used 05-06

1.09

0.28

1.06

0.24

1.03

0.18

1.04

0.20

2.62*

0.006

Security
Used 07-08

0.07

1.01

0.30

1.00

0.38

0.98

0.52

0.91

18.06***

0.02

Note. η2 = effect size; *p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001

The means for all three waves of data were plotted to visually depict trends of
security personnel usage at schools with differing minority makeup (see Figure 4). The
line graph suggests consistent trends in the deployment of security cameras across the
2003-2004 and 2005-2006 waves of data collection, which suggests schools with the
smallest percentage of minorities deployed a higher average usage of security personnel.
On the contrary, the 2007-2008 data revealed the opposite trend whereby schools with the
largest percentage of minorities deployed a higher average usage of security personnel.
These findings are mixed. Only the 2007-2008 trend line supports hypothesis one, while
the other two waves fail to support hypothesis one. In addition, Figure 4 reveals a
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declining trend in the overall use of security personnel in schools from 2003-2004 and
2005-2006 compared to 2007-2008, which further fails to support hypothesis one.
Figure 4. Plotted Means for Security Guard Usage During School
Hours Across Percentage Minority Makeup Categories
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Three one-way ANOVAs were conducted to examine whether the American
schools with less than 5%, 5 to 20%, 20-50%, and greater than 50% of minorities differ
in their average total disciplinary actions (see Table 2.5). The Levene’s F test revealed
that the homogeneity of variance assumption was not met (p < .001) for all three
ANOVAs. Therefore, the Welch’s F test was used. The ANOVAs revealed a statistically
significant effect: Welch’s F 03-04 (3, 1484) = 32.77, p < .001, η2 = .03; Welch’s F 05-06 (3,
1404) = 26.24, p < .001, η2 = .03; Welch’s F 07-08 (3, 1367) = 23.32, p < .001, η2 = .02.
Post hoc comparisons, using the Games-Howell post hoc procedure, were
conducted to determine which pairs of the four percentage minority category means
differed significantly. The results for the 2003-2004 data revealed that schools with
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greater than 50% minority students (M = 112.90, SD = 213.00) had a significantly higher
average of total disciplinary actions compared to schools with less than 5% minority
students (M = 41.20, SD = 89.00), 5 to 20% minority students (M = 61.8, SD = 129.30),
and 20 to 50% minority students (M = 96.10, SD = 184.6). The effect size was weak for
this relationship (η2 = .03). Similarly, the results for the 2005-2006 data revealed that
schools with greater than 50% minority students (M = 108.60, SD = 164.90) had a
significantly higher average of total disciplinary actions compared to schools with less
than 5% minority students (M = 46.80, SD = 100.60), 5 to 20% minority students (M =
60.80, SD = 111.80), and 20 to 50% minority students (M = 85.00, SD = 161.80). The
effect size was also weak for this relationship (η2 = .03). Likewise, the results for the
2007-2008 data revealed that schools with greater than 50% minority students (M =
157.80, SD = 468.20) had a significantly higher average of total disciplinary actions
compared to schools with less than 5% minority students (M = 41.10, SD = 74.30), 5 to
20% minority students (M = 62.10, SD = 122.60), and 20 to 50% minority students (M =
113.10, SD = 381.30). This relationship was weak too (η2 = .02).
The means for all three waves of data were plotted to visually depict trends of
total disciplinary actions at schools with differing minority makeup (see Figure 5). The
line graph suggests a steady upward trend in total disciplinary actions taken against
students across the three waves of data collection. These findings support hypothesis two,
which expected schools with greater than 50% minority makeup, compared to the other
categories, to have significantly higher averages of total disciplinary actions serving as
exclusionary social control mechanisms for marginal groups of students.
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Table 2.5. One-Way ANOVAs for Total Disciplinary Actions Across Minority
Categories in Three Waves of Data
Percent Minority Makeup Categories
>5%
Variable

5 - 20%
SD

M

SD

> 50%
M

SD

ANOVA
F

Ƞ2

M

SD

Total
Disciplinary
Actions 03-04

41.2

89.0

61.8 129.3

96.1

184.6 112.9 213.0 32.77*** 0.03

Total
Disciplinary
Actions 05-06

46.8 100.6 60.8 111.8

85.0

161.8 108.6 164.9 26.24*** 0.03

Total
Disciplinary
Actions 07-08

41.4

74.3

M

20 – 50%

62.1 122.6 113.1 381.3 157.8 468.2 23.32*** 0.02

Note. η2 = effect size; *p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001
Three one-way ANOVAs were conducted to examine whether the American
schools with less than 5%, 5 to 20%, 20-50%, and greater than 50% of minorities differ
in their average total removals without continued educational services (see Table 2.6).
The Levene’s F test revealed that the homogeneity of variance assumption was not met (p
< .001) for all three ANOVAs. Therefore, the Welch’s F test was used. The ANOVAs
revealed a statistically significant effect: Welch’s F 03-04 (3, 1451) = 4.31, p = .005, η2 =
.005; Welch’s F 05-06 (3, 1359) = 11.89, p < .001, η2 = .002; Welch’s F 07-08 (3, 1373) =
7.36, p < .001, η2 = .005.
Post hoc comparisons, using the Games-Howell post hoc procedure, were conducted to
determine which pairs of the four percentage minority category means differed
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Mean Levels of Total
Disciplinary Actions at
Schools

Figure 5. Plotted Means for Total Disciplinary Actions Across
Percentage Minority Makeup Categories
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significantly. The results for the 2003-2004 data revealed that schools with greater than
50% minority students (M = 1.03, SD = 4.98) had a significantly higher average of total
removals without continued educational services compared to schools with less than 5%
minority students (M = 0.42, SD = 2.06). The effect size was weak for this relationship
(η2 = .005). In addition, the results for the 2005-2006 data revealed that schools with
greater than 50% minority students (M = 1.64, SD = 7.13) had a significantly higher
average of total removals without continued educational services compared to schools
with less than 5% minority students (M = 0.37, SD = 1.36) and 5 to 20% minority
students (M = 0.89, SD = 3.53). The effect size was also weak for this relationship (η2 =
.002). Moreover, the results for the 2007-2008 data revealed that schools with greater
than 50% minority students (M = 1.27, SD = 6.05) had a significantly higher average of
total removals without continued educational services compared to schools with less than
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5% minority students (M = 0.37, SD = 1.47) and 5 to 20% minority students (M = 0.62,
SD = 2.49). This relationship was weak too (η2 = .005).

Table 2.6. One-Way ANOVAs for Total Removals Without Continued Educational
Services Across Minority Categories in Three Waves of Data
Percent Minority Makeup Categories
>5%
Variable
Total
Removals
03-04

Total
Removals
05-06

Total
Removals
07-08

5 - 20%

20 – 50%

> 50%

ANOVA

M

SD

M

SD

M

SD

M

SD

F

Ƞ2

0.42

2.06

0.56

1.87

0.79

3.20

1.03

4.98

4.31**

0.005

0.37

1.36

0.89

3.53

2.05

24.83

1.64

7.13

11.89*** 0.002

0.37

1.47

0.62

2.49

1.06

6.56

1.27

6.05

7.36***

0.005

Note. η2 = effect size; *p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001
The means for all three waves of data were plotted to visually depict trends of
total removals without continued educational services at schools with differing minority
makeup (see Figure 6). The line graph suggests a steady upward trend in total removals
taken against students attending schools with the highest minority levels across the three
waves of data collection. The 2005-2006 trend line was unexpectedly higher than
hypothesized. However, these findings generally support hypothesis three, which
expected schools with greater than 50% minority makeup, compared to the other
categories, to have significantly higher averages of total removals without continued
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educational services acting as exclusionary social control mechanisms for marginal
groups of students.

Figure 6. Plotted Means for Total Removals Without Continued
Educational Services Across Percentage Minority Makeup
Categories

Mean Levels of Total
Removals at Schools

2.5
2
1.5
1
0.5
0
Less than
5%

5 to 20 %

20 to 50%

More than
50%

Percentage Minority Makeup
2003-2004

2005-2006

2007-2008

There were significant differences between categories for the percentage of
minority students at schools in regard to the crime levels where those students lived for
the 2003-2004 data, χ2 (9) = 847.19; Cramer’s V = .32; p < .001. The Cramer’s V reveals
that the relationship has a strong effect size given the degrees of freedom in the matrix. 5
As depicted in Table 2.7, in almost 9 out of 10 cases (88.3%), students who attended
schools with greater than 50% minorities were more likely to live in areas with the
highest levels of crime. Conversely, in roughly 3 out of 10 cases (30.2%), students who
came from schools with less than 5% minorities were more likely to live in areas with the
5

According to Cohen (1988; as cited in Gravetter & Wallnau, 2008), when a cross-tabulation uses more
than three degrees of freedom and is larger than a 2 x 4 matrix, the researcher should interpret any
Cramer’s V coefficient at or above .29 as a large effect size.
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lowest levels of crime. Indeed, only 3.9% of students at schools with less than 5%
minorities lived in high-crime areas. These significant findings support hypothesis four,
which holds that students living in areas with the highest crime levels will be more likely
to attend schools with a higher percentage of minority students.

Table 2.7. Chi-Square Results for Percentage of Minority Makeup by Levels of Crime
Where Students Live (2003-2004)

% Minority
Makeup
< 5%
5-20%
20-50%
> 50%
Total

Levels of Crime Where Students Live
Moderate
High (%)
Low (%)
Varying (%)
(%)

Total (%)

7 (3.9)

45 (8.0)

470 (30.2)

31 (7.5)

553 (20.4)

2 (1.1)

72 (12.7)

548 (35.2)

82 (20.0)

704 (25.9)

12 (6.7)

146 (25.8)

343 (22.0)

156 (38.0)

657 (24.2)

159 (88.3)

303 (53.5)

196 (12.6%)

142 (34.5)

800 (29.5)

180 (6.6)

566 (20.9)

1557 (57.4)

411 (15.1)

2714 (100)

Note. χ (9) = 847.19; Cramer’s V = .32; p < .001. Bonferroni corrections revealed
significant differences for all percent minority categories by levels of crime.
2

Likewise, the categories for the percentage of minority students at schools were
significantly associated with the crime levels where students lived for the 2005-2006
data, χ2 (9) = 875.66; Cramer’s V = .33; p < .001. The Cramer’s V also suggests a strong
effect size for this relationship. As depicted in Table 2.8, in 9 out of 10 cases (90.9%),
students who attended schools with greater than 50% minorities were more likely to live
in areas with the highest levels of crime. On the other hand, around 3 out of 10 cases
(26.8%), students who came from schools with less than 5% minorities were more likely
to live in areas with the lowest levels of crime. In fact, only 0.5% of students at schools
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with less than 5% minorities lived in high-crime areas. These significant findings also
support hypothesis four.
Table 2.8. Chi-Square Results for Percentage of Minority Makeup by Levels of Crime
Where Students Live (2005-2006)

% Minority
Makeup
< 5%
5-20%
20-50%
> 50%
Total

Levels of Crime Where Students Live
Moderate
High (%)
Low (%)
Varying (%)
(%)

Total (%)

1 (0.5)

28 (5.5)

417 (26.8)

13 (3.3)

459 (17.3)

3 (1.6)

74 (14.5)

565 (36.3)

87 (22.0)

729 (27.5)

13 (7.0)

122 (23.9)

371 (23.8)

155 (39.2)

661 (25.0)

169 (90.9)

287 (35.9)

203 (13.0)

140 (35.4)

799 (30.2)

186 (7.0)

511 (19.3)

1556 (58.8)

395 (14.9)

2648 (100)

Note. χ2 (9) = 875.66; Cramer’s V = .33; p < .001. Bonferroni corrections revealed
significant differences for all percent minority categories by levels of crime.
Significant differences were also found between categories for the percentage of
minority students at schools in regard to the crime levels where those students lived for
the 2007-2008 data, χ2 (9) = 855.24; Cramer’s V = .33; p < .001. The effect size for this
relationship was also large for the 2007-2008 data. As revealed by Table 2.9, students
who attended schools with greater than 50% minorities were more likely (88.8%) to live
in areas with the highest levels of crime. Alternatively, the majority of students who came
from schools with less than 5% minorities were more likely (20.7%) to live in areas with
the lowest levels of crime compared to high-crime areas (1.7%). These results support
hypothesis four.
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Table 2.9. Chi-Square Results for Percentage of Minority Makeup by Levels of Crime
Where Students Live (2007-2008)

% Minority
Makeup
< 5%
5-20%
20-50%
> 50%
Total

Levels of Crime Where Students Live
Moderate
High (%)
Low (%)
Varying (%)
(%)

Total (%)

3 (1.7)

32 (5.8)

297 (20.7)

21 (5.3)

353 (13.8)

3 (1.7)

56 (10.1)

580 (40.4)

68 (17.3)

707 (27.6)

14 (7.9)

122 (22.1)

371 (25.9)

149 (37.8)

656 (25.6)

158 (88.8)

343 (62.0)

187 (13.0)

156 (39.6)

844 (33.0)

178 (21.6)

553 (21.6)

1435 (56.1)

394 (15.4)

2560 (100)

Note. χ2 (9) = 855.24; Cramer’s V = .33; p < .001. Bonferroni corrections revealed
significant differences for all percent minority categories by levels of crime.
Together, the three chi-square analyses produced results consistent with what was
projected by hypothesis four. Over time, schools with the highest percentage of
minorities were unfailingly more likely to have a majority of students coming from highcrime areas (i.e., 88.3% for 2003-2004, 90.9% for 2005-2006, and 88.8% for 2007-2008).
This trend suggests a slightly increasing or steady percentage of students from high-crime
areas attending schools with 50% or more minorities across the three waves of data.
Similarly, over time, schools with the lowest percentage of minorities were consistently
less likely to have a majority of students coming from high-crime areas (i.e., 3.9% for
2003-2004, 0.5% for 2005-2006, and 1.7% for 2007-2008). This trend reveals a decrease
in the percentage of students from high-crime areas attending schools with less than 5%
minorities across the three waves of data.

229

Three one-way ANOVAs were conducted to examine whether students who come
from areas with high, moderate, low, or varying levels of crime differ in their average
total removals without continued educational services (see Table 2.10). The Levene’s F
test revealed that the homogeneity of variance assumption was not met (p < .001) for all
three ANOVAs. Therefore, the Welch’s F test was used. The ANOVAs revealed a
statistically significant effect: Welch’s F 03-04 (3, 554) = 7.55, p < .001, η2 = .02; Welch’s
F 05-06 (3, 589) = 4.38, p = .005, η2 = .004; Welch’s F 07-08 (3, 523) = 5.68, p < .001, η2 =
.01.
Post hoc comparisons, using the Games-Howell post hoc procedure, were
conducted to determine which pairs of the four percentage minority category means
differed significantly. The results for the 2003-2004 data revealed that students coming
from high-crime areas (M = 2.13, SD = 8.94) had a significantly higher average of total
removals without continued educational services compared to students coming from
moderate-crime areas (M = 0.88, SD = 3.35) and low-crime areas (M = 0.46, SD = 1.85).
The effect size was weak for this relationship (η2 = .02). Next, the results for the 20052006 data revealed that students coming from high-crime areas (M = 2.76, SD = 9.56)
had a significantly higher average of total removals without continued educational
services compared to students coming from moderate-crime areas (M = 2.52, SD = 27.57)
and low-crime areas (M = 0.75, SD = 4.22). The effect size was also weak for this
relationship (η2 = .004). Similarly, the results for the 2007-2008 data revealed that
students coming from high-crime areas (M = 2.29, SD = 10.88) had a significantly higher
average of total removals without continued educational services compared to students
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coming from moderate-crime areas (M = 1.10, SD = 4.42) and low-crime areas (M =
0.53, SD = 2.24). This relationship was weak as well (η2 = .01).

Table 2.10. One-Way ANOVAs for Total Removals Without Continued Educational
Services Across Crime Level Categories in Three Waves of Data
Crime Levels Where Students Live
High
Variable
Total
Removals
03-04

Total
Removals
05-06

Total
Removals
07-08

Moderate

Low

Varying

ANOVA

M

SD

M

SD

M

SD

M

SD

F

Ƞ2

2.13

8.94

0.88

3.35

0.46

1.85

1.07

3.86

7.55***

0.02

2.76

9.56

2.52

27.67

0.75

4.22

1.19

4.16

4.38**

0.004

2.29

10.88

1.10

4.42

0.53

2.24

1.43

7.94

5.68**

0.01

Note. η2 = effect size; *p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001
The means for all three waves of data were plotted to visually depict trends of
total removals without continued educational services for students coming from areas
with differing crime levels (see Figure 7). The line graph suggests a slight upward trend
in total removals taken against students coming from areas with higher crime areas across
the three waves of data collection. The 2005-2006 trend line was unexpectedly higher
than hypothesized. However, these findings generally support hypothesis five, which
expected students coming from higher-crime areas, compared to the other crime level
categories, to have significantly higher averages of total removals without continued
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educational services, which serves as exclusionary social control mechanisms for
marginal groups of students.

Figure 7. Plotted Means for Total Removals Without Continued
Educational Services Across Crime Level Categories

Mean Levels of Total
Removals at Schools

3
2.5
2
1.5
1
0.5
0
Varying

Low

Moderate

High

Percentage Minority Makeup
2003-2004

2005-2006

2007-2008

To sum, the quantitative results yielded support for hypotheses two, three, four,
and five; however, the effect sizes were weak. As such, exclusionary social control
mechanisms, including all possible disciplinary actions and removals (i.e., expulsions)
without continued educational services provided, are more likely to be used in schools
with a higher percentage of minority students and schools with students coming from
high-crime areas. These relationships tend to be at steadily consistent or increasing levels
over time. However, the 2005-2006 trend line for total removals without continued
educational services is uncharacteristically high compared to the other two waves of data.
Regardless, the 2005-2005 trend line is in the expected direction for Figures 6 and 10.

232

The findings for the ANOVA analyses testing hypothesis one were mixed, but
collectively, they did not yield overwhelming support for the first hypothesis, which
projected higher security measures for schools with larger minority populations. The
ANOVA analyses for the average usage of metal detectors actually found that schools
with a greater percentage of minority students were less likely to employ this security
technology compared to schools with least amount of minority students. These finding do
not support hypothesis one. ANOVA analyses for the average utilization of access
controls, via locked or monitored doorways, revealed only significant findings for the
2005-2006 data. For this wave of data, access controls were more likely to be used in
schools with the lowest percentage of minority students compared to the schools with the
highest levels of minority students, which fails to support hypothesis one.
For the ANOVA analyses assessing the use of security cameras, only the 20072008 data yielded significant results, which actually supported hypothesis one. For that
wave of data, security cameras were more likely to be used in schools with the highest
percentage of minority students compared to schools with the lowest percentage of
minority students. However, the ANOVA analyses evaluating the deployment of security
personnel during school hours yielded conflicting findings. For the 2003-2004 and 20052006 waves of data, the results revealed that security personnel was more likely to be
used at schools with the lowest percentage of minority students compared to the schools
with the highest percentage of minority students. In contrast, the 2007-2008 data found
the opposite (albeit at an overall lower rate compared to the previous two waves), where
security personnel were used more in schools with the highest percentage of minority
students compared to schools with the lowest percentage of minority students. The mixed
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findings for security personnel only offer partial support for hypothesis one. The
rationales for these conflicting findings and trends related to the results for hypothesis
one will be further explained in the chapter 7 discussion.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
DISCUSSION

In summary, this study is the first of its kind to simultaneously examine, both
qualitatively and quantitatively, the explanatory rigor of political economic theories as
they relate to the expansion of school-based social control efforts during the neoliberal
era of U.S. capitalism. In the school setting, widespread implementation of zero-tolerance
policies have empowered school officials with greater discretion in which to punish and
remove those students who are perceived to have no market value such as those who are
identified as flawed consumers, and who are classified as “other” because of their
perceived associations with crime, redundancy, poverty, or expendability (Giroux, 2003;
Hall & Karanxha, 2012). Additionally, this study is the first to theoretically incorporate
neoliberal economic theory with the relevant components of existing theoretical metanarratives in order to propose a comprehensive theoretical framework in which to
empirically test how zero-tolerance policies have emerged and endured as favored
disciplinary practice in American elementary and secondary schools. The new theoretical
approach attempts to explain how school criminalization efforts are legitimized by the
state, primarily through the authority of the courts.
Specifically, a qualitative textual and discourse analysis of the pertinent case law,
in which legal challenges to zero-tolerance policies were litigated for allegedly violating
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either the First, Fourth, Eighth, and/or Fourteenth Amendment rights of students was
conducted. The applied case law method subjected 75 district court, appellate court, State
Supreme Court, and U.S. Supreme Court decisions to two levels of textual analysis and a
final overall thematic investigation. The first level of textual analysis carefully
investigated the plain meaning of the court decisions by filtering them through the eight
contextual/diagnostic research questions to distinguish the jurisprudential intent conveyed
by the courts’ rulings. The second level of textual analysis complimented the first by
identifying how the legal language, embodied in the jurisprudential intent, represented
manifest content that could be categorized into five emergent themes relevant to the
neoliberal theoretical framework. In other words, the second layer of inquiry unpacked
the political economic philosophy that was encoded within the law. Lastly, the thematic
investigation examined intratextually and intertextually the patterns in which themes
appeared within and across court cases. The qualitative findings reveal a majority of
support for the research questions and the second level analysis provided a theoretical
link to the framework described in chapter 3.
This study also builds upon the limited quantitative research that currently exists
by investigating whether neoliberal social controls, via zero-tolerance policies, are used
primarily against marginalized populations and if these practices have increased over
time. Prior research has primarily been cross-sectional in design. The current study used
nationally representative data collected from the School Survey on Crime and Safety
(SSOCS), which provides relevant school disciplinary variables over several years. Five
research hypotheses were tested to determine if enhanced school security measures, total
disciplinary actions, and removals from school without continued educational services
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were disproportionately applied to schools with the highest percentage of minority
students and students living in high-crime areas compared to schools with the smallest
percentage of minority students and students who live in low-crime areas. The
quantitative findings revealed support for four of the five research hypotheses.
Specifically, support was found for hypotheses 2, 3, 4, and 5. However, the ANOVAs
conducted to test hypothesis one largely produced results, which suggested that enhanced
security measures were more likely to be placed in schools with the lowest percentage of
minority students compared to schools with the highest percentage of minority students.
The purpose of this chapter is to further discuss, in detail, the qualitative and
quantitative findings. Based on these findings, recommendations for changes in school
policies and practices will be made, while being mindful of evidence-based best practices
that may serve as viable alternatives to the current zero-tolerance policies. Finally, the
limitations of this study will be explained and avenues for future research and theory
development will be delineated.
Qualitative Findings
The case law method employed in this study entailed several steps. The first step
in this design was to extract jurisprudential intent from the court decisions by probing the
plain meaning arguments made apparent by the courts. This step was accomplished by
undertaking a careful reading of the court cases, while filtering the jurists’ attitudes,
rationales, and conclusions through the eight research questions to determine which text
segments or passages conveyed the underlying judicial intent in either support of or
against these queries. In other words, the researcher searched for language, which would
constitute respective responses to these guiding questions to unearth the plain meaning of
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the judicial intent underpinning these court decisions. In order to provide some
perspective on how the researcher arrived at his conclusions regarding what passages
from the court decisions provided evidence supporting or rejecting the research questions,
examples and justifications will now be given in hopes of elucidating this process for
other researchers.
Evidence Related to Plain Meaning of Court Cases. For research question one, the
researcher was searching for language that either suggested that the courts found control
of potential threats of danger and/or disruption outweighed any intrusion into the
individual constitutional rights of students, or vice versa. If passages found control of
threats and disruption was valued more than perceived infringement on the rights of
students, then the relevant passages represented support for question one. Consider the
following passage from Covington County v. G.W. (2000):
School officials need not obtain a warrant before searching a student who is under
their authority…the warrant requirement, in particular, is unsuited to the school
environment: requiring a teacher to obtain a warrant before searching a child
suspected of an infraction of school rules (or of the criminal law) would unduly
interfere with the maintenance of the swift and informal disciplinary procedures
needed in schools…While it is important to note that students have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in their school lockers, we must also emphasize that high
school students fall into a different and generally less suspect class… the realities
of the school setting require that teachers and other school personnel have the
power to make an immediate, limited search for contraband, weapons, or other
prohibited objects or substances…society places a high value on education, which
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requires an orderly atmosphere which is free from danger and disruption. (pp.
193-194)
This passage from the Covington decision clearly expressed the juridical argument that
the students are not fully protected by the Fourth Amendment in school settings as adults
would be in other contexts, because the court opined that the need for school officials to
maintain safe schools, free of disruption, outweighed a strict adherence to the Fourth
Amendment for public school students. Precisely, the Covington court ruled that the
warrant requirement for searches and seizures was ill-suited for public schools. Many
other court decisions echo this sentiment and even argue further by stating that the need
for teachers and administrators to maintain order does not require a strict adherence to the
requirement of probable cause (see In re L.A., 2001; Hill v. Sharber, 2008; Morgan v.
Snider High Sch., 2007). Thus, text segments or passages asserting similar arguments or
language was deemed evidence in support of research question one. There were 44 court
cases, which yielded such support.
However, there were instances where court decisions provided evidence that
failed to support research question one. In such cases, the courts decided that there was
not a legitimate state interest that outweighed the rights of the student. For example,
consider this passage from D.G. v. Independent Sch. Dist. No. 11 (2000):
It is impossible to have a “no tolerance” policy against “threats” if the threats
involve speech. A student cannot be penalized for what they are thinking. If those
thoughts are then expressed in speech, the ability of the school to censor or punish
the speech will be determined by whether it was (1) a “true” or “genuine” threat,
or (2) disruptive of the normal operation of the school. Neither of those
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circumstances exist in the case before the court. In sum, the court finds that any
commotion caused by the poem did not rise to the level of a substantial disruption
required to justify a suspension of the plaintiff. (pp. 15-16)
As one can see, the court in D.G. did not decide in the fashion that the majority of others
did when weighing the school’s interests in maintaining an orderly environment, free of
disruption, against the constitutional rights of students. There were 21 court decisions that
provided evidence, which failed to support research question one. However, twice as
many provided evidence supporting the hypothesis that neoliberal court mechanisms are
employed to reinforce zero-tolerance social control efforts in schools.
The second research question sought to identify evidence among the court
decisions that would determine whether courts took into account the intentions of the
student transgressors or if their intentions were disregarded in light of school safety
concerns. If phrases or passages, within court decisions, found that the intensions of the
students, who were punished by zero-tolerance policies, were overshadowed and
dismissed in favor of strict disciplinary action to maintain school safety, then such
passages were deemed evidence in support of research question two. Consider the
following passage from J.M. v. Webster County Bd. of Educ. (2000):
The coach found the particular expletive chosen by J.M.’s father to be quite
objectionable, and feared that the argument might escalate into a physical
altercation, so he asked J.M.’s father to go outside and calm down…After his
father left the room, J.M. took out the loaded gun and fifty-six additional rounds
of ammunition, and surrendered them to the coach, asking the coach to “take care
of them,” and adding that he thought his father “was going to kill him”…There is

240

no question that J.M. had a firearm on his person while on school grounds.
However, J.M. argues that he had not intended to be upon school grounds and was
transported to the school by his father and against his will. Thus he argues that the
lack of a mental element or mens rea of “intent” makes it impossible for him to be
guilty of possession…the fact finder determined that J.M.’s actions in having a
gun tucked into his pants on school property constituted a violation of the
statute…even if the initial taking of the gun were defensible (which we question)
J.M. had several opportunities to discard the gun or the bullets. While J.M.’s
actions might be excusable to some, they were not to the principal, the board, nor
the superintendent. (pp. 500-507)
In the case of J.M., a student, threatened by his father, attempted to prevent his father
from accessing his gun safe by hiding the key. However, he forgot to lock up one
handgun and a box of ammunition. In a rush, he concealed the weapon and bullets on his
person, because his father demanded that they go to the school to get permission to
remove J.M. from school so he could get J.M. a job at the lumber yard as punishment for
his misbehavior. The only teacher still at school was the football coach. After getting the
father to calm down and leave the room, the coach was presented with the gun from J.M.
who intended only to keep the weapon away from his father for his own safety.
Regardless of J.M.’s well-intended actions, the court ruled in favor of the school’s zerotolerance disciplinary action, which suspended him for a year. Therefore, regardless of
the circumstances and J.M.’s intentions, he still brought a dangerous weapon onto to
school grounds, and school safety concerns outweighed the context of his good
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intentions. A total of sixteen cases found support for research question two that were
similar to the court decision described above.
Of course there were court rulings, which provided evidence where the court
acknowledged the intentions of the student, and regardless of the serious nature of the
offense, the court ruled in favor of the student because he or she did not knowingly or
intentionally violate the school’s zero-tolerance policy. Consider the following judgment
of the court in Seal v. Morgan (2000):
We believe, however, that the board’s zero tolerance policy would surely be
irrational if it subjects to punishment students who did not knowingly or
consciously possess a weapon. (p. 578)
In Seal, the court rationalized that it was improper to subject a student to an automatic
expulsion if he did not knowingly, or intentionally, possess a dangerous weapon on
school grounds. There were only 7 cases which found similar evidence failing to support
research question two. Still, more than twice as many cases provided evidence supporting
research question two suggesting that the courts employ neoliberal mechanisms to
reinforce zero-tolerance social controls in schools.
For research question three, the researcher searched for text segments or passages
where the court provided school administrators and/or teachers with immunity from any
charges of liability, regardless of whether the court found that the student’s individual
rights were violated. Such support is found in the following passage from the Morgan v.
Snider High Sch. (2007) decision:
Simmons and Bailey are not liable for any purported constitutional violations
arising from the vehicle searches…even if the court somehow found a
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constitutional violation, the case law probably reassured the defendants that they
were on solid legal footing, and thus they are entitled to qualified immunity. (pp.
14-28)
School officials were given qualified immunity even when the court ruled that there was
a violation of a student’s constitutional rights, as in the Stafford v. Redding (2006)
decision, where school officials were given qualified immunity even though their strip
search of the female student for ibuprofen pills was found a violation of her Fourth
Amendment rights. Twenty-four court decisions yielded support for research question
three.
Conversely, there were court decisions which provided passages that failed to
support research question three. For example, consider the passage from Evans v. Bd. of
Educ. Southwestern City Sch. Dist. (2010):
He failed to address the situation or take any remedial measures, and that he then
retaliated against L.E. by suspending her when she was subject to forced sexual
conduct. Therefore, Smathers is not entitled to qualified immunity. (pp. 32-33)
The Evans court decision did not provide the principal with immunity from lawsuit when
it found a violation of the student’s rights. However, textual evidence rejecting research
question three was quite rare, with only five other cases yielding similar reasoning. Four
times as many court decisions found support for research question three.
When passages were identified that revealed the court’s preference for security
and safety from disruptions favored the discretion of school officials over the individual
rights of students, the researcher listed these passages as support for research question
four. Consider the court’s reasoning in Hammock ex rel. Hammock v. Keys (2000):
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Indeed, courts staunchly resist the suggestion that school discipline hearings
should emulate criminal trials…the court notes that the system of public
education…relies necessarily upon the discretion of school administrators and
school board members…Vesting a school official with the discretion to determine
which situations warrant expulsion is not only necessary in order to maintain
discipline and good order, it is desirable. (pp. 1229-1233)
Several other cases presented similar evidence suggesting that the courts were
“consistently reluctant to intrude upon the disciplinary discretion of school districts”
(Edwards v. O’Fallon Twp. High Sch. Dist. No 203, 1999, p. 1078). Overall, twenty-five
court decisions found support for research question four.
As with the previously mentioned research questions, there were examples of
passages in court decisions where the court’s ruling failed to support research question
four. For example, the Colvin ex rel. Colvin v. Lowndes County (2000) decision revealed
the following passage:
While the court is fully aware that school disciplinary matters are best resolved in
the local community and within the institutional framework of the school system,
the court is of the opinion that the board employed an erroneous standard in
considering Jonathan’s case. (p. 513)
Thus, although the Colvin court acknowledged the typical reasoning of the courts in
desiring not to second-guess school disciplinary matters or intrude upon the discretion of
school administrators, it also acknowledged when improper administrative standards
where applied in a student’s disciplinary case. Nevertheless, only two court decisions
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provided evidence failing to support research question four, which pales in comparison to
the twenty-five cases supporting this research question.
When searching for evidence supporting research question five, the researcher
looked for passages where the court provided preference favoring the neoliberal
disciplinary practices of schools, while dismissing them as not cruel and unusual
punishments, even if the infractions did not present an imminent threat to the school
environment. For instance, consider the following passage from New Jersey v. T.L.O.
(1985):
The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment applies
only to punishments imposed after criminal convictions and hence does not apply
to the punishment of school children by public school officials. (p.334)
Interestingly, the court in T.L.O. reasoned that school discipline cannot be considered
cruel and unusual punishment simply because it is not the result of a criminal conviction.
Such logic dismisses the potential harm zero-tolerance practices can have on students
who are suspended or expelled for even nonthreatening behaviors. Only four court
decisions yielded support for research question five.
There was only one court case where evidence relevant to research question five
actually failed to provide support. Consider the following passage from James P. v.
Lemahieu (2000):
First, there is a legitimate possibility of irreparable harm that could result from not
rescinding disciplinary action prior to the end of the litigation. For example,
Robert P.’s college applications will be tarnished since the actions taken by the
school will be on his record, his grades will suffer if he is not able to make up his
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work and he will not be able to compete in athletic events. It is also very possible
that his inability to participate…will negatively affect his ability to obtain an
athletic scholarship. (p. 1122)
The Lemahieu court’s logic definitely acknowledged the potentially harmful effects that
an automatic suspension can have for a student, especially when the violation is a minor
one. Still, the Lemahieu decision is outnumbered by the other four decisions providing
support for research question five.
In regard to research question six, any text segment or passages revealing that the
jurisprudential intent of the court is to dismiss allegations of constitutional violations as
not binding on the court, or without merit, because it is not the court’s role to make such
judgments was considered support. For example, such support can be found in the
following passage from Defabio v. E. Hampton Union Free Sch. Dist. (2009):
Although plaintiffs seek to second-guess with hindsight the judgment of school
administrators, that is not the role of the courts. If the school’s decision satisfies
the constitutional standard in Tinker, then it is irrelevant that a litigant or court
believes the situation could have been handled better. It is not the role of the
federal courts to set aside decisions of school administrators which the court may
view as lacking a basis in wisdom or compassion. (p. 481)
The Defabio decision plainly stated that the courts have no role, nor should they, in
second-guessing the judgment of school officials in disciplinary matters regardless of
whether the student believes he or she has been treated unfairly. In addition, the court’s
logic in Defabio suggested that federal courts have no place in overturning the
disciplinary decisions of school officials even if the court disagrees with the reasoning
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behind the school’s harsh disciplinary actions. A total of fifty court decisions provided
evidence supporting research question six.
There were a few court decisions where evidence was found that failed to support
research question six. Once such instance was found in the following passage from the
ruling in Hinds County Sch. Dist. Bd. of Trs. v. R.B. (2007):
The court finds that the school board’s decision was arbitrary and capricious and
not supported by substantial evidence. The school board relied solely on the
report from the appeals committee and the faxed photocopy of an item purporting
to be the “knife” found on R.B. The findings of the appeals committee are
themselves deficient, as the appeals committee chose to rely on the written reports
characterizing the device as a pocket knife without examining the device
themselves…Had the school board conducted even a cursory examination of the
actual device, it would have realized that the appeals committee’s
recommendation…did not constitute substantial evidence upon which to
discipline R.B. for possession of a weapon. (pp. 501-502)
Although the Hinds court did question the discretion wielded by the school board and
decided in favor of the student, this case was only one among six, which failed to support
research question six. Compared to the fifty cases providing support, these few cases that
reject research question six are largely overshadowed by the numerous instances where
support was found.
The researcher also searched for language in the individual court cases that
revealed if the courts favored suspensions or expulsions even when viable alternative
punishments were available. Such passages affirming this preference for harsh discipline

247

in light of less stigmatizing alternatives would provide support for research question
seven. Only four court cases provided evidence in support of research question seven.
Consider the evidence provided by the following passage in the Covington County v.
G.W. (2000) decision:
While it is true that there are many punishments that would seem less harsh or
more appropriate in this case, we must recognize that the law commits this entire
matter to the discretion of the school board. (p. 192)
The Cathe A. v. Doddridge County Bd. of Educ. (1997) decision provided a similar
argument with this passage:
The twelve-month expulsion period...may seem to be a severe penalty. But the
legislature is entitled to believe that only such a penalty would serve as an
effective deterrent to further the important goal of a strict weapons-free
environment in our school. (p.529)
Thus, it is clear that the courts rarely, if at all, acknowledged alternative punishments to
zero-tolerance practices of exclusion. When the courts did acknowledge potential
punishments that were less harsh, and perhaps more restorative or rehabilitative, the
courts dismissed them and sided with the disciplinary actions taken by the school
officials. There were no instances where evidence could be distinguished as rejecting
research question seven. Such a finding reveals that alternative sanctions are seldom
considered in court rulings regarding the potential infringement zero-tolerance policies
have on the rights of students.
Finally, the researcher also searched for text segments or passages that mentioned
the need for school officials to enforce strict disciplinary actions in order to preemptively
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prevent possible future disruptions. Evidence suggesting the courts support harsh
disciplinary actions in order to preemptively stop substantial school disruptions were
listed as support for research question eight. Consider the following passage from
Demers v. Leominster Sch. Dep’t. (2003):
However, the potential for disruption or disorder to the students of the Northwest
School was greater than merely the school’s negative reaction to an unpopular
political viewpoint…On these facts, a reasonable interpretation of the law would
allow a school official to prevent potential disorder or disruption to school safety,
particularly in the wake of increased school violence across the country. We
review, however, with deference, schools’ decisions in connection with the safety
of their students even when freedom of expression is involved. At the time when
school officials made their determination to emergency expel him, they had facts
which might reasonably have led them to forecast a substantial disruption of or
material interference with school activities. (p. 203)
As evidenced in the Demers opinion, the courts tend to favor disciplinary actions that
seek to prevent potential disorder or disruption of the school environment even if such
actions infringe on students’ constitutional rights, such as the First Amendment. Eleven
court decisions provided similar evidence supporting research question eight.
Only two court decisions provided evidence failing to support research question
eight (see Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. Dist., 1969; J.S. v. Blue Mt. Sch. Dist., 2011).
Consider the court’s reasoning in the J.S. v. Blue Mt. Sch. Dist. ruling:
The facts in this case do not support the conclusion that a forecast of substantial
disruption was reasonable…The facts simply do not support the conclusion that
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the school district could have reasonably forecasted a substantial disruption of or
material interference with the school as a result of J.S.’s profile. Under Tinker,
therefore, the school district violated J.S.’s First Amendment free speech rights
when it suspended her for creating the profile. (pp. 928-931)
Although the court used the Tinker standard in determining that the school erred in
suspending J.S. in the Blue Mt. Sch. Dist. decision, this evidence is outweighed when
compared to the support found in favor of research question eight.
Evidence Related to Jurisprudential Intent and Neoliberal Theory. In the second
step of the case law method, the researcher identified the use of repetitive legal language
conveyed through the jurisprudential intent, which denotes principles characteristic of the
mechanisms described in the neoliberal theoretical framework advanced in chapter 3.
Five themes emerged from the manifest content that was discerned from the
jurisprudential intent collected in the first step of the method. Sixty of the seventy-five
court decisions yielded manifest content that could be categorized into one or more of
these themes. The researcher will now explain how the concepts expressed through the
emergent themes in the case law translate back into the theoretical mechanisms presented
in the neoliberal theoretical framework.
Interest Balancing. Interest balancing was the first emergent theme identified
within the jurisprudential intent of the court decisions. Interest balancing refers to
striking a balance between the school authorities’ interests in maintaining an orderly
school environment, free from disruption, and ensuring students’ individual constitutional
rights are not violated in zero tolerance court decisions. The jurisprudential intent
revealed in the first step of the case law method found that the majority of cases

250

supporting research question one showed that the courts found the school authorities’
interests outweighed the interests of individual students claiming constitutional rights
violations. For instance, consider the following manifest content present in the passage
from the J.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist. (2002) decision:
In various situations, the high courts of both the United States and Pennsylvania
have performed the delicate balance and concluded that the constitutional interests
of the student, in certain circumstances, must yield to the school officials’ need to
maintain order and to discipline when necessary to assure a safe school
environment that is conducive to learning…[the] school board…is in the best
position to weigh the strengths and vulnerabilities of the town’s 785 students. (pp.
651 & 672)
The court, in the J.S. v. Bethlehem decision, reinforces the concept of moral panic by
suggesting there are dangerous threats to school safety, as well as threats to the
maintenance of order and discipline within public schools. In response to these potential
threats, which the theoretical framework identifies as being driven by sensationalized
media coverage and manipulated by politicians, the courts suggest that the constitutional
rights of students are outweighed by the schools’ interests in utilizing broader social
controls to eliminate perceived threats to school safety (Burns & Crawford, 1999;
Hirschfield, 2008; Giroux, 2003; Simon, 2007, p. 230).
Additionally, the court ruled in Pendleton v. Fassett (2009) that “the general
governmental interest in safe and disciplined schools in order to promote and ensure a
productive learning environment is more weighty here,” (p. 21) which reflects the
theoretical concept in the framework that argues the tightening of school disciplinary
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practices is necessary to provide the school environment essential to socialize students for
today’s neoliberal economy. The R.M. v. Washakie County Sch. Dist. (2004) decision
reiterates this logic by stating that “A student’s right to an education may be
constitutionally denied when outweighed by the school’s interest in protecting other
students, teachers, and school property, and in preventing the disruption of the
educational system” (p. 19).
As explained in the theoretical framework, the media-driven moral panic, which
resulted from the school shootings in the 1980s and 1990s, provided policy makers with
the opportunity to gain the public support necessary to implement zero-tolerance policies
that allows school officials to remove and exclude students who threaten the reconfigured
educational system designed to produce “compliant bodies” demanded by the
deindustrialized neoliberal state (Burns & Crawford, 1999; Hirschfield, 2008; Kupchik &
Monahan, 2006). Therefore, zero-tolerance policies serve as the legislative answer to
controlling school violence and crime caused by a perceived growing number of
“dangerous” youth in American schools, and the courts’ interest-balancing logic
legitimizes this process (Boccanfuso & Kuhfeld, 2011; Hirschfield, 2008; Hirschfield &
Celinska, 2011; Stinchcomb et al., 2006). Thus, interest balancing is a neoliberal
mechanism in which the courts utilize the fear of school violence to rationalize the
weakening of constitutional rights for public school students while promoting the state’s
interest in providing a safe, undisturbed educational environment in which students can
effectively be socialized into their appropriate class-defined roles (Hirschfield, 2008). As
a result, the political utility of fear mongering from policy makers is coupled with the
interest balancing dynamics of judicial reasoning to convince, parents, school officials,
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and society more generally that schools should and could be safer through the continued
enforcement of zero-tolerance policies (Giroux, 2003; Hirschfield, 2008; Lyons & Drew,
2006).
Qualified Immunity The second theme to emerge from the jurisprudential intent,
which was communicated through the relevant court decisions, is the concept of qualified
immunity. Qualified immunity means that even if the court finds that enforcement of zerotolerance policies have violated a student’s constitutional rights, school administrators
and teachers, who are primarily involved in the enforcement of such school disciplinary
actions, are immunized from any charges of liability. As a result a court may refuse to
rule on a case or grant summary judgment in favor of the school officials, regardless of
whether the court finds them to be in violation of the U.S. Constitution or not.
Qualified immunity reflects the role that the due process meta-narrative plays in
the theoretical framework. Recall that the students’ rights movement of the 1960s and
1970s secured due process for students by curbing arbitrary and capricious disciplinary
practices by school officials and regulating many of the existing disciplinary practices
(Arum, 2003).Two of the landmark Supreme Court decisions during this period are
included in the data set for the current qualitative analysis (see Goss v. Lopez, 1975;
Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. Dist., 1969); however, subsequent Supreme Court decisions
weakened the due process rights granted to students in the 1960s and 1970s (e.g., Bethel
Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 1986; Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 1988; New Jersey v.
T.L.O., 1985; Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 1995). Scholars argued that the added due
process undermined the traditional moral authority exerted by school administrators
because these authorities faced potential litigation for applying harsh disciplinary action
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without considering the constitutional rights of students (Arum, 2003; Toby, 1998). Zerotolerance policies transfer disciplinary authority away from traditional school authorities
and into the control of inflexible disciplinary codes, law enforcement, and the justice
system (Beger, 2002; Hirschfield & Celinska, 2011; Lyons & Drew, 2006).
Furthermore, the transfer of disciplinary authority to strict zero-tolerance codes
and law enforcement entities allows school administrators to circumvent litigious claims
from students who believe their constitutional privacy and due process rights have been
violated by zero tolerance practices (Arum, 2003; Hirschfield, 2008). Consequently, the
manner in which neoliberal social controls are exerted via school-based zero tolerance
policies and an increased law enforcement presence at schools has reinforced the
formation of a crime control model where students’ rights are weakened, due process is
minimized, and the movements of students are controlled (Lyons & Drew, 2006; Nolan
& Anyon, 2004). The courts aid this process by granting school officials qualified
immunity from liability when the application of zero-tolerance disciplinary punishments
infringe upon the constitutional rights of students. Consider the following manifest
content arising from the Cuff v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist. (2012) decision:
School administrators must be permitted to react quickly and decisively to address
a threat of physical violence against their students, without worrying that they will
have to face years of litigation second-guessing their judgment as to whether the
threat posed a real risk of substantial disturbance. (p. 470)
The legal reasoning depicted in this passage from the Cuff decision unmistakably conveys
the principles explained in the theoretical framework. Zero-tolerance policies permit
school officials to shift disciplinary authority to the written policy itself, and the courts
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grant them immunity by adhering to the strict enforcement of the policy. Thus, school
officials can apply harsh disciplinary actions, which may infringe upon the constitutional
rights of the students being accused of wrongdoing, and the courts will use qualified
immunity as the neoliberal court mechanism to reinforce zero-tolerance social control
efforts in schools.
As mentioned above, even when a court finds a violation of students’
constitutional rights, it is possible for school administrators to enjoy qualified immunity
and be granted summary judgment without ever being held liable for their actions. For
instance, contemplate the message expressed by the court in the Demers v. Leominster
Sch. Dep’t (2003) decision:
Even if the law is clearly established, an official is entitled to qualified immunity
if at the time of the challenged actions, such official’s belief that his or her actions
were lawful is objectively legally reasonable…A reasonable, though mistaken
conclusion about the lawfulness of one’s conduct does not subject a governmental
official to personal liability…there is limited case law on this issue of school
violence in this Circuit, which lends further credence to conclude that this area of
the law is unsettled. Therefore, the individual defendants are entitled to qualified
immunity. (pp. 207-208)
A similar ruling was ordered in the Beard v. Whitmore Lake Sch. Dist. (2005) decision
where over twenty students were subjected to nude or partially nude strip searches
because money had been reported missing by a student. Although the court found the
searches to have violated the students’ Fourth Amendment rights because of the absence
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of individualized suspicion, the school officials and the law enforcement officer involved
still were granted qualified immunity. The court’s ruling is as follows:
However, the teachers and officer were entitled to qualified immunity because the
law at the time the searches were conducted did not clearly establish that the
searches were unreasonable under the particular circumstances present in the
case…Because the searches in this case did not violate clearly established law, the
defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. (pp. 598 & 608)
The rulings in Beard and Demers suggest that the existing case law regarding strip
searches of a large number of students, without individualized suspicion, has largely
found that such searches are either constitutional or that the written statutes have not
narrowed the procedure in which students can be searched enough so the courts may
construe that the school officials should have known better. Hence, qualified immunity
serves as another neoliberal court mechanism to reinforce the enforcement of zerotolerance policies in schools.
Disempowered Citizenship. The third emergent theme is disempowered
citizenship. This theme reiterates three things mentioned in the theoretical framework,
which school criminalization teaches students. Those three things are: (1) that students
have no meaningful influence over their schools, (2) students have little recourse should
the government have violated their rights, and (3) students have few rights to begin with
(Hirschfield & Celinska, 2011; Kupchik & Monahan, 2006; Lyons & Drew, 2006). The
neoliberal agenda, as applied to school criminalization efforts, endorses a “narrow public
sphere” and a “docile citizenry” (Giroux, 2003; Hirschfield, 2011, p. 7). Therefore,
enforcement of neoliberal social control efforts, via zero-tolerance policies, has
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transformed the role of public schools to replicate a model of disempowered citizenship
that is similar to the neoliberal labor dynamics, where students’ rights are weakened and
their movements are controlled and scrutinized (Giroux, 2003; Lyons & Drew, 2006).
The manifest content that was discovered in the second step of the case law
method revealed twenty-three instances in which disempowered citizenship emerged. For
example, consider the following passage from the Northwestern Sch. Corp. v. Linke
(2002) decision:
The United States Supreme Court has taken the view that while public schools are
state actors subject to constitutional oversight, the nature of a school’s role is
custodial and tutelary, permitting a degree of supervision and control that could
not be exercised over free adults…We find that students are entitled to less
privacy at school than adults would enjoy in comparable situations. In any
realistic sense, students within the school environment have a lesser expectation
of privacy than members of the population generally. (pp. 979-980)
Such judicial reasoning clearly establishes how the courts acknowledge and agree with
neoliberal principles suggesting that students are less worthy of the constitutional
protections afforded to adults in similar circumstances, while outside of public schools.
Indeed, the Doran v. Contoocook Valley Sch. Dist. (2009) ruling also concluded that
“Unemancipated minors lack some of the most fundamental rights to selfdetermination—including the right to come and go at will” (p. 193). The legal language
in the Doran decision also reflects the principles described in the neoliberal theoretical
framework by plainly stating that the students’ rights are not only weakened but their
movements are also in need of control.
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Furthermore, several of the court decisions in this investigation revealed judicial
reasoning, which argues that “Given the school’s need to be able to impose disciplinary
sanctions for a wide range of unanticipated conduct disruptive of the educational process,
the school disciplinary rules need not be as detailed as a criminal code” (Bethel Sch. Dist.
v. Fraser, 1986, p. 686; Hammock ex rel. Hammock v. Keys, 2000, pp. 1230-1232; J.S. v.
Blue Mt. Sch. Dist., 2011, pp. 935-936; Morgan v. Snider High Sch., 2007, p. 21;
Posthumus v. Bd. of Educ., 2005, p. 903). In addition, many of the rulings also opined
that “the constitutional rights of students are not automatically coextensive with the rights
of adults in other settings” (Anderson v. Milbank Sch. Dist. 25-4, 2000, p. 686; Bethel
Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 1986, p. 682; Defabio v. E. Hampton Union Free Sch. Dist., 2009, p.
474; Demers v. Leominster Sch. Dep’t, 2003, p. 200; Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier,
1988, pp. 266-267; J.S. v. Blue Mt. Sch. Dist., 2011, p. 926; Posthumus v. Bd. of Educ.,
2005, p. 900). Another common attitude conveyed by the court decisions is that “the
typical requirements of warrant and probable cause are relaxed when a school official
conducts a search of a student” (Bundick v. Bay City Indep. Sch. Dist., 2001, p. 738;
Commonwealth v. Lawrence L., 2003, pp. 880-882; Commonwealth v. Smith, 2008, pp.
178-179; Doran v. Contoocook Valley Sch. Dist., 2009, p. 191; Hill v. Sharber, 2008, pp.
676-677; In re K.K., 2012, p. 653; In re L.A., 2001, p. 885; Lausin v. Bishko, 2010, p.
629; New Jersey v. T.L.O., 1985, p. 325; Pendleton v. Fassett, 2009, pp. 15-16; Sims v.
Bracken County Sch. Dist., 2010, pp. 18-19; State v. Best, 2008, pp. 109-110; Vernonia
Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 1995, p. 653). As one can see, the manifest content described above
expresses the judicial attitude favoring the disempowered citizenship of public school
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students, which yields significant theoretical import to the neoliberal theoretical
framework.
Empowered Discretion of School Authorities. The fourth theme to develop from
the manifest content discerned in the jurisprudential intent is empowered discretion of
school authorities. As mentioned in the theoretical framework, school criminalization
efforts, in accordance with the neoliberal agenda, alters the role of teachers so that they
may manage and classify students much like employees would be treated in a neoliberal
economy (Hirschfield & Celinska, 2011; Kupchik & Monahan, 2006). Recall that the
classification of students, via anticipatory labeling, allows teachers and school
administrators to project perceived future social and structural realities onto their
disaffected and disruptive students (Hirschfield, 2008). Sociologists argue that structural
forces, like those relevant to neoliberal restructuring, “condition” and “constrain”
individual perceptions and interactions with others (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1977;
Hirschfield, 2008, p. 91).
Thus, the neoliberal agenda, especially in light of the infusion of economic
accountability standards into public education, may influence school officials’
perceptions of students’ future prospects by linking social structure to the students’
educational and occupational aspirations and classroom effort (Hirschfield, 2008). As
such, in order to meet competitive performance standards with other schools, teachers
and school administrators are charged with the task of classification and socialization,
which forces them to consciously and unconsciously prepare students for their rightful
place in the social hierarchy by sorting future dropouts from those students who have the
best chance of functioning in the neoliberal workplace environment (Bowditch, 1993;
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Ferguson, 2000; Hirschfield, 2008). Moreover, the pressure to achieve neoliberal
standards of accountability for underperforming schools further motivates educators to
control and remove disaffected and disruptive students, who obstruct the socialization
processes that promote the values and norms of a dominant economic class (Kupchik &
Monahan, 2006; Shapiro, 1984). In order to achieve these neoliberal goals, teachers and
school administrators must be empowered with wide discretionary authority to classify
and remove those students who pose a threat to the pedagogical imperatives of the
neoliberal agenda that seeks to reproduce the structure of capitalist society through the
socialization of students in the values of the market place as preferred by the ruling class
elites (Giroux, 2003; Kupchik & Monahan, 2006; Shapiro, 1984).
The courts play a role in acquiescing to and further enhancing the discretionary
power of school officials by refusing to question or rule on improper or inappropriate
disciplinary actions taken by school authorities, which may infringe upon the
constitutional rights of students. There were numerous instances in which the
jurisprudential intent revealed manifest content supporting the concept of empowered
discretion of school authorities. For example, consider the following passage from the
Cuff v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist. (2012) decision:
Although plaintiffs seek to second-guess with hindsight the judgment of school
administrators, that is not the role of the courts…It is not the role of the federal
courts to set aside decisions of school administrators which the court may view as
lacking a basis in wisdom or compassion. (pp. 469-470)
By using such judicial logic, the courts legitimize neoliberal social control efforts in
schools by emboldening school officials with more discretion in which to classify and
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socialize students in accordance with the neoliberal pedagogical agenda. Numerous other
court decisions argue that it is not the courts’ role to “second-guess” the judgment or “set
aside the decisions of school administrators” (e.g., Brett N. v. Cmty Unit Sch. Dist. NO.
303, 2009, pp. 8-11; Doe by & Through Doe v. Bd. of Educ., 1995, p. 10; Fuller v.
Decatur Pub. Sch. Bd. of Educ. Sch. Dist. 61, 2000, pp. 821-822; Hammock ex rel.
Hammock v. Keys, 2000, p. 1224; Morgan v. Snider High Sch., 2007, pp. 23-24; PiekoszMurphy v. Bd. of Educ. of Cmty. High Sch. Dist. No. 230, 2012, p. 961; Stafford Unified
Sch. Dist. v. Redding, 2009, p. 356; Tun v. Fort Wayne Cmty. Sch., 2004, p. 938; Vann v.
Stewart, 2006, p. 890).
The ruling in the E.M. v. Briggs (1996) decision further articulates the concept of
empowered discretion of school authorities as depicted in the theoretical framework.
Consider the following passage:
It should be here noted that the management, supervision and determinations of
policy are the prerogative and responsibility of the school officials; and that the
courts should be reluctant to enter therein…It is the policy of the law not to favor
limitations on the powers of boards of education, but rather to give them a free
hand to function within the sphere of their responsibilities…Section 1983 does
not extend the right to relitigate in federal court evidentiary questions arising in
school disciplinary proceedings or the proper construction of school regulations.
The system of public education that has evolved in this nation relies necessarily
upon the discretion and judgment of school administrators and school board
members, and § 1983 was not intended to be a vehicle for federal court correction
of errors in the exercise of that discretion (E.M. v. Briggs, 1996, p. 757).
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The language used in the Briggs decision reinforces the theoretical concept of empowered
discretion by clearly arguing that school officials deserve wider rather than more limited
discretionary powers when it comes to enforcing school disciplinary actions. The courts’
reluctance to rule on alleged abuses of discretion by school officials serves to further
empower school authorities to enforce zero-tolerance policies in order to classify and
socialize students in accordance with the neoliberal agenda. Thus, by granting school
authorities with empowered discretion, the courts engage in the reinforcement of
neoliberal social controls in schools.
Preemptive Exclusion. The fifth emergent theme arising from the manifest content
extracted by way of the jurisprudential intent of the relevant court decisions is preemptive
exclusion. As stated in the theoretical framework, zero-tolerance policies attempt to deter
the presence of weapons, drugs, and troublesome or disruptive behaviors that might
inhibit the teachers’ roles in socializing the “compliant bodies” needed for the flexible
labor force of the new neoliberal state (Kupchik & Monahan, 2006). Students who
exhibit these forms of disruptive behaviors are stigmatized and labeled as “at-risk of
failing,” “unsalvageable,” and “bound for jail,” which mirrors the otherizing rhetoric of
the original child-saving movement that sought to contain and control problematic youth
because their behavior was not in accordance with the mainstream American values and
norms (Ferguson, 2000, p. 9; NAACP, 2005; Platt, 2009). Moreover, the tightening of
school disciplinary practices attempts to mold students into compliant future employees
who conform to the service-oriented needs of the neoliberal economy (Kupchik &
Monahan, 2006; Hirschfield, 2008). Those students who disturb this socializing process
are perceived to hinder the future prospects of other “promising” students who are
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expected to be economically viable laborers and consumers in the neoliberal economy
(Hirschfield, 2008; Kupchik & Monahan, 2006). As mentioned in the theoretical
framework, the labeling and categorizing of particular groups of students as “unworthy,”
“unruly,” and “unsalvageable” (Ferguson, 2000, p. 9; Wacquant, 2001, p. 108) is
reminiscent of the child-saving movement of the 19th and 20th centuries that was harmful
to poor, urban youth identified as delinquents and treated as dangerous (Platt, 2009).
By using zero tolerance exclusionary practices, school administrators and
educators are able to focus on the best performing students and remove those students
who threaten overall school performance, as well as undermine the controlled and
disciplined school environment required for the didactic socialization efforts promoted
under the neoliberal state to produce students who accommodate the needs of the
restructured economy (Bowditch, 1993; Fuentes, 2003; Giroux, 2003; Hirschfield, 2008;
Kupchik & Monahan, 2006; Toby, 1998). Therefore, school criminalization policies and
practices enforced in the neoliberal state attempt to instill a “passive acquiescence to state
and corporate power” among the student populations and their parents (Lyons & Drew,
2006, p. 195). This goal is pursued by isolating and funneling those students, who disrupt
this socialization process, out of school and onto a path leading to confinement and
perpetual marginalization before they can even enter the labor force (Hall & Karanxha,
2012). Thus, the new American educational apparatus assists in the criminalization of
poor students, which aids in the establishment and maintenance of a criminal class that
legitimates systems of inequality in modern capitalist societies, while flexible students
who adapt or succumb easily to the labor instability, invasive monitoring, and
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exploitative working conditions of the neoliberal state are rewarded (Kupchik &
Monahan, 2006).
The theoretical framework also identifies the formation of a crime control model
in public schools to reinforce a governing through crime initiative, which approaches
problems faced by schools as criminal problems rather than social or counseling
problems (Kupchik & Monahan, 2006; Simon, 2007). Under this governing through
crime logic, disruptive students are recast as criminals and the criminal element
threatening the schools must be identified and expelled in order to improve the prospects
and performance of promising students, such as those who are flexible and compliant to
the needs of the neoliberal economy (Kupchik & Monahan, 2006; Simon, 2007). The
courts assist public schools in the process of isolating and funneling out those disruptive
students who threaten the neoliberal agenda in education by ruling in favor of
preemptive, exclusionary actions taken by school official regardless of alleged
constitutional rights violations.
For example, contemplate the following passage from the Demers (2003)
decision:
On these facts, a reasonable interpretation of the law would allow a school official
to prevent potential disorder or disruption to school safety, particularly in the
wake of increased school violence across the country…At the time when school
officials made their determination to emergency expel him, they had facts which
might reasonably have led them to forecast a substantial disruption of or material
interference with school activities…Michael’s suspension and subsequent
expulsion were rationally related to the school’s interest in maintaining a safe
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school environment, particularly in light of the apprehensive climate that existed
at the time due to highly publicized incidents of school violence around the
country. (pp. 203-206)
The judicial reasoning employed in this court case reflects the theoretical principles put
forth in the framework, which suggests that school officials are charged with the role of
excluding students whose behavior may potentially cause disorder or disruption to the
schools activities or overall operations.
In a similar opinion, the Defabio (2009) court embodied similar principles by
ruling in the following manner:
In this context, it is well settled that school officials do not have to wait for actual
disruption from the speech before they act; instead, school officials have an
affirmative duty to not only ameliorate the harmful effects of disruptions, but to
prevent them from happening in the first place…Not only are school officials free
to act before the actual disruption occurs, they are not required to predict
disruption with absolute certainty to satisfy the Tinker standard…Moreover,
forecasting disruption is unmistakably difficult to do. Thus, rather than requiring
certainty of disruption, Tinker allows school officials to act and prevent the
speech where they might reasonably portend disruption form the student
expression at issue…Because of the special circumstances of the school
environment, the level of disturbance required to justify official intervention is
lower inside a public school than it is outside the school. The First Amendment
does not deprive school administrators of the ability to rely upon their own
considerable experience, expertise, and judgment in recognizing and diffusing the
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potential for disruption and violence in public schools. Indeed, they are dutybound to do just that. That duty is particularly acute when threats of physical
violence have already been made and actual violence could well erupt if the
hostile situation is not promptly and emphatically controlled. (pp. 480-481)
The language utilized by the court in the Defabio decision clearly supports the concept of
preemptive exclusion. Moreover, the passage from Defabio urges that school officials are
“duty-bound” to preemptively prevent disruption in public schools. Indeed, other court
rulings also found that “school officials have a duty to prevent the occurrence of
disturbances” (J.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 2002, p. 662).
In addition to disruptive behaviors, the courts also take the opinion that school
officials “need not tolerate speech that is inconsistent with its pedagogical mission, even
though the government could not suppress that speech outside of the schoolhouse”
(Anderson v. Milbank Sch. Dist. 25-4, 2000, p. 686; Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier, 1988, p.
261; Porter v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 2004, p. 615; S.G. v. Sayreville Bd. of Educ.,
2004, p. 422). Thus, the courts’ also express their approval of the suppression of student
expression that impedes the pedagogical concerns of schools attempting to instill youth
with the neoliberal values of the ruling class, which was mentioned in the theoretical
framework. The evidence discussed above reveals that preemptive exclusion is a
neoliberal social control mechanism in which the courts legitimize suits brought against
schools for allegedly violating students’ constitutional rights.
Thematic Investigation
The thematic investigation, which was conducted as the third step of the case law
method found that these five themes emerged 112 times across 80% (n = 60) of the court
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decisions in the sample. The two most prominently employed themes reflective of the
principles found in the theoretical framework were qualified immunity and empowered
discretion of school authorities. These two themes were evidenced roughly 50% of the
time. Thus, the results of this study suggest that qualified immunity and empowered
discretion are the neoliberal court mechanisms utilized by courts the most in order to
reinforce zero-tolerance social control efforts in public schools. As such, future research
regarding judicial decision making in zero tolerance court cases should attempt to
measure and assess aspects of these two theoretical concepts. Two other themes were
evidenced approximately 35-40% of the time, and those are interest balancing and
disempowered citizenship, respectfully. Likewise, with these theoretical concepts being
referenced 4 out of 10 times, future research should seek to measure and evaluate these
concepts further. Lastly, although only evidenced just below 20% of the time, the
theoretical concept of preemptive exclusion should also be included in subsequent
empirical investigations attempting to measure and identify the presence of neoliberal
social controls in social institutions, such as education. The themes identified in this
qualitative inquiry are transferable as neoliberal theoretical constructs that can be used in
future studies investigating the application of neoliberal social control mechanisms in
similar or other contexts.
The overall qualitative findings reflect the neoliberal principle, which embraces
the rule of law and articulates that any conflict or opposition to neoliberal policies must
be “mediated through the courts” (Harvey, 2005, p. 66). Thus, by finding that the courts
predominantly rule in favor of upholding neoliberal social control mechanisms (e.g.,
zero-tolerance policies), this study has identified a way in which neoliberal contradictions
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are legitimized in a representative democracy. As such, the legitimacy crisis, embodied
within the U.S. neoliberal democratic system (Habermas, 1975; Harvey, 2005; Shapiro,
1984; Wolfe, 1977), is given validity through the precedent established through the rule
of law determined by the court system.
Quantitative Findings
There were five research hypotheses tested by conducting a series of one-way
ANOVAs and chi-square analyses. Of these five hypotheses, the quantitative results
found support for hypotheses two, three, four, and five. Specifically, for hypothesis two,
the researcher found that schools with 50% or more minority students had a significantly
higher average of total number of disciplinary actions compared to schools with less than
5% minority students for all three waves (i.e., 2003-2004, 2005-2006, and 2007-2008) of
data. Although the ANOVA results for hypothesis one yielded weak effect sizes, the
plotted trend lines, over time, suggested a consistently steady or increasing level of total
disciplinary actions taken against students attending school with the highest minority
levels.
Similarly, the ANOVA results for hypothesis three revealed that schools with
50% or more minority students had a significantly higher average of total removals
without continued educational services compared to schools with less than 5% of
minority students across all three waves of data. The effect sizes for the hypothesis three
ANOVAs were also weak. When the trend lines were plotted, the pattern suggested a
steady upward trend in total removals applied to students attending schools with the
highest levels of minority students across the three waves. These findings reveal that the
total disciplinary and removals without continued educational services are
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disproportionately applied to schools with larger populations of minority students, which
is consistent with the research findings mentioned in the empirical literature (Lawrence,
2007; Reyes, 2006; Skiba & Knesting, 2001; Skiba et al., 2002; Sughrue, 2003).
However, the 2005-2006 trend line was unexpectedly higher than hypothesized.
There may be a couple of reasons for why there was a spike in the total removals
without continued educational services for the 2005-2006 wave of data. First of all, the
No Child Left Behind Act did not really go into effect until 2003 (Kim et al, 2010).
Therefore, the effects on disciplinary actions resulting from the increased accountability
standards placed on underperforming schools may have resulted in more expulsions
without continued educational services for the years closely following the 2003
implementation in order to meet those heightened performance standards by removing
students who cause disruptions and bring down standardized test scores. Another
plausible explanation is that there were two mass school shootings in 2005 (i.e., Red
Lake High School in Minnesota and Campbell County High School in Tennessee) and
another two mass school shootings in 2006 (i.e., Pine Middle School in Nevada and
Weston High School in Wisconsin), which caught media attention (Kyle & Thompson,
2008). Thus, the elevated levels of fear and panic created by media coverage of these
tragic events may have had an effect on the increased number of removals the 2005-2006
school years. Indeed, an enhanced vigilant response from school administrators may have
resulted in a greater use of harsh disciplinary action in attempts to prevent or deter more
incidents of school violence. With these two phenomena working in tandem, it is feasible
to expect a spike in the number of removals that those two years.
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The chi-square results for hypothesis four revealed that students who attended
schools with greater than 50% minorities were more likely to live in areas with the
highest levels of crime, while the majority of students who came from schools with less
than 5% minorities were more likely to live in areas with the lowest levels of crime.
These chi-square results were consistent for all three waves of data and the effect sizes
were quite strong. When looking across the chi-square results for the three waves of data,
it appears that the schools with the highest percentage of minorities were consistently
more likely to have a majority of students residing in high-crime areas, such that the trend
revealed a slightly increasing or steady percentage of students from high-crime areas
attending schools with a 50% or greater minority student makeup. Likewise, over time,
the schools with the lowest percentage of minority students were unvaryingly less likely
to have a majority of students coming from high-crime areas. As such, the trend line
suggested that there was a decrease in the percentage of students from high-crime areas
attending schools with a less than 5% minority student makeup. These findings are
similar to other research findings which acknowledge that minorities are more likely to
reside in communities characterized by high levels of crime (Giroux, 2003; Hall &
Karanxha, 2012; Hirschfield, 2008; Wacquant, 2001, 2009a, 2009b).
The ANOVA results for hypothesis five found there to be a significantly higher
average of total removals without continued educational services for students coming
from high-crime areas compared to students coming from areas with moderate or low
levels of crime for all three waves of data. Although this relationship also yielded weak
effect sizes, the trend line, when plotted over time, revealed an expected slight upward
trend in total removals taken against students coming from high-crime areas. Similar to
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the findings for hypothesis three, the 2005-2006 trend line was higher than expected. As
mentioned before, this increase in removals may have been a result of moral panic caused
by the four mass school shootings in those years or increased accountability efforts by
school administrators to remove disaffected and disruptive students in hopes of
improving overall school performance for the newly implemented No Child Left Behind
Act.
These findings, combined with the findings from hypothesis three, suggest that
students coming from high-crime neighborhoods and attending schools consisting of 50%
or more minorities are more likely to receive exclusionary removals without continued
educational services compared to students who come from low-crime neighborhoods and
attend schools with less than 5% minority students. All of these findings are consistent
with the prior empirical research (Christle et al., 2004; Fenning & Rose, 2007; Giroux,
2003; Lawrence, 2007; Reyes, 2006; Skiba & Knesting, 2001; Skiba et al., 2002;
Sughrue, 2003).
Overall, the ANOVA analyses conducted for hypothesis one did not yield
support. The results suggested that the average usage of metal detectors and access
control, by way of locked or monitored doorways, was higher for schools with the least
amount of minority students. In regards to the average use of security cameras, only the
2007-2008 data found that schools with the highest percentage of minority students were
significantly more likely to use security cameras. The other two waves of data produce
null findings. For the first two waves of data, significant results suggested that security
personnel was more likely to be used in schools with the lowest percentage of minority
students compared to schools with the highest percentage of minority students. The 2007-
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2008 data revealed opposite findings, which depicted schools with the highest percentage
of minority students being more likely to use security personnel compared to schools
with the lowest percentage of minority students. Thus, these findings, collectively, are
inconclusive and should be treated as a rejection of the first hypothesis.
The fact that the results found metal detectors, access controls, and security
personnel to be more likely implemented in schools with the smallest percentages of
minority students is at first puzzling. Especially, since prior research has found that these
enhanced security measures were more likely to appear in urban schools with higher
percentages of minorities (Devine, 1996; DeVoe, Peter, Noonan, Snyder, & Baum, 2005;
Skiba, 2000). However, research has also found that the use of drug sniffing dogs is more
common in predominantly white, suburban and rural schools (DeVoe et al., 2005).
Furthermore, research has acknowledged the growing number of middle class, suburban
and rural schools instituting metal detectors, SROs, and security cameras (Kupchik &
Monahan, 2006). The results of this study did reveal that security cameras and security
personnel, in 2007 to 2008, were more likely to be placed in schools with the highest
percentages of minority students, which does match the findings in previous research
(Devine, 1996; DeVoe et al., 2005; Skiba, 2000; Noguera, 2003); however, the lack of a
similar finding in the other two waves leads the researcher to reject the notion that this is
a distinct trend. Therefore, one must ask why is it that security measures were more likely
to be found in schools with the lowest percentages of minorities, when the opposite was
expected. There are a few plausible explanations for this outcome.
First of all, currently there is a preoccupation with policing and punishment in
contemporary society, especially among suburban homeowners who are eager to install

272

alarm systems, security cameras, build gated communities, and invest in private security
patrols (Garland, 2001; Hirschfield, 2008; Kupchik & Monahan, 2006). Of course more
affluent families and communities can better afford these surveillance and security
technologies. It is only logical to deduce that parents living in more affluent areas possess
the social, political, and economic capital to pressure local and state legislatures to either
provide funding, or seek federal funding, that is necessary to build and install security
programs and technologies in suburban schools, which are predominantly in low-crime
areas. For example, the Safe Schools Act makes it clear that schools must build up
community support for school security programs (Simon, 2007). Indeed, even the
selection criteria governing funding unmistakably favors repeated financial awards to
schools that are able to garner the highest levels of participation from parents and
community residents for funded projects and activities focused on school crime and
safety (Simon, 2007).
Thus, the implementation of security technologies is not only influenced by racial
issues but also class-based dynamics. It can be assumed that parents living in
impoverished, crime-stricken communities are less likely to possess the social, political,
and economic capital to wield influence over funding for additional surveillance and
security technologies in local schools. Those parents living in poor neighborhoods, with
such capital, will more likely pursue funding for other resources (e.g., computers, books,
lab equipment, etc.) considering that inner-city schools are perhaps the most underfunded
for such resources (Hirschfield, 2008). Moreover, surveillance systems and security
technologies, like computers, function as “symbols of progress” and prestige because
they represent technological solutions to social problems (Kupchik & Monahan, 2006, p.
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626). Thus, suburban, white parents, who believe they are sending their children to
potentially dangerous schools, gain a sense of pride and control by pushing for
surveillance technologies to make their children’s schools safer and more prestigious
(Kupchik & Monahan, 2006; Simon, 2007).
Another factor affecting the presence of security and surveillance technologies in
white, suburban communities is that there is money to be made by private security
companies in these locales (Casella, 2003b). The widespread adoption of security
technologies in suburban schools may have to do with how these products are marketed
to more affluent audiences (Casella, 2003b; Hirschfield, 2008). The media-driven, moral
panic surrounding school violence primarily depicts school violence as an urban,
minority problem that threatens to spill over into white suburbia (Beale, 2006; Burns &
Crawford, 1999; Chiricos et al., 1997; Dorfman & Schiraldi, 1999; Soler, 2001). Thus,
the racial and social threat hypotheses may have relevance in how companies, selling
security technologies, are marketing their products and services to suburban communities
(Casella, 2003b). The racial and social threat hypotheses suggest that white racism and
white racialized fear of criminal victimization increases when it is perceived that African
American and/or Hispanic populations are expanding and spreading into predominantly
white communities (Welch, 2005, 2011). Thus, suburban parents may anticipate this
threat, which is often fueled by media coverage (Beale, 2006), and exercise the neoliberal
economic principles of self-discipline, consumer freedom, and individual productivity by
choosing to endorse the funding of softer, surveillance approaches to school control that
promise “greater order, efficiency and predictability in an increasingly complex, scary,
and fragmented social world” (Casella, 2003b; Hirschfield, 2008, p. 84; Staples, 2000). In
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accordance with the neoliberal educational agenda, Kupchik and Monahan (2006) argued
that exposure of both poor and middle class students to penal rituals through increased
surveillance and control helps to mold workers that “embody extreme flexible
compliance to the vicissitudes of the marketplace” and “submit willingly to scrutiny and
manipulation” (p. 627). Thus, the increasing introduction of surveillance and security
technologies into all schools may be necessary to fulfill the demands of the neoliberal
state.
These quantitative findings reveal support for the political economic dynamics
detailed in the theoretical framework. Recall that neoliberal policies and practices are
determined to return all responsibility to the individual, while severely reducing access to
social welfare provisions, such as public education (Harvey, 2005; Wacquant, 2009a,
2009b). Indeed, it is argued that the neoliberal restructuring of capitalism in the American
economy has exerted restrictions on the social programming that would otherwise seek to
redistribute resources more equitably (Wacquant, 2009a, 2009b). Of course, the
deregulation of the market, the privatization of state enterprises, and the reduction of the
welfare state allows for marginal populations, representing the surplus labor force and
underclass, to grow in numbers, especially among urban, minority youth (Harvey, 2005;
Kotz, 2003, 2008, 2009; Wacquant, 2009a, 2009b). The growing numbers of
impoverished, marginal populations creates a democratic threat to the elite who benefit
from the current existing class structure. Thus, these marginal populations are deemed in
need of coercive social control to subdue any collective action, including popular
democratic social and political movements, which these marginal populations may
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develop to overturn the neoliberal structure (Harvey, 2005; Wacquant, 2009a, 2009b).
After all, in a representative democracy, each person has a vote.
In regards to the neoliberal social controls applied in public school settings, the
current study’s findings reveal that removals without continued educational services are
predominantly utilized in schools where the majority of students are minorities and come
from areas with high levels of crime. Expulsion without any continued educational
provisions represents the neoliberal state’s retraction of social welfare. By denying
students alternative educational services, in addition to expulsion, the neoliberal state
increases the likelihood that these students will dropout and possibly penetrate the
juvenile and/or criminal justice systems (Bullara, 1993; Felice, 1981; Fenning & Rose,
2007; Fuentes, 2003; Giroux, 2003; Gordon et al., 2000; Hall & Karanxha, 2012;
Hanson, 2005; Hirschfield, 2008; Pettit & Western, 2004; Sheley, 2000). Thus, by
sending students, representing marginal populations, down the school-to-prison pipeline,
state actors increase the likelihood that these youth will be disenfranchised, due to
confinement, and that they will be denied opportunities to receive an education whereby
they might develop the critical thinking skills necessary to question the fairness of
existing class structure and organize for social change (Fenning & Rose, 2007; Giroux,
2003; Hanson, 2005; Hirschfield, 2008; Kim et al., 2010; Skiba & Knesting, 2001; Skiba
et al., 2003; Stader, 2006). Such outcomes are optimal to the powerful, who benefit from
the structure of the neoliberal state, because these exclusionary practices promote a
“docile citizenry,” while also benefiting the vested capitalist interests in the prison
industrial complex (Hirschfield, 2008; Hirschfield & Celinska, 2011, p.7; Lynch, 2007,
2010). These political economic motivations are easily disguised by using rhetoric that
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focuses blame on the individual student for disruptive or violent behavior, rather than the
structural, racial, and social inequalities made worse by the neoliberal restructuring of the
U.S. economy (Harvey, 2005).
Policy Implications
The previous empirical research has revealed that zero-tolerance policies are not
succeeding in providing safer schools (APA Zero Tolerance Task Force, 2008;
Boccanfuso & Kuhfeld, 2011; Skiba & Knesting, 2001). In fact, recent research has also
revealed that higher rates of suspensions and expulsions are associated with worsening
school environments, increasing dropout rates, and poor school-wide academic
achievement (APA Zero Tolerance Task Force, 2008; Boccanfuso & Kuhfeld, 2011;
Skiba & Rausch, 2006). The current study found that total disciplinary actions and
removals without continued educational services are applied significantly more to schools
with the highest percentage of minorities compared to schools with the lowest
percentages of minorities, and that this trend is steady or increasing over time. This
finding builds upon prior research that also found that exclusionary zero-tolerance
policies are disproportionately applied to minority students, especially African Americans
(Fenning & Rose, 2007; Lawrence, 2007; Reyes, 2006; Skiba & Knesting, 2001; Skiba et
al., 2002; Sughrue, 2003).
In addition, this study’s qualitative investigation has found that the courts serve
the role of legitimizing neoliberal social controls in schools through judicial decisions
that rule in favor of the application of zero-tolerance policies by deciding that the
schools’ interest in maintaining an orderly learning environment, free from disruption,
outweighs the constitutional rights of students. Such an environment is desired in order
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for the pedagogical message of the larger neoliberal agenda to shape students for the
flexible, service-oriented workforce that awaits them. By providing legitimacy to this
process, the courts make it possible for zero-tolerance policies to flourish. Thus, the
precedent created from the majority of the legal decisions evaluated suggests that the
constitutional rights of students are weakened by neoliberal social control efforts (i.e.,
zero-tolerance policies) and that the courts have empowered school officials with greater
discretionary authority to employ, even preemptively, exclusionary disciplinary
punishments without fear of liability if such actions actually violate the rights of students.
Given the findings of this study, as well as prior research, it can be argued that
school-based zero tolerance policies are not effective in creating safer schools. Instead,
zero-tolerance policies act as social control mechanisms of the neoliberal state that seek
to target marginalized populations (especially minorities and the poor) for exclusion and
subsequent confinement in order to manipulate the future labor force for the needs of the
neoliberal economy. With these conclusions in mind, viable alternatives to zero-tolerance
policies should be considered for adoption by schools and local and state legislatures.
In contrast to the ineffectiveness of zero-tolerance policies, as exhibited by
previous empirical findings, several experimental and quasi-experimental program
evaluations have identified numerous non-punitive approaches to school discipline,
which have proved to have positive influences on student behavior and academic
performance without severely punishing students for disruptive behavior by excluding
them from attending school (Boccanfuso & Kuhfeld, 2011; Greene, 2005). These
effective, evidence-based programs will now be summarily described.
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Peer-Led Programs. Peer-led programs enlist student involvement in order to
ensure and promote interventions that are in sync with student culture and foster student
responsibility for violence prevention initiatives (Greene, 2005). Kenney and Watson’s
(1998) “student problem solving” approach has shown promise. In this approach,
students take part in the development, implementation, and assessment of circumscribed
programs or strategies based on their acknowledgment and perception of school problems
(Greene, 2005; Kenney & Watson, 1998). For example, students worked with school
officials to increase the availability of preferred foods and reduce lunch lines, and
reduced fights in the cafeteria (Greene, 2005; Kenney & Watson, 1998). Thus, these
programs empower students with a voice to participate in developing ways to prevent
violence or disruption in schools.
Restorative Justice Programs. Restorative justice is a form of mediated
reconciliation, whereby a process of conflict resolution is established by engaging all
injured parties in discussion and negotiation (Karp, Sweet, Kirshenbaum, & Bazemore,
2004; Van Ness & Heetderks Strong, 2007; Zehr & Toews, 2004). Restorative justice
programs seek to repair the harm done and address the reasons for the offense, while also
promoting reconciliatory sanctions that are salubrious for the victim(s), offender(s), and
other involved parties (Zehr, 2002). Some effective restorative justice programs include:
(1) community conference models, (2) victim offender conferences (VOC), and (34)
family group conferences (FGC). Several studies revealed that juveniles who successfully
complete a family group conference are less likely to reoffend in a 2 year follow-up when
compared to the control group (McGarrell, 2001; McGarrell & Hipple, 2007; McGarrell,
Olivares, Crawford, & Kroovand, 2000; Rodriguez, 2005). Indeed, after New Zealand
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revolutionized its juvenile justice system in 1989 to use restorative justice mediation
programming, especially FGC, as the primary response to juvenile delinquency and
crime, there has been a two-thirds decline in juvenile offending (Mulligan, 2009; Zehr,
2002).
Given these findings, restorative justice programs are well-suited for addressing
school-based infractions and crimes committed by students (Zehr, 2002). In response to
the stigmatizing, exclusionary, and harmful effects of school-based zero-tolerance
policies, restorative justice promotes reparative solutions that attempt to prevent the
youthful transgressor from feeling “alienated, more damaged, disrespected,
disempowered, less safe and less cooperative with society” (Arrigo et al., 2011; Braswell,
Fuller, & Lozoff, 2001, p. 142; Sellers & Arrigo, 2009). Restorative justice approaches
seek to prevent negative outcomes for juveniles by giving offender(s), victim(s),
mediator(s), and the broader community a voice in a dialogue and negotiation that
determines reparative resolutions that heal harm and do not retributively exclude (Arrigo
et al., 2011; Karp et al., 2004; Sellers & Arrigo, 2009). In accordance with these aims,
restorative justice presents the community, and society at large, the opportunity to correct
underlying causes of youthful violence and criminality (Arrigo, et al., 2011; Van Ness &
Heetdirks Strong, 2007). Thus, the reparative efforts could and should be social,
economic, and environmental in nature (Arrigo et al., 2011; Tifft & Sullivan, 2005).
Psychosocial and Psychoeducational Programs. These programs provide
teaching, counseling, coaching, and training to students in order to enhance their conflict
resolution strategies and interpersonal skills (Greene, 2005). One particularly successful
program, in this category, is the Promoting Alternative Thinking Strategies (PATHS)
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program, which is curriculum-based and promotes self-control, emotional understanding,
positive self-esteem, prosocial relationship building, and interpersonal problem solving
(Greenberg, Kusche, & Mihalic, 1998; Greene, 2005). Evaluative studies of PATHS
found statistically significant improvements in students’ prosocial problem-solving
strategies and lower levels of aggressive behavior (Greenberg et al., 1998; Greene, 2005).
These programs utilize a cognitive-behavioral approach that acknowledges
developmental challenges of students and provides positive feedback rather than label
such students as disruptive and problematic, while seeking to remove them via zerotolerance, because of the threat of disorder they potentially present to the school
environment (Greene, 2005).
Character Education and Social-Emotional Learning Programs. These programs
attempt to cultivate student’s character by teaching them skills to recognize and manage
their emotions, aspire to achieve positive goals, exhibit caring and concern for others,
maintain positive relationships, and make responsible decisions (Boccanfuso & Kuhfeld,
2011). The results from rigorous evaluative studies of character education and sociallearning programs have found that these programs have a significant positive influence
on building social and emotional skills, adjusting problematic behavior, reducing
aggressive behavior, and improving academic achievement (Berkowitz & Bier, 2005;
Durlak & Weissberg, 2007; Payton et al., 2008). The What Works Clearinghouse, an
initiative of the U.S. Department of Education’s Institute of Education Sciences, has
identified six of these programs that have shown positive effects on adolescent behavior.
They include the following: (1) Positive Action, (2) Connect with Kids, (3) Caring
School Community, (4) Skills for Adolescence, (5) Too Good for Drugs, and (6) Too
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Good for Violence (Boccanfuso & Kuhfeld, 2011). These programs promote prosocial
character development, while utilizing an ethic of care that teaches students cooperation
rather than competition (Boccanfuso & Kuhfeld, 2011). In addition, these programs
reengage teachers in interactive teaching strategies, including mentoring, role-playing
exercises, and group discussion that allow teachers to better understand the needs of their
students (Boccanfuso & Kuhfeld, 2011).
Targeted Behavioral Supports for At-Risk Students. These programs provide
targeted, rigorously evaluated behavioral supports for at-risk students exhibiting known
risk factors (Boccanfuso & Kuhfeld, 2011). In these programs, there is typically a
program leader who instructs students in daily or weekly exercises to develop social
skills and help the students learn to listen, manage anger, resolve conflicts, and cope with
stress (Boccanfuso & Kuhfeld, 2011). Randomized controlled trial or quasi-experimental
program evaluations have shown that these programs significantly improve the behavior
of at-risk students (Boccanfuso & Kuhfeld, 2011). For example, experimental evaluations
found that students who completed the Reconnecting Youth program had lower rates of
alcohol consumption, drug use, aggressive tendencies, and school dropout rates compared
to students who did not participate (Eggert, Thompson, Herting, & Nicholas, 1995;
Eggert, Thompson, Herting, Nicholas, & Dickers, 1994). Likewise, an experimental
evaluation of the Cognitive-Behavioral Training Program for Behaviorally Disordered
Adolescents program found that students assigned to the program displayed increased
self-control and a decreased level of aggressive behavior compared to the control group
(Etscheidt, 1991). These programs look beyond the behavior of disruptive students and
acknowledge risk factors that may extend into the students’ homes and the surrounding
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community (Boccanfuso & Kuhfeld, 2011). Indeed, these programs often involve family
members in an effort to better understand the sources of a student’s negative or disruptive
behavior (Boccanfuso & Kuhfeld, 2011).
School-Wide Positive Behavioral Interventions and Supports (SWPBIS). This
prevention program is a multi-tiered approach to school discipline, which includes the
following three tiers: (1) defining and teaching behavioral expectations, rewarding
positive behavior, providing a continuum of possible consequences for problem
behaviors, and collecting data for decision making purposes; (2) providing targeted
interventions to at-risk students displaying early signs of behavior problems; and (3)
implementing more intensive, individualized interventions for students with serious
behavioral problems, which typically involve family or community members
(Boccanfuso & Kuhfeld, 2011). Two experimental evaluations of the PeaceBuilders
program found that students who completed the program exhibited increased social skills
and peaceful behavior and decreased levels of aggressive behavior (Flannery et al., 2003;
Vazsonyi, Belliston, Flannery, 2004).
Programs that are geared toward school climate-oriented strategies promote a
“communal” orientation and an “ethos of caring” consistent with the traditional roles
schools performed prior to neoliberal restructuring (Greene, 2005, p.244). This
programming also strives to establish trust and connectedness among students, teachers,
parents, and administrators (Barrios et al., 2001; Fein et al., 2002; Greene, 2005; Resnick
et al., 1997). Thus, these goals are in stark contrast to the aims of zero-tolerance policies,
which tend to foster teacher disengagement and erode students’ trust (Brotherton, 1996;
Hirschfield & Celinska, 2011; Kupchik, 2010).
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While all of these evidence-based programs may require additional staffing and
financial resources, their non-punitive and preventative approaches show great promise in
correcting the behavioral and emotional problems of disruptive students without
excluding them from the educational process all together (Boccanfuso & Kuhfeld, 2011).
In addition, the long-term costs that could be saved by preventing more children from
entering the school-to-prison-pipeline by replacing zero-tolerance, deterrence-based
punishments with some combination of these strategies could be substantially larger than
it would cost to implement them. Of course, such changes would require popular public
support to pressure policy makers to adopt these initiatives and abandon zero-tolerance
policies. Such a task will not be easily fought or easily won, especially given the political,
organizational, and structural barriers currently impeding any changes to the existing
school criminalization efforts; however, political economic systems can evolve to meet
the demands of an informed and engaged citizenry.
Limitations and Avenues for Future Research
There are limitations to the present study, which need to be addressed in order to
inform future research. First of all, the qualitative inquiry was limited to a textual and
discourse analysis that derived jurisprudential intent from the plain meaning decisions
expressed in the court cases, and then subjected the extracted jurisprudential intent to a
second level of analysis whereby the legal language conveyed was categorized into
emergent themes reflective of the applied neoliberal theoretical framework, which made
apparent the political economic philosophy encoded in the case law. This qualitative
investigation has laid the groundwork on which numerous potential future studies may
build. In fact, the legal language identified in the themes can serve as the basis for a
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codebook to be developed in which a quantitative content analysis can be conducted for
both the current dataset and potentially other case law datasets deemed relevant to test the
neoliberal theoretical framework advanced in this study.
In addition, the language of the jurisprudential intent can also be used to generate
survey questions that attempt to measure the five neoliberal thematic constructs. The
questions developed by use of the language conveyed in the judicial decision making can
then be used to create scenarios, or vignettes, in a questionnaire to actually survey judges.
For example, a vignette, depicting the disciplining of a student for a zero-tolerance
infraction at school, could be manipulated in various factorial designs to ask judges how
they would decide in such cases. Follow-up questions could discern why the judge ruled
in such a manner. Additionally, follow-up questions could ask if he or she felt the school
administrators were entitled to qualified immunity or if he or she believed that the
school’s interests in maintaining an orderly and disciplined school environment
outweighed the individual rights of the student in the scenario. Of course, any
questionnaires will need to be piloted to evaluate reliability and validity of measures.
These questionnaires could also be modified and applied to school administrators,
parents, students, and the public more generally to better understand if attitudes toward
zero-tolerance policies in schools are changing. Moreover, surveys of these various
groups may also ask questions regarding the appropriateness of and preference for
alternative, non-punitive program instead of zero-tolerance punishments. There is vast
opportunity for new research questions and hypotheses to be developed from this line of
research.
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Next, there were many limitations to the quantitative analyses. First of all, the
available SSOCS datasets were restricted in the variables made accessible for analyses.
As such, the bivariate quantitative analyses conducted in this study were primarily
descriptive and exploratory in nature. There are key restricted variables that the
researcher would need to petition for, and even purchase the rights for the use of, in order
to engage in more sophisticated modeling. One such variable is the percentage of students
on free or reduced lunch. This variable is typically used as a proxy for social class. By
obtaining unrestricted access to the three waves of SSOCS data, the researcher could
construct indexes to better measure the socioeconomic makeup of the schools.
Another limitation, which has implications for the generalizability of the findings
in this case, is that the variable measuring percentage of minority students is not mutually
exclusive in how it is measured and it does not allow the researcher to decipher the exact
percentages of various races or ethnicities (e.g., African American, Caucasian, Asian,
American Indian, Hispanic etc.) making up those overall percentages. In order to
understand the breakdown of the racial makeup of the schools surveyed, it may require
that the schools, which were given anonymous numerical identifiers, be identified so that
census tract data can be utilized to drill down and ascertain data by racial and ethnic
groups for those schools. Other census tract data could also be used to gather information
about the social class divisions in these schools. Funding from a grant may be necessary
to accomplish these tasks.
If the unrestricted datasets can be secured and tied to census tract data, then
several multivariate analyses may be conducted. For example, structural equation models
(SEM) could be created to determine if school disciplinary policies have differing
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impacts on schools with certain social class and racial makeups. Furthermore, SEM
models could address what affect these policies have on reducing various types of school
infractions and crimes. As for assessing trends over time, the unrestricted data may allow
researchers to conduct latent class growth analysis and growth mixture modeling. This
more sophisticated modeling may aid researchers in determining longitudinal change in
how zero-tolerance policies and practices are used over time.
The findings from the suggested future research may potentially provide a body of
empirical evidence to pressure lawmakers for removal of zero-tolerance policies in
schools, as well as other social institutions and contexts. Moreover, future quantitative
research is required to further test the applicability of the neoliberal theoretical
framework advanced in this study. Indeed, subsequent studies may not only build upon
the theoretical framework, but also improve it.
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Appendix B: Court Case Synopses
Safford Unified Sch. Dist. #1 v. Redding (2009)
[This case is about the constitutionality of the strip search of a 13-year-old middle school
student who was accused of possessing over-the-counter ibuprofen pills. While the search
was deemed a violation of her Fourth Amendment rights, school officials received
qualified immunity.]
K.M. v. School Board of Lee County Florida (2005)
[This case is about a troubled student, suspected of having a diability, who made a threat
of violence toward a teacher and was suspended and removed to an alternate school as a
result. He was denied an IDEA due process hearing because he was not properly
diagnosed as disabled; however, parents argue the school deliberately withheld his
records to prevent such a diagnoses and the proper hearing he deserved. Court dismiss the
parent’s claims and upheld the district court’s decision.]
S.G. v. Sayreville Bd. of Educ. (2003)
[In this case, a 5-year-old was suspended after saying “I’m going to shoot you,” while
playing cops and robbers on the school playground. The court decided in favor of the
school’s zero tolerance policy because the threat of violence outweighed the student’s
First Amendment rights. The school officials were granted qualified immunity.]
Cuesta v. Sch. Bd. (2002)
[In this case, a student, who distributed a pamphlet at school that contained poems,
cartoons, and essays depicting racial, sexual, and violent activity, was referred to police,
arrested, and strip searched pursuant to arrest. The court found school officials immune
from liability and the search constitutional.]
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Ratner v. Loudoun County Pub. Sch. (2001)
[In this case, a 13-year-old found out that his friend had been suicidal and that she had
inadvertently brought a knife to school in her binder. He took the binder from her and put
it in his locker. School officials learned of the knife and suspended for violating a zero
tolerance policy. The court ruled in favor of the school regardless of Ratner’s intentions
to help his suicidal friend.]
Seal v. Morgan (2000)
[In this case, a high school student was found with a knife in the glove compartment of
his car while on campus. He was subsequently expelled for violating the school’s zero
tolerance policy. He did not know that the knife was in his car. The court ruled that by
not taking into account the student’s state of mind, or intent, the district court mistakenly
affirmed the School Board’s motion for summary judgment; however, the court granted
immunity to school officials.]
West v. Derby Unified Sch. Dist. No. 260 (2000)
[In this case, a seventh grade student was suspended for drawing a confederate flag on a
piece of paper during math class. The court upheld to district court’s decision, which
found that the suspension did not violate his First Amendment rights because the image
could have caused substantial disruption in the school.]
Piekosz-Murphy v. Bd. of Educ. of Cmty. High Sch. Dist. No. 230 (2012)
[In this case, a 17-year-old student, who was an athlete, attended a party where alcohol
was being consumed by minors. He did not participate in the drinking; however, his
presence at the party and failure to report the party violated the school code of conduct
and he was suspended from participating in any extracurricular and co-curricular
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activities. The court dismissed his claim as without merit and upheld the school’s
disciplinary actions.]
Ottaviano v. Kings Park Cent. Sch. Dist. (2010)
[In this case, a high school senior admitted to providing another student with alcohol,
which was subsequently taken to a school function. As a result, she was suspended from
participating in any extracurricular activities for a year in accordance with the school’s
zero tolerance policy. The court upheld the school’s decision and denied the student’s
claims.]
Evans v. Bd. of Educ. Southwestern City Sch. Dist. (2010)
[In this case, two 12-year-old girls claimed of being sexually harassed and physically
assaulted on several occassions by a male student on the bus. One day a teacher saw one
of the girls crying in the lunch room. When asked what was wrong, the girl told the
teacher that the boy, who had been harassing her, forced her to perform felacio on him
while on the bus. Both the girl and the boy were suspended for consensual sexual
activities that disrupted school. The court found the school district was not culpable for
the emotional distress the girl endured; however, the court found that Principal Smathers
was not entitled to summary judgment for some of the plaintiffs claims and his motion
for summary judgment was denied.]
Cuff v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist. (2010)
[In this case, a 10-year-old wrote violent themes on his astronaut drawing in class. He
was suspended because of the potential threat the drawing posed the school’s. The court
upheld the school’s decision to discipline the student and found no violation of his First
Amendment rights.]
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Lee v. Lenape Valley Reg’l Bd. of Educ. (2009)
[In this case, a 14-year-old, bi-racial boy transferred to Newton High School where he
was repeatedly harassed and called derogatory names. One day, E.L. was called a
“nigger” by another student, and when the incident escalated the boys began fighting.
Both students were suspended. After the incident, school officials called E.L.’s parents to
meet with them. The school stated that they did not know what to do for E.L. and that he
would need to be home instructed until an out of district placement could be found. The
court found in favor of the student plaintiff because of evidence suggesting the school
failed to follow their anti-discrimination policies and denied the defendant school
officials their motion for summary judgment.]
Hardie v. Churchill County Sch. Dist. (2009)
[In this case, a pocket knife was found on the floor of the bus that was taking the high
school students on a field trip. Hardie recognized that the knife was probably his and told
the bus driver so. As a result, Hardie was expelled. The court upheld the school officials
decision.]
Doran v. Contoocook Valley Sch. Dist. (2009)
[In this case, students were told to leave their belonging in the classrooms as they were
all escorted to the football field and kept there for 90 minutes, so police dogs could sniff
their belonging. Students’ parents filed federal and state claims against the school for
violating the childrens’ Fourth Amendment rights. The court dismissed the federal claims
finding no violation of the Fourth Amendment; however, the court remanded the state
claims to state court for resolution.]
Brett N. v. Cmty Unit Sch. Dist. No. 303 (2009)
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[In this case, a high school student was physically attacked by another student and he
fought back in self-defense. The student who fought in self-defense was suspended. The
court upheld the suspension citing that maintaining a peaceful and orderly school
environment was a legitimate government interest that outweighed the student’s right to
defend himself.]
Barnett v. Tipton County Bd. of Educ. (2009)
[In this case, two high school students created a fake MySpace profile that parodied
Assistant Principal LeFlore and made sexually suggestive comments about female
students. Barnett was sent to an alternative school and Black received an in-school
suspension. The court upheld the school’s disciplinary action, because website created a
disruption at school that outweighed the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of the
students.]
Griffin v. Crossett Sch. Dist., Inc. (2008)
[In this case, a 14-year-old, African American special needs student (Willie) brought a
handgun to school and gave it to another student. During the same school year, a 9-yearold Caucasian boy (Jacob), who was also a special needs student brought a gun to school.
Both students received a Section 504 Evaluation and Manifestation Determination
Conference to decide if their disabilities impaired their ability to understand the impact
and consequences of their behavior. While Willie’s committee found that his disability
did not affect his understanding of his behavior, Jacob’s committee found that his
disability did impair is ability to understand the impact of his behavior. Thus, Willie was
expelled and Jacob only received a 10 day suspension. The court upheld the school’s
decisions and found that there was no case of discrimination and that the 504 committees
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were not biased in their punishment of these students, who the plaintiffs argue are
similarly situated.]
Hill v. Sharber (2008)
[In this case, the Sheriff’s Department conducted a sweep of the parking lots at Franklin
High School with drug sniffing dogs. The drug sniffing dog alerted to the possibility that
there might be drugs in Ky Hill’s (student at FHS) car. Hill was removed from class,
informed of the positive alert, given his Miranda rights, and asked if he had drugs in the
car. Hill was handcuffed while the car was searched, and the deputies found beer in the
car. The Manifestation Meeting found that Hill’s behavior was not due to his disability.
In accordance with the schools zero tolerance policy, Hill was placed in an alternative
school and banned from participating in extracurricular activities. The court upheld the
search and the disciplinary actions taken against Hill.]
Simonian v. Fowler Unified Sch. Dist. (2008)
[In this case, a high school student was called to his vehicle because a drug sniffing dog
showed interest in his car. Jonathan gave consent for his car to be search and a pin-head
size piece of marijuana was found. As a result, Jonathan was expelled for the suspicion of
possessing marijuana. The court upheld his expulsion and assignment to an alternative
school setting.]
Morgan v. Snider High Sch. (2007)
[In this case, a high school student drove two classmates to the homecoming dance at
Snider High School. While Kevin was approaching the parking lot on the school campus,
he noticed that one of the students in the car had a “bowl” and asked Kevin for
permission to smoke marijuana in the car. Kevin refused, pulled on to the school’s
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property, and promptly had the passenger exit his car. At the dance, the Assistant
Principal detected the odor of marijuana on the boy who rode with Kevin. The boy
informed the school officials that Kevin had driven him to the dance. Kevin’s consented
to a search of his car and a marijuana seed and “siftings” were found in the back seat.
Kevin was suspended from participating in any extracurricular activities for a year. The
court upheld the school’s disciplinary action.]
Roy v. Fulton County Sch. Dist. (2007)
[In this case, a high school student’s MP3 player was stolen from his locker. The school
officials question J.B., a white male, about the stolen electronics and J.B. told them that
he and Mark (a black male) stole the MP3 player from another student’s locker and sold
it. Mark was questioned about the theft and denied any involvement. Assistant Principal
Groves decided to search Mark’s locker and found a dead cell phone. Mark later provided
a statement that a friend gave him a MP3 player and asked him to sell it; however, he
claimed he did not steal it and did not know it was stolen. Mark was suspended as a
result. The court found the search to be constitutional and not a violation of the Fourth
Amendment; however, the court found Mark’s allegations of the violation of his equal
protection rights to be sufficient and denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss Mark’s
equal protection claim.]
Bogle-Assegai v. Bloomfield Bd. of Educ. (2006)
[In this case, a high school girl pushed another high school boy and put him in a
headlock. The boy did not fight back. The girl, as the sole aggressor, was charged with
breach of the peace and assault and she was arrested. In addition, she was suspended and
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later expelled. The court upheld the school’s disciplinary action and found no violation of
her due process or equal protection rights.]
Langley v. Monroe County Sch. Dist. (2006)
[In this case, a high school girl (Laura)car did not start and she was forced to drive her
mother’s car to school instead. The Assistant Principal, Chad O’Brian, went to check
parking decals in the parking lot and noticed that Laurs’s car did not have one. He looked
inside the call and saw an open beer can. Laura denied having any knowledge of the beer
and surmised that it had to belong to her mother since it was her mother’s car. She was
suspended and later placed in an alternative school. The court ruled that there was enough
evidence to present to a jury as to the mental anxiety and stress suffered by Laura as well
as her substantive due process claims.]
Vann v. Stewart (2006)
[In this case, a student (Austin) was found in possession of a small pocketknife while at
school. He was suspended for one calendar year in accordance with the school’s zero
tolerance policy. The court upheld the school’s disciplinary actions and dismissed the
student’s claims.]
McKinley v. Lott (2005)
[In this case, a teacher asked the student resource officer to escort a 16-year-old boy to
the principal’s office because he smelled heavily of marijuana. When the principal asked
the student if he had been smoking marijuana, the student replied yes but was under the
impression that the principal was asking if he had ever smoke marijuana before and not
on that particular day. The youth was arrested and transported to juvenile hall. Criminal
charges were eventually dropped; however, the student was transferred to an alternative
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school as a punishment. The court upheld the school’s disciplinary actions and dismissed
the student’s claims.]
Posthumus v. Bd. of Educ. (2005)
[In this case, a school official took graham crackers from a student prior to an assembly.
The student challenged the official and called him a vulgar name. He was suspended for
10 days. The court upheld the school’s disciplinary action, dismissed the student’s First
Amendment rights claims, and found that he did not have a fundamental right to attend
school.]
Collins v. Prince William County Pub. Schs. (2004)
[In this case, a high school student (Jeremy) replicated a science experiment where toilet
bowl cleaner and aluminum foil were placed inside soda bottles to create bottle bombs.
He and his friends detonated these bottle bombs in several locations in the local
neighborhoods, including near local schools. The high school expelled Jeremy even
though the acts were committed off-campus. The court upheld the school’s disciplinary
action and dismissed his constitutional protection claims.]
Sypniewski v. Warren Hills Reg’l Bd. of Educ. (2001)
[In this case, a high school student wore a Jeff Foxworthy t-shirt which displayed the
term “Redneck” and other language that the school officials felt violated the dress code
and the policy regarding racial harassment and intimidation. The student was suspended
for insubordination because he violated the above mentioned policies. The court upheld
the school’s disciplinary action under the Tinker substantial disruption standard;
however, the court also ruled that the dress code and policy were overbroad and
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constitutionally vague and as such, a case for irreparable injury for the student could be
made.]
Anderson v. Milbank Sch. Dist. (2000)
[In this case, the student’s mother worked as a cook for the school and left a note for her
in the principal’s office instructing her to take the bus home on that day. The student
muttered to herself, “Shit.” The principal’s secretary heard her and reported her foul
statement to the principal. The student received in-school suspension and a reduction in
her grades for the class work she missed. The court upheld the school’s disciplinary
action and dismissed the student’s First Amendment rights claims.]
D.G. v. Independent Sch. Dist. No. 11 (2000)
[In this case, an 11th grade student wrote a poem about her teacher expressing her
frustration about being in her class. The poem was later found and she was suspended.
The court found in favor of the student and held that once the administration gathered all
the relevant facts, and the context of the poem was revealed, there was no basis to believe
it was a threat. Thus, her poem was protected under the First Amendment and a
preliminary injunction was granted.]
Hammock ex rel. Hammock v. Keys (2000)
[In this case, Virginia Hammock, a high school senior, was made aware that a drug sniff
dog gave interest to her car. After a search of her vehicle, marijuana fragments were
found in her vehicle, which was parked on school property. She was immediately
suspended and subsequently expelled. The court upheld the school’s disciplinary action
and dismissed the student’s motion for a preliminary injunction.]
Colvin ex rel. Colvin v. Lowndes County (2000)
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[In this case, a 6th grade student (Jonathan), who had learning disabilities and handicaps
was found with Swiss Army knife at school. The disciplinary hearing officer suspended
him for a day, but the school board overruled the hearing officer’s recommendation and
approved his expulsion from school. The court found in favor of the student and
remanded the case with instructions to the defendant school board to reconsider the
appropriate penalty.]
James P. v. Lemahieu (2000)
[In this case, a high school student (Robert) was suspended for drinking alcohol at his
home before he attended the senior luau. The court found in favor of the student because
there was no evidence that Robert possessed the alcohol while at the luau. Robert was
granted injuctive relief and the disciplinary action was expunged from his record.]
Fuller v. Decatur Pub. Sch. Bd. of Educ. Sch. Dist. 61 (2000)
[In this case, six high school students were expelled for two years because they were
involved in a violent fight, which was deemed gang-like activity, in the stands at a high
school football game. The court upheld the school’s disciplinary action and dismissed the
students’ claims.]
Doe by & Through Doe v. Board of Educ. (1995)
[In this case, a 13-year-old, learning disabled high school student was allegedly found in
possession of a pipe and a small amount of marijuana. He was suspended and
subsequently expelled. The court upheld the school’s disciplinary action and dismissed
the student’s due process claims.]
Jordan by Edwards v. O’Fallon Twp. High Sch. Dist. No. 203 Bd. of Educ. (1999)
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[In this case, a high school student suspended from participation in interscholastic
athletics as punishment for violating the school’s zero-tolerance policy, which prohibited
the student from being in an inebriated state at school. The court upheld the school’s
disciplinary action and found that the student had no constitutionally protected interest in
taking part in athletics even though he may have received an athletic scholarship.]
Northwestern Sch. Corp. v. Linke (2002)
[In this case, two students in the Northwestern School Corporation argued that the
school’s random drug testing violated their Fourth Amendment rights. The court upheld
the school’s testing program and ruled that the immediate governmental concerns at issue
for safety outweighed students’ privacy rights.]
In re L.A. (2001)
[In this case, the Assistant Vice Principal Herrington, at Campus High School, received a
tip from the school Crime Stoppers organizer that a 16-year-old boy (L.A.) had marijuana
in the headband of his baseball cap. Herrington and a school security guard searched L.A.
and found marijuana and Valium on his person. L.A. was referred to law enforcement
and he was adjudicated as a juvenile offender and received out-of-home placement for 90
days. The court upheld the adjudications and found no violation of L.A.’s Fourth
Amendment rights.]
Commonwealth v. Lawrence L. (2003)
[In this case, the Vice Principal at Breed Middle School received a tip that there was
going to be a problem among the student who wore blue bandanas after school. He went
around talking to these students and one of them smelled like marijuana. He searched the
student and found a folded piece of paper containing marijuana. The student was referred
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to police, put in custody, and charged with two counts of marijuana possession. The court
found the search to not be a violation of the student’s Fourth Amendment rights, and the
student’s motion to suppress the evidence was denied.]
Covington County v. G.W. (2000)
[In this case, a teacher sent a note to Assistant Principal Thames, which informed him
that a 17-year-old (G.W.) was drinking beer in the school parking lot. Thames and a
school security guard went to G.W.’s truck and found empty beer cans in his truck bed.
The principal requested G.W. open his vehicle and allow the officer to search his truck.
They found more beer in a locked toolbox inside the truck. G.W. was immediately
suspended and subsequently expelled. At a chancery court hearing, the chancellor
overturned the school’s disciplinary action. The school district appealed, and the court
upheld the disciplinary action and overturned the chancellor’s ruling.]
Hinds County Sch. Dist. Bd. of Trs. v. R.B. (2007)
[In this case, Principal Campbell was informed that one of the middle school students at
Byram was selling drugs. He approached R.B. and searched his backpack. The search
revealed that R.B. had a nail file device. Expulsion was recommended and the chancery
court overturned the school district’s disciplinary action because it relied solely on a
photocopy of the item that was being called a knife by school officials. The appellate
court ruled that the decision by the school district was arbitrary and capricious and not
supported by substantial evidence.]
State v. Best (2010)
[In this case, Assistant Principal Brandt received a report that a was suspected of being
under the influence of drugs. This student told Brandt that another 18-year-old student
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(Thomas) gave him the pill. Thomas Best denied any involvement, but Brandt’s search of
Thomas turned up 3 white pills in his pants. Brandt searched his car too and found
various drug-like substances and paraphernalia. Thomas was arrested and criminally
charged. The court upheld the search by Brandt and dismissed Thomas’ Fourth
Amendment claims.]
In re K.K. (2011)
[In this case, a high school principal received a tip from a police officer that a student
(K.K.) might be dealing in heroin. The principal decided to search K.K.’s pants pockets
and book bag, which revealed he did have drugs on his person. K.K. was referred to
juvenile court and charged with two counts of delinquency. The court upheld the search,
which was in accordance with the school’s zero tolerance policy and dismissed the
student’s Fourth Amendment claims.]
In the Interest of F.B. (1999)
[In this case, a high school student went through a point of entry search upon entering
school and a Swiss Army knife was found on his person. He was arrested and adjudicated
as a delinquent in juvenile court. The court upheld the adjudication and dismissed the
student’s Fourth Amendment claims.]
In re Hinterlong (2003)
[In this case, a high school senior (Hinterlong) was asked to allow Vice Principal Clark to
search his car because they had received a tip that he had either alcohol or drugs in his
vehicle. Hinterlong complied and the search yielded an open water bottle with a very
small amount of alcohol in it. Hinterlong claimed that he was set up, but the school
proceeded with expulsion. In municipal court, a jury acquitted Hinterlong and Hinterlong
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filed suit against the school and to identify the person who gave the false tip to school
officials. The appellate court found that the trial court abused its discretion in denying
Hinterlong’s motion to compel discovery. The appellate court directed the real parties in
interest to submit an in camera affidavit of the student informant and to order disclosure
of any information that the trial court deemed necessary to a fair determination of the
disputed facts.]
E.M. v. Briggs (1996)
[In this case, 3 middle school students were found in possession of marijuana while on
school. In accordance with the school’s zero tolerance policy, they were expelled. The
court upheld the school’s disciplinary actions and dismissed the students’ complaints.]
Cathe A. v. Doddridge County Bd. of Educ. (1997)
[In this case, a high school student was found on the school bus with two knifes. He was
suspended and subsequently expelled. The school offered to provide educational services
at the student’s home; however, the parents were requested to pay for these continued
services. The court upheld the disciplinary action of the school but found that the parents
should not be required to pay for an at-home instructional program that was offered in
lieu of regular school classes.]
J.M. v. Webster County Bd. of Educ. (2000)
[In this case, a 15-year-old, high school student (J.M.) misbehaved in class and was
suspended for 2 days. When his father found out about his suspension, he became
extremely upset at J.M. and told him that he was taking J.M. out of school and getting
him a job at the lumber yard. When they returned home, J.M. accidentally hit the truck
door on the family lawnmower. The father picked up an axe and threatened to kill J.M. if
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he had done damage to the truck. While his father was in the yard, J.M. secured all of his
father’s firearms by locking them in the gun cabinet and hiding the keys; however, J.M.
discovered that he forgot to lockup a revolver and ammunition left on top of the gun
cabinet. Not wanting his father to discover him with the gun, J.M. tucked in in his pants.
J.M.’s father took J.M. to the school to get the paperwork so he could get him a job at the
lumber yard, but everyone had already left for the day and only the football coach was
there. The coach found J.M.’s father to be extremely agitated and asked him to go cool
off for a while. When J.M. was alone with the coach he turned the revolver over to him to
hide it from his father because he feared for his life. The coach took it from him and
eventually turned it over to the principal. The principal suspended J.M. for a year and
placed him in an alternative school for bringing the gun on campus. The court upheld the
school’s disciplinary actions and dismissed the student’s case.]
Goss v. Lopez (1975)
[In this landmark 1975 case, high school student, who had been suspended for
misconduct for up to 10 days without a hearing brought a class action suit against the
school officials for violation of their due process rights. The Supreme Court ruled that the
students procedural due process rights were violated and the students’ protected liberty
interests in public education could not be taken away by suspension without the minimal
procedural safeguards of notice and an opportunity to be heard, flexibly applied in a
given situation.]
Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. Dist. (1969)
[In this landmark 1969 case, two high school students and one junior high school student
wore black armbands to their school to publicize their objection to the Vietnam War. The
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students were suspended as a result because it violated the school dress code policy. The
Supreme Court ruled that school officials’ actions violated the student’s First
Amendment rights and reversed the lower court’s decision to uphold the school’s
disciplinary actions.]
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier (1988)
[In this landmark 1988 case, a high school principal censored the publication of the
school newspaper because of the subject matter. The students brought action against the
school for violating their First Amendment rights. The court found that there was no
violation of the student’s First Amendment freedoms because public school is not the
same as other public places and that school administrators should be able to determine the
manner of speech appropriate for the school setting.]
New Jersey v. T.L.O. (1985)
[In this landmark 1985 case, a teacher found a 14-year-old freshman smoking cigarettes
in the restroom. The assistant vice principal searched the student’s purse and found
cigarettes and rolling papers, and after a more thorough search found marijuana in the
purse. The student was referred to juvenile court where she faced delinquency charges.
The state supreme court found the search unreasonable and reversed the lower court’s
decision. The Supreme Court deemed the search reasonable and not a violation of the
Fourth Amendment. As a result the evidence was found to be admissible.]
Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser (1986)
[In this landmark 1986 case, a high school student delivered a speech that used a sexually
explicit metaphor. The student was suspended as a result. The trial court and appellate
court found for the student with the ruling that the punishment violated his First
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Amendment rights. The Supreme Court overturned the lower courts’ rulings, upheld the
school’s disciplinary actions, and found no violation of the First Amendment.]
Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton (1995)
[In this landmark 1995 case, a seventh grade student and his parents refused to sign the
mandatory drug testing forms and the student was denied participation in football. The
parents filed suit for the violation of their son’s Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment
rights. The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court’s decision to reverse and remand
because the policy violated the student’s constitutional rights. The Supreme Court found
in favor of the school and ruled that students are not entitled to full Fourth Amendment
rights and have a decreased expectation of privacy.]
Binder v. Cold Spring Harbor Cent. Sch. Dist. (2010)
[ In this case, Assistant Principal Browne was informed that a student smelled of
marijuana. Browne asked the student (Binder) to empty his pockets and security guard
searched Binder’s backpack even though Binder refused. The search turned up marijuana
in his backpack. Binder was suspended and later filed suit against the school for violating
his Fourth Amendment rights. The court upheld the school’s disciplinary action and
dismiss the student’s claims.]
C.H. v. Folks (2010)
[In this case, a middle school student (C.H.) went into one of the bathroom stalls at
school and the school custodian allegedly observed C.H. marking the inside of the stall
door. The custodian was in the ceiling looking down on the stall. When C.H. exited the
bathroom, the custodian stopped C.H. and put his hands in C.H.’s pockets. C.H. was
arrested and charged with a felony, but the prosecutor declined to prosecute the case.
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C.H. brought suit against the school officials for sexual harassment and violation of his
Fourth Amendment rights. The court dismissed all of C.H.’s claims except one. The court
found that the pocket search and surveillance of C.H. in the restroom stall was a violation
of his Fourth Amendment rights.]
Beard v. Whitmore Lake Sch. Dist. (2005)
[In this case, a high school student in the second-hour gym class reported that her prom
money had been stolen during the class. The principal was absent, so the acting principal,
school teacher Charmaine Balsillie, was advised of the theft and she called the police.
Four school officials searched all of the student’s backpacks in the gym and locker
rooms. Two male teachers searched the 20 boys individually in the locker room shower
by making them lower their pants and underpants and removing their shirts. The boys
were not physically touched. Two female teachers searched 5 girls in the bathroom by
having them pull up their shirts and pull down their pants while standing in a circle. None
of the girls were touched. The money was never discovered. The students filed suit for
violation of their Fourth Amendment rights. The court found the search of the students to
be unreasonable because of the absence of individualized suspicion; however, the court
granted the school officials qualified immunity because the law at the time the searches
were conducted did not clearly establish that they were unreasonable under those
particular circumstances. The court reversed the lower court decision and granted
summary judgment in favor of the school officials.]
Sims v. Bracken County Sch. Dist. (2010)
[In this case, Kentucky State Police (KSP) conducted a random narcotics patrol of
Bracken County High School with drug-sniffing canines. One of the dogs returned a
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positive alert to one student’s jacket (Mercadez). The search of her jacket did not reveal
any drugs. On a separate occasion, Mercadez was questioned about unsubstantiated
reports that she was smoking marijuana on a school field trip. No marijuana was found;
however, Mercadez had allow boys into her hotel room, which violated school policy and
she received in-school suspension was stripped of her officer role in the Future Business
Leaders of America. Later, another drug patrol was conducted and this time the dogs
alerted to Mercadez’s brother’s (K.S.) locker. They found no drugs in his locker, but they
did find cigarette rolling papers and he was suspended for 5 days because of that. The
school conducted another patrol and this time K.S. was pulled from class and asked if he
had drugs in his car, which he denied. The police searched his car and uncovered a
chewed straw. They thoroughly searched his car and found nothing, but they construed
the straw to be drug paraphernalia. K.S. did admit that marijuana had been smoked in the
car by someone else a week prior. The KSP crime lab test found marijuana residue in the
car and K.S. was suspended and expulsion proceedings were started. Ms. Sims, the
mother of both Mercadez and K.S., filed claims that the discipline her children received
violated their constitutional rights. The court found in favor of the school officials and
dismissed the students’ case.]
Lausin v. Bishko (2010)
[In this case, a threatening message was found on the wall of the girl’s bathroom at
Richmond Heights High School. After reviewing the video tape outside of the bathroom,
school officials identified Gina Lausin as the primary suspect. Upon questioning, Gina
denied writing the message. Gina’s locker was searched and a note containing racial slurs
was found. Gina was taken to the police station, mirandized, and asked further question
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in an interrogation room. Eventually, after about 20 minutes, she confessed to writing the
threat and apologized. Gina was suspended and later expelled. Juvenile charges were also
brought against Gina; however, charges were dropped when a handwriting analyst could
not conclusively determine if Gina was the person who wrote the threat. Gina filed suit
for violation of her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The court ruled in favor of
the school officials and dismissed the student’s claims.]
Pendleton v. Fassett (2009)
[In this case, a high school student (Pendleton) at Brown Street was subjected to a point
of entry search. Pendleton was asked to lift her shirt and brassiere to expose her breasts
and Officer Fisher touched her beneath her breasts. Pendleton also had to lower her pants
and the officer ran her fingers through the waistline of her underwear. No contraband was
found. The student filed a claim for the violation of her Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights. The court found the search to be unreasonable given there was no
individualized suspicion; however, the court gave the officials immunity and dismissed
the student’s claim.]
Wooleyhan v. Cape Henlopen Sch. Dist. (2011)
[In this case, an 18-year-old, high school student (Wooleyhan) was talking with his
girlfriend when a teacher (Jester) told them to go to class. They did not immediately go,
so Jester separated the by placing her arms between them and pushing them apart. The
teacher claimed that Wooleyhan elbowed her in the chest and Wooleyhan denied doing
this. Wooleyhan was arrested as well as suspended. The hallway security did not capture
Wooleyhan elbowing Jester. Wooleyhan was found not guilty of the criminal charges.
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Wooleyhan filed suit against Jester and other school officials. The court dismissed
Wooleyhan’s claims against all school officials except Jester.]
Porter v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd. (2004)
[In this case, a 12-year-old (Andrew) took a drawing pad from his older brother’s (Adam)
room, which had a drawing in it that Adam drew 2 years before in the privacy of his
home. The drawing was of the school in a state of siege with missiles, a gas tanker, and
armed persons. While on the bus, Andrew’s friend flipped through the drawing pad and
found the picture. Andrew’s friend showed the bus driver and pad was turned over to
Principal Wilson at the middle school. School officials at the high school were notified
and Adam was immediately searched. They found a box cutter that he claimed he used at
his after-school job at the local grocery store. Adam was expelled and placed in an
alternative school. Adam eventually dropped out. Adam and Andrew’s mother brought
suit against the school board and superintendent for violation of her son’s First, Fourth,
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The court found that Adam’s drawing could
not be considered a true threat; however, school officials were given qualified immunity
and granted the school board summary judgment.]
Demers v. Leominster Sch. Dep’t. (2003)
[In this case, a 15-year-old student (Demers), in the eighth grade, who had special needs
was talking while in his English class. Demers was asked to leave and went to the
classroom next door. The substitute math teacher in the other room asked Demers to draw
a picture showing how he felt about being kicked out of school. He drew a picture of the
school surrounded by explosives with students hanging out of the windows crying. The
next day, Demers wrote a note with the phrases “I want to die” and “I hate life.” The
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principal met with the student’s father and suspended him after the meeting. He was
suspended for the rest of the school year and placed in an alternative school. The parents
filed a suit for violation of their son’s First Amendment rights. The court found in favor
of the school and dismissed the student’s claims.]
Bundick v. Bay City Indep. Sch. Dist. (2001)
[In this case, a drug sniffing dog alerted to a high school student’s (Bundick) truck.
Bundick was summoned to his truck. Upon searching the toolbox of the truck, police
found a machete among the tools. Bundick was expelled as a result, and he filed suit for
violation of his Fourth Amendment and privacy rights. The court found in favor of the
school and dismissed the student’s claims.]
Butler v. Rio Rancho Pub. Schs. Bd. of Educ. (2003).
[In this case, a high school student (Joshua) borrowed his brother’s car and drove to
school. Joshua parked in the faculty parking lot without a permit. A security guard
noticed the vehicle did not have a permit and upon looking into the car noticed the butt
end of a knife sticking up between the passenger seat and the center console. The security
guard also found a handgun and ammunition in the car, which all belonged to Joshua’s
brother. Joshua was suspended for one school year. Joshua’s parent filed suit, and the
district court found in favor of Joshua. However, the appellate court for the 10th Circuit
found in favor of the school district and reversed and remanded the case.]
DeFabio v. E. Hampton Union Free Sch. Dist. (2009)
[In this case, a Hispanic student at East Hampton High School was killed in an
motorcycle accident. The following Monday was a day of mourning. A tenth grade
student (Daniel) overheard someone say, “one down 40,000 to go,” and he repeated it by
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whispering in a friend’s ear what he heard. Soon word spread that Daniel made the
comment, and several Hispanic students became very upset and started yelling and
threatening Daniel. Daniel was sent home, which he thought was for his safety; however,
he learned that he was suspended. Daniel wanted an opportunity to tell his fellow
students about the misunderstanding but was denied access to the school’s PA system or
a school assembly. Daniel received threatening phone calls at his home. The
superintendent found him guilty of making the comment and suspended him for the
remainder of the year. The family filed suit. The New York State Education
Commissioner overturned the superintendent’s decision and ordered the incident
expunged from Daniel’s record. Upon appeal, the appellate court upheld the school’s
disciplinary actions and dismissed Daniel’s claims that the school violated his First and
Fourteenth Amendment rights.]
Tun v. Fort Wayne Cmty. Sch. (2004)
[In this case, a high school boy (Tun) and his other friends were showering at school after
wrestling practice. Another student, who was a foreign exchange student, came into the
shower and took photographs of them. He developed the film gave Tun the negatives.
Tun was caught looking at the negatives while in photography class and the pictures were
turned over to the principal. Tun was expelled for allowing another student to photograph
him nude. Tun filed suit and the court found that Principal Whitticker and the expulsion
hearing examiner, Judith Platz, were liable for violating Tun’s substantive due process
rights. However, the court dismissed Tun’s claims against the school district, the
photography teacher, the wrestling coach, Whitticker, and Platz for acting in their official
capacities.]
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T.T. v. Bellevue Sch. Dist. (2009)
[In this case, employees at a dental office near Newport High School witnessed a person
with a pipe smoking what they believed to be marijuana on their property. They
contacted the school officials and identified the person as 10th grader, T.T., after looking
at photos in the high school yearbook. T.T. was emergency expelled. T.T.’s mother filed
suit; however, the court upheld the school’s disciplinary action and dismissed T.T.’s
claims.]
S.H. v. Rowland Unified Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. (2005)
[In this case, the Nogales High School band teacher was informed that his car had been
“keyed.” A parent informed the teacher that a high school student (S.H.) had committed
the vandalism with a knife. The campus police officer conducted a pat down of S.H. and
searched his bookbag. The knife was found in S.H.’s bookbag. S.H. was suspended and
later expelled. S.H. file suit against the school, but the court found in favor of the school.]
Jones v. Long County Sch. Dist. (2012)
[In this case, a middle school student (E.J.) was placed in an alternative STAR program
for being insubordinate, disrespectful, and disruptive. E.J. was late to the first day of the
program because his mother overslept. The assistant principal was angered by this an
ordered E.J. to in-school suspension; however, E.J. did not go and hid in a bathroom
instead. When E.J. was discovered he received out-of-school suspension for 3 days for
not doing as he was instructed. E.J. had a dispute with two of the teachers in the STAR
program for disruption and was suspended for another 5 days. E.J.’s mother tried to reenroll him after the suspension, but the principal informed her that he would not be re-
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enrolled until he completed 10 days in the STAR program. His mother filed suit against
the school. The court found in favor of the school and dismissed the student’s claims.]
J.S. v. Blue Mt. Sch. Dist. (2011)
[In this case, an eighth grade student (J.S.) created an internet profile, at her home, of her
principal, which used adult language and sexually explicit content. J.S. was suspended
because the school argued that her web profile disrupted the school’s operation severely.
J.S. and her parents filed suit, and the court ruled in favor of J.S. for the violation of her
First Amendment rights because there was no evidence to lead a reasonable person into
thinking the profile would cause a substantial disruption. However, the court ruled that
the district’s policies were not overbroad or void-for-vagueness, and that the district did
not violate the parent’s Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process rights.]
Boim v. Fulton County Sch. Dist. (2006)
[In this case, a ninth grade student (Rachel) was suspended for writing a violent story
about shooting her math teacher in her notebook. Rachel’s parents filed suit against the
school district for violating her First Amendment rights. The court found in favor of the
school district and dismissed the student’s claims with prejudice.]
Commonwealth v. Smith (2008)
[In this case, a high school student was found in an unauthorized area of the school, and
he was taken to an office to perform a search. The school administrator found a .380
caliber handgun in his jacket. The student was arrested and criminally charged. The
student moved to suppress the weapon because he alleged that his Fourth Amendment
rights were violated. The court found the search to be constitutional.]
J.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist. (2002)
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[In this case, an eighth grade student (J.S.) created a website containing derogatory
content about his school principal and his math teacher on his home computer and posted
it on the internet with a disclaimer. The student revealed the existence of the website to
others and the school officials became aware of it. The principal believed the website
badly disrupted the school. The school did not attempt to get J.S. any type of
psychological evaluation and waited until the school year ended to punish him although
he had taken it down after a couple of weeks. J.S. was first suspended and later expelled.
J.S. filed suit for violation of his First Amendment rights. The court upheld the school
district’s disciplinary action, finding that J.S.’s rights were not violated even though he
conducted the speech off-campus.]
RM v. Washakie County Sch. Dist. No. One (2004)
[In this case, R.M. and B.C. were caught selling marijuana to other students while on
school grounds. Both students were expelled. The juvenile court found them guilty of
delinquency, but ordered the school district to provide the students with continued
educational services while they were expelled because the Wyoming constitution
obligated them to provide free education. The appellate court upheld the school district’s
disciplinary action and found that the school district did not have to provide educational
services for students who had been expelled for bad conduct.]
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